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ABSTRACT 
The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus was the cause of a pandemic of 
avian influenza which affected poultry from most parts of the world. In contrast to 
most Southeast Asian countries where HPAI is endemic, Timor Leste is currently 
free from  HPAI. The  current  study was  designed to  collect  data to  confirm  that 
Timor Leste is actually free from HPAI and to identify potential risk factors that 
might be involved in the introduction of HPAI into the country. Data to confirm 
freedom were collected from various sources, and included biological samples for 
HPAI testing from regions with a high risk of infection. 
The  analysis  of  existing  animal  health  data  (2004  to  2006)  found  that,  with  the 
exception of a survey in June 2004, there was no evidence of HPAI being present in 
Timor Leste. In the survey of June 2004 low titres were found indicating previous 
exposure to HPAI virus (H5 and H7). As only two serological positive samples were 
found and there were no reports of outbreaks of clinical disease typical of HPAI, it is 
likely that the results were false positives. 
As no surveys had been undertaken in Timor Leste since March 2006, as part of the 
current study, targeted surveillance was conducted in July 2009. As all samples were 
negative the findings support the belief that Timor Leste was free from HPAI at the 
time of sample collection. 
Although the country may currently be free from HPAI, the country is at risk of 
having an incursion of HPAI through certain high risk practices. These include the 
smuggling of live chickens, the lack of awareness of HPAI by farmers, a lack of iii 
 
adoption of biosecurity measures by households owning poultry and the extensive 
poultry management system adopted. 
A risk assessment that was conducted as part of this study demonstrated that the 
probability of entry of infection through a smuggled chicken was high. The most 
important factors that would contribute to the entry of HPAI included: an increased 
number of chickens smuggled; increased number of smugglers; and the prevalence 
of AI in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT). On the other hand the risk decreased by: 
strengthening the detection, confiscation, and submission of smuggled birds by the 
Border Police Units (BPU) and by increasing the destruction of smuggled poultry by 
quarantine staff. 
Although  there  were  many  putative  risk  factors  identified  for  HPAI,  it  was 
confirmed that Timor Leste was free from HPAI, however the control measures to 
prevent the introduction of HPAI into the country should be reinforced and target the 
most influential factors identified in this project. 
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CHAPTER 1:  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Brief description of the nature of avian influenza 
Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) may be defined as those epidemic diseases 
which are highly contagious or transmissible, have the potential for rapid spread 
across national borders, and result in serious socio-economic and possibly public 
health consequences (Breeze, 2006).  
Avian influenza (AI) is a transboundary disease of poultry. This disease is a highly 
contagious and devastating disease of domesticated chickens and wild birds which 
can also infect other species including humans (Alexander, 2000; Chotpitayasunondh 
et al., 2005; David et al., 2009). The disease is caused by Avian Influenza viruses 
(AIVs), which belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family (Rappole and Hubalek, 2006).  
Of the birds affected, domestic chickens tend to be more susceptible to AI than do 
other  species  such  as  wild  waterfowl  and  the  latter  are  believed  to  be  potential 
reservoirs  of  the  virus  (Matrosovich  et  al.,  2000).  The  common  method  for 
transmission of AI is via the faecal-oral route (Chen et al., 2006c). The disease can 
be  spread  through  direct  or  indirect  contact  with  infected  birds,  movement  of 
infected poultry, movement of contaminated equipment, fomites, or vehicles, and 
exposure to contaminated infectious organic material and migratory birds  (Capua 
and Marangon, 2006). Once AIVs are transmitted to suitable hosts, the clinical signs 
that follow can vary from mild to severe and the mortality rate can be very high. The 
morbidity and mortality rate varies depending on the species infected and the strain 
of virus involved. The most virulent or highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2 
 
strains include two main sub types (H5 e.g. H5N1 and H7 e.g. H7N3). The HPAI 
H5N1 strain first occurred in 1959 in Scotland (Alexander, 2000). It was detected 
again in Hong Kong in 1997 (Claas et al., 1998; Guan et al., 1999) and then spread 
to many Southeast and East Asian countries in 2003 and early 2004 (Martin et al., 
2006b). The disease then spread rapidly to other parts of the world resulting in a 
significant world-wide pandemic. 
In the past, there have been four well documented pandemics (i.e. Spanish influenza, 
Asian influenza, Hong Kong influenza and Russian influenza) caused by influenza A 
which have claimed many millions of human lives (Webster et al., 1992; Reid et al., 
1999;  Baigent  and  McCauley,  2003;  Ligon,  2005).  Recently  (2009),  another 
pandemic called ―pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus‖ was declared by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) (Echevarria-Zuno et al., 2009), however this pandemic 
was declared over in August 2010 (CIDRAP, 2010).  
Outbreaks of HPAI can have a huge economic impact and cause significant health 
risks. This can be as a result of high mortality from the disease, slaughter of birds to 
control the spread of the disease, the costs associated with the veterinary services 
necessary  to  detect,  confirm  and  eradicate  the  disease  and  the  restriction  and 
disruption on the trade of chickens and their products (Lu et al., 2003b) both locally 
and internationally. The impact of AI can be significant on subsistence farmers in 
developing nations such as Timor Leste. This is because in such countries poultry are 
an important source of income as well as a major protein source to households. 
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1.2  HPAI status in Timor Leste 
Historically  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  has  never  been  reported  in  Timor  Leste 
(FAOAIDE, 2010b) and consequently it is regarded as an exotic disease. Due to this 
fact,  some  surveys  were  conducted  between  2000  and  2006  by  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) Timor  Leste with assistance from the Northern 
Australian Quarantine Services (NAQS). The aim of these surveys was to monitor 
the presence of AI in general and HPAI H5N1 in particular. 
The monitoring for AI is important because geographically Timor Leste is bordered 
by Indonesia, where HPAI is endemic. This significantly increases the risk of an 
outbreak of HPAI in Timor Leste. Consequently a risk assessment of AI is needed to 
identify  risk  factors  that  might  contribute  to  the  introduction  of  HPAI  into  the 
country and to confirm that the country is indeed free from HPAI. To identify risk 
factors and to confirm the status of HPAI in Timor Leste a survey based on sound 
epidemiological principles was required and this forms the basis of this thesis.  
1.3  Scientific contribution of HPAI risk assessment in Timor 
Leste 
Once a country is infected, to revert to disease-free status requires expenditure of 
significant expense in implementing control measures (Ziller et al., 2002). Therefore 
maintaining AI free status is a high priority for Timor Leste. 
There are significant benefits in maintaining free zone status for AI and for early 
detection of an incursion to minimize the risk of the disease spreading widely and 
becoming endemic. These benefits will be seen at the regional, national and local 
levels. At the national and local levels, East Timorese will enjoy the freedom of 
exporting chicken and chicken products to other areas and not having to live with 4 
 
concerns over the risk of humans becoming infected. At the regional level, freedom 
of AI will help stop the spread of the disease to other neighbouring AI free regions. 
The use of risk assessment through a risk based surveillance approach would help 
Timor Leste in the implementation of a surveillance program for AI. This approach 
would increase the capacity of the livestock authorities to focus on the real threat of 
AI, to properly identify high risk areas and to manage any risks appropriately. 
1.4  Aims of this thesis 
The general aim of this thesis is to help protect Timor Leste from the threat of AI by 
conducting  risk  assessment  for  AI  to  ensure  that  free  zone  status  for  AI  can  be 
demonstrated and to ensure early detection of disease to minimise the risk of any 
incursion  becoming  endemic.  Specifically  this  thesis  will  help  demonstrate  the 
countries  freedom  from HPAI  and will involve identification of risk factors that 
might be involved in the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste. 
1.5  Thesis structure  
In order to achieve these aims, this thesis is presented in ten chapters. 
 Chapter 1 General introduction. This provides a brief introduction on the 
nature of HPAI and the HPAI status in Timor Leste in particular. It also 
provides the aims and structure of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2. Literature review. In this chapter the history and the nature of AI 
and  in  particular  HPAI  are  reviewed.  The  clinical  description,  control, 
eradication and distribution of the disease are also discussed. 5 
 
 Chapter  3.  Production  system  and  market  chain  for  poultry  in  Timor 
Leste. This chapter describes and evaluates the poultry industry in Timor 
Leste and the marketing of poultry and their products in Timor Leste. 
 Chapter  4.  Development  of  models  to  estimate  the  number  of  village 
chickens in Timor Leste. In this chapter the village chicken population is 
estimated through the development of a computer model. The results of this 
chapter  were  then  used  to  provide  data  on  the  current  village  chicken 
population. 
 Chapter  5.  Analysis  of  existing  surveillance  data  on  avian  influenza  in 
Timor Leste. This chapter provides the results of analyses of existing sero-
surveillance data on AI in Timor Leste using descriptive statistics to provide 
and support evidence of HPAI freedom in the country. 
 Chapter 6. Analysis of factors that have the potential to be involved in the 
introduction of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) into Timor 
Leste. In this chapter the results of field observations and questionnaires and 
existing literature, are used to identify regions and districts where outbreaks 
may  occur.  In  this  chapter  risk  pathways  that  may  be  involved  in  HPAI 
introduction are identified. 
 Chapter 7. A targeted serological survey to demonstrate Timor Leste is 
free from Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. This chapter provides the 
results of samples collected from free range ducks and village chickens in 
identified high-risk villages in Timor Leste to confirm the countries freedom 
from HPAI. 
 Chapter  8.  Analysis  of  risk  factors  that  may  be  involved  in  the 
introduction of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) into Timor 6 
 
Leste: based on targeted surveillance. Analysis of risk factors that might be 
involved in the introduction of HPAI based on questionnaire surveys with 
farmers during the targeted surveillance to demonstrate freedom from HPAI 
are reported in this chapter. 
 Chapter  9.  Risk  assessment  of  the  entry  and  establishment  of  Highly 
Pathogenic  Avian  Influenza  (HPAI)  into  Timor  Leste.  This  chapter 
provides  a  risk  assessment  of  HPAI  entering  Timor  Leste  through  the 
smuggling of fighting cocks resulting in a disease outbreak. 
 Chapter 10. General discussion and conclusion. In this chapter the results 
supporting the evidence for HPAI freedom in Timor Leste are discussed. The 
general conclusions summarise the main points of the preceding chapters. 
In the following chapter the literature on AI is reviewed. This and subsequent 
chapters concentrate on HPAI. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
The  word  influenza  originated  from  the  Latin  word  ―influencia‖,  meaning  to 
influence. Originally it was thought that the disease was caused by a bad influence 
from the heavens or through astrological influence (Broxmeyer, 2006; Stallknecht et 
al.,  2007).  This  latter  belief  alluded  to  the  idea  that  influenza  was  a  fluid  or 
emanation given off by certain stars that governed human affairs. Subsequently it 
was shown that the disease was the result of viral infection (Wallensten, 2006). 
There are three genera (A, B and C) of influenza virus. Avian Influenza, which will 
be discussed in this thesis, refers to Influenza A, especially HPAI such as H5N1. 
This  strain  has  the  potential  to  lead  to  the  next  influenza  pandemic  in  humans 
(Auewarakul,  2007;  Peiris  et  al.,  2007),  has  implications  for  international  trade 
(Sabirovic et al., 2004; Lupiani and Reddy, 2005) and is of greatest concern for 
human health due to the severity of the resultant disease and its high case fatality rate 
(Lee and Lau, 2007).  
History  has  recorded  many  epidemics  and  pandemics  of  influenza  in  humans 
occurring as early as 412 BC. Between the 18
th and 19
th century, 25 severe disease 
epidemics occurred, approximately half of which were due to influenza (Ghendon, 
1994). In the 20
th and 21
st centuries there have been five well documented pandemics 
caused  by  influenza  A,  which  have  claimed  many  millions  of  human  lives.  The 
Spanish influenza (1918-1919) due to H1N1 claimed between 20 and 50 million 
lives (Reid et al., 1999; Reid and Taubenberger, 2003; Oxford et al., 2005). Asian 8 
 
influenza  caused  by  H2N2  claimed  more  than  one  million  lives  in  1957-1958 
(Baigent and McCauley, 2003). Hong Kong influenza in 1968-1969, which was due 
to  H3N2  (Ligon,  2005),  resulted  in  the  deaths  of  between  one  and  four  million 
people  (Kraabøl,  2006),  the  Russian  influenza  in  1977  was  caused  by  the  re-
emergence  of  H1N1  (Webster  et  al.,  1992)  and  the  2009  pandemic  influenza  A 
(H1N1) virus, which was first reported in Mexico in April 2009, was due to a novel 
H1N1 Influenza A virus (Echevarria-Zuno et al., 2009). The disease spread very 
quickly and within 3 months there were more than 5,000 hospitalizations and 300 
deaths in the USA alone (Reed et al., 2009). This latest pandemic was declared over 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) on the 10
th of August 2010 (CIDRAP, 
2010). 
Pandemics of AI in animals have resulted in economic loss through the culling of 
millions of birds. For example, 16,000,000 in Italy from H7N1; 5,000,000 in the 
United States of America (USA) in 2002 (H7N2); 30,000,000 in the Netherlands in 
2003 (H7N7); and 17,000,000 in Canada in 2004 (H7N3) (Capua and Marangon, 
2007). 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza is a disease capable of causing extremely high (up 
to 100%) mortality rates in poultry (Capua and Mutinelli, 2001; Capua et al., 2002; 
Alexander  and  Koch,  2009)  and  a  high  case  fatality  rate  (CFR)  in  humans.  For 
instance, from 2003 to 15 May 2010 more than 490 laboratory-confirmed cases of 
human infection were reported to WHO, with a CFR of 59% (FAOAIDE, 2010f; 
WHO, 2010). 
Due to the importance of AI on international trade, its impact on public health and on 
the economy, in this chapter a broad range of information on AI, especially the HPAI 9 
 
viruses  is  reviewed.  The  epidemiology,  clinical  description  and  control  and 
eradication are discussed. The literature review concludes with a brief discussion on 
the HPAI status in Timor Leste.  
2.2  Epidemiology 
2.2.1   Aetiology  
Influenza A was first described by Eduardo Perroncito in 1878 in Italy (Wallensten, 
2006) where it had been endemic for approximately 50 years (UCHCPD, 2000) and 
was known as fowl plague (Alexander, 2000). Over 20 years later in 1901 two other 
Italian scientists (Centanni and Savonuzzi) identified fowl plague as a viral disease 
(Wallensten, 2006). The viral disease is now known to be caused by influenza A 
viruses, which are negatively-stranded RNA viruses of the family Orthomyxoviridae 
(Rappole and Hubalek, 2006; Tracey et al., 2006).  
The family influenza virus is  classified into 3 types  (A, B  and C) based on the 
antigenic character of the internal  nucleoprotein (NP) antigen and  matrix protein 
(M1) (Alexander, 1982; Murphy et al., 1999; Van Regenmortel et al., 2000; Condit, 
2001; Tracey et al., 2004; WHO, 2007). 
All  AIV  are  type  A  viruses.  Influenza  A  viruses  are  made  up  of  a  protein  coat 
(capsid)  that  protects  the  viral  genome,  a  single  strand  of  RNA  split  into  eight 
segments, each carrying a single gene. The eight gene segments of influenza A virus 
encode 10 polypeptide proteins (HA, NA, matrix proteins M2 and
 M1, nonstructural 
(NS) proteins (NS1 and NS2), the nucleocapsid,
 and the three polymerases, PB1 
(polymerase basic 1), PB2,
 and PA (polymerase acidic) proteins) (Webster et al., 
1992). 10 
 
Of the 10 proteins encoded, HA and NA are the most important. Haemagglutinin 
(HA) is a surface antigen that the virus uses to bind to and break into host cells. 
Neuraminidase (NA) is another surface antigen, which helps newly formed virus 
escape to infect other cells (Nicholls, 2006). Of the 10 proteins, there are three viral 
proteins that contribute to the pathogenicity of pandemic-causing influenza viruses: 
HA, the RNA polymerase protein complex (PA, PB1 and PB2) and the viral non-
structural protein NS1 (Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2005). 
There are two main methods for classifying influenza A viruses. These are based on 
their antigenicity (16 major H-types and nine major N types) or their pathogenicity 
(Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2001; Lee et al., 2004; Bennett and Whiting, 2006). The 
HPAI viruses, which have caused major outbreaks in poultry, mostly belong to the 
H5 and H7 strains, although not all H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic (Koch 
and Elbers, 2006).  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza can emerge from mutation and recombination of 
lowly  pathogenicity  of  avian  influenza  (LPAI).  The  switch  from  LPAI  virus 
phenotype to HPAI phenotype is achieved by the introduction of basic amino acid 
residues into the HA0 cleavage site of the polypeptide precursor of the HA that 
facilitates systemic virus replication (Olsen et al., 2006). For instance an epidemic in 
Italy caused by H7N1 began with low pathogenicity but mutated within nine months 
to  be  highly  pathogenic  (Webster  et  al.,  1992).  Recently  in  North  America 
researchers found H5 AIV
 of
 wild bird origin with low pathogenicity. Such wild bird 
adapted viruses are antigenically
 and genetically distinct from the highly pathogenic 
Asian H5N1
 virus lineage (Spackman et al., 2007). 
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2.2.2  Differentiation of LPAI and HPAI 
The  LPAI  and  HPAI  can be differentiated on  the cleavability  of HA0 precursor 
virus‘  proteins  by  host  proteases  for  transitional  cleavage  (Zepeda  and  Salman, 
2007). Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza viruses have a series of basic amino acids 
(e.g. furin and PC6) at the cleavage site, whereas LPAI viruses have a single basic 
amino acid (trypsin like enzyme) at that site. Replication sites for LPAI mainly occur 
in the respiratory and intestinal tracts but in HPAI the replication occurs throughout 
the body (Horimoto et al., 1994; Perkins et al., 2002; Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2005; 
Koch and Elbers, 2006). 
Due  to  the  fact  that  avian  influenza  viruses  (AIVs)  have  a  segmented  genome 
(Belshe, 2005), they can evolve and can change from LPAI to HPAI. The discussion 
on how it has evolved is described in the following sections.  
2.2.3  The evolution of the AI viruses 
Pandemics in the 20th century have involved viruses with only three haemagglutinin 
(HA) subtypes (H1-3) and two neuraminidase (NA) subtypes (N1-2). It is believed 
that these viruses have adapted to humans by reassortment of the HA and NA gene 
segments between avian and human viruses via infection of a common host (Stevens 
et al., 2006a). The current outbreak (from 2003) of HPAI, however has been limited 
to H5 and H7 subtypes (Webster et al., 1992). This is because some subtypes of 
influenza  A  viruses,  such  as  H5  [e.g.  A/chicken/Scotland/59  (H5N1, 
A/turkey/England/50-92/91 (H5N1 and A/chicken/Hong Kong/97 (H5N1)] and H7 
[e.g. A/turkey/England/63 (H7N3, A/turkey/Italy/99 (H7N1 and A/chicken/NSW/97 
(H7N4)] (Alexander, 2000; Bennett and Whiting, 2006), may shift from being lowly 
pathogenic to highly pathogenic strains in poultry species  (Alexander, 2000) and 12 
 
subsequently cause outbreaks of HPAI. There have been three known outbreaks of 
HPAI which have originated from LPAI, all involving H5N2, i.e. Pennsylvania in 
1983–84, Mexico in 1994–1995, and Italy in 1999–2000 (Bean et al., 1985; Garcia 
et al., 1996; van der Goot et al., 2003b). 
There are two reasons for AIV to evolve rapidly. Firstly, it has a segmented genome 
which  allows  each  influenza  A  virus  to  exchange  genetic
  material  with  other 
influenza A viruses (Belshe, 2005). Secondly, it lacks a proof reading or an error 
correction mechanism (Zambon, 1999). There are two mechanisms which lead to the 
evolution  of  influenza  virus:  evolution  of  the  virus  surface  (antigenic  shift)  and 
reassortment of the segment viruses (antigenic drift) (Zambon, 1999) and the reasons 
for strain variations will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.2.3.1  Antigenic drift of the surface of influenza virus or point mutation  
All type A influenza viruses may undergo antigenic drift (Rothstein, 2005), which is 
responsible  for  most  of  the  strain  variation  (Varghese,  1999).  Antigenic  drift  is 
caused by gradual change in the antigenicity of the HA and NA proteins through 
amino  acid  changes  that  affect  the  antibody  epitopes.  It  is  a  progressive 
accumulation of individual mutations resulting in the gradual decline in the intensity 
of the antibody response (Muzaffar et al., 2006). This occurs if the genes encoding 
the viral surface antigens (NA and HA) undergo stepwise mutation every time the 
virus replicates. Eventually these proteins become sufficiently different so that the 
host cannot neutralise the virus, resulting in disease (Zambon, 1999). 
Influenza virus is an RNA virus (Section 2.2.1). As the virus replicates, it makes 
mistakes  in  proof-reading  (Stephenson  and  Zambon,  2002).  This  is  because 13 
 
replication  of  the  influenza  genome  requires  RNA  polymerase  activity,  but  this 
enzyme  lacks  proof-reading  ability  and  has  limited  potential  to  correct  mistakes 
during RNA transcription, resulting in a high frequency of mutations in any newly 
replicated  virus  population  (Stephenson  and  Zambon,  2002).  These  mistakes  can 
make a virus hard to defeat as the body has to change its immune response to fight 
the new variant. 
2.2.3.2  Reassortment  of  the  segmented  genome  (antigenic  shift  /  genetic 
reassortment) 
Unlike antigenic drift, antigenic shift occurs infrequently, but when it does occur an 
entirely  new  gene  for  a  surface  glycoprotein  is  generated  which  is  significantly 
different (~50%) in amino acid sequence from the parent virus (Varghese, 1999). 
Antigenic shift occurs due to the fact that influenza A viruses have eight separate 
gene segments. The segmented nature of the genome enables influenza A viruses to 
swap genetic material and fuse with other viruses and cause evolution by a process 
called genetic reassortment/antigenic shift, i.e. the mixing of genes from two or more 
influenza viruses (Olsen et al., 2006). This may occur through two ways. Firstly by 
simultaneous infection by two different virus subtypes in one host (e.g. a pig) that 
may allow viruses to mix genetic material resulting in the emergence of a new virus 
with  novel  surface  and  internal  proteins  (Stephenson  and  Zambon,  2002;  CDC, 
2005;  Donis,  2005;  Rothstein,  2005;  Muzaffar  et  al.,  2006).  This  results  in 
significant changes  in  the virus, producing a new subtype that differs  from  both 
parent viruses (Zambon, 1999). This virus may be able to infect humans and spread 
from  person  to  person  and  would  have  surface  proteins  (HA  and/or  NA)  not 
previously  seen  in  influenza  viruses  infecting  humans  (CDC,  2005).  Secondly, 
antigenic shift can result from an influenza virus acquiring a new HA and usually a 14 
 
new NA, which can arise from genetic reassortment of an existing non-avian host 
virus with a bird virus that provides the new HA and NA genes (Hunt, 2009). To 
date four shifts have been reported: 1889, 1918, 1957 and 1968 (Taubenberge and 
Morens,  2006;  Taubenberger,  2006).  Any  combination  of  HA  and  NA  (through 
genetic reassortment) can create new strains of influenza A viruses, however not all 
new strains arising from genetic reassortment are pathogenic (Murphy et al., 1999). 
The 1957 (H2N2 "Asian"
 virus) and 1968 (H3N2 "Hong Kong" virus) pandemics 
originated from reassortment of avian and human viruses (Matrosovich et al., 2000; 
Thompson  et  al.,  2006).  Genes  encoding  for  the  HA  and  polymerase  1  (PB1) 
proteins of Asian and 1968 Hong Kong viruses and the enzyme NA of the Asian 
strain were acquired from a Eurasian AIV; the other genes were all obtained from the 
human influenza virus circulating at that time (Webster, 2001). The pandemic in 
1918-1919 was thought to be due to the mixing of different animal species, such as 
horses, pigs and live birds, in a military compound, and then subsequent contact with 
soldiers (Oxford et al., 2005).  
2.2.4  Host range 
Most  influenza  viruses  are  species  specific  and  usually  do  not  cross  species 
boundaries. This is related to host cell receptors which differ between avian species 
and mammals. Therefore, in order for an AIV to infect non-avian species the virus 
has  to  first  mutate  (Behrens  and  Stoll,  2006).  Lessons  learnt  from  the  Spanish 
influenza (Reid et al., 1999; Reid and Taubenberger, 2003; Oxford et al., 2005) and 
recent outbreaks in Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian countries show that the 
species barriers for human and avian influenza viruses may be permeable, therefore a 
straight  transmission  of  virulent  strains  from  birds  to  humans  is  possible 15 
 
(Kristensson, 2006). Avian influenza viruses have been isolated from a range of non-
avian species including humans (Subbarao and Katz, 2000; Chotpitayasunondh et 
al., 2005), cats (Kuiken et al., 2004; Leschnik et al., 2007; Thiry et al., 2007), dogs 
(Butler, 2006; Songserm et al., 2006b), tigers and leopards (Keawcharoen et al., 
2004), pigs (Karasin et al., 2000), seals, horses and whales (CDC, 2005). However, 
the main hosts for AI are birds (both wild and domesticated), pigs and humans.  
Pigs are an important host in the ecology of the virus since they are susceptible to 
infection  with  both  avian  and  human  influenza  A  viruses  (Brown,  2000). 
Consequently they can act as a mixing vessel to create new reassortments that have 
the  potential  to  infect  humans  (Fouchier  et  al.,  2003b).  Birds,  especially  wild 
waterfowl, are important because they can harbour and act as the natural reservoirs 
for influenza A viruses of all known HA and NA
 subtypes (Matrosovich et al., 2000; 
Nguyen et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2006a). 
Despite  the  fact  that  AIV  can  infect  many  species,  most  outbreaks  of  AI  have 
occurred in domesticated birds, with only a few outbreaks having occurred in wild 
birds. An outbreak of HPAI in wild birds was first documented in 1961 in South 
Africa in a common tern (Sterna hirundo) (virus H5N3 - A/tern/South Africa/61 
(Becker, 1966; Olsen et al., 2006). Another outbreak of HPAI (H5N1) occurred in 
wild birds at Qinghai Lake in China, where more than 6,000 birds (Mundkur, 2006) 
of a range of species died (such as  great black-headed gulls (Larus ichthyaetus), 
brown-headed gulls (Larus brunnicephalus), bar-headed geese (Anser indicus), great 
cormorants  (Phalacrocorax  carbo),  Chinese  egret  (Egretta  eulophotes),  common 
merganser  (Mergus  merganser),  great  white  egret  (Casmerodius  albus),  Eurasian 
wigeon (Anas penelope), ruddy shelduck (Tadorna ferruginea), black-necked cranes 16 
 
(Grus nigricollis) and bar-headed geese (A. indicus)) (Liu et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2006a; EMPRES, 2006). 
Avian influenza viruses have been isolated from 12 bird orders, but most isolations 
are from the orders of Anseriformes (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988) (in particular in 
the family Anatidae: ducks, swans, geese) and Charadriiformes (shore birds, gulls, 
terns) (Gilbert et al., 2006). Wild birds that can be infected with HPAI H5N1 include 
the great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus), mute swan (Cygnus olor), mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) and wild ducks (Anas sp.), little egret (Egretta garzetta) (Rappole 
and Hubalek, 2006), red-crested pochard (Netta rufina), wood duck (Aix sponsa), 
black-necked  Swan  (Cygnus  melanocoryphus),  and  coscoroba  swan  (Coscoroba 
coscoroba) (Ellis et al., 2004a). The virus has also been isolated from a range of 
other  birds  including  sparrows  (Passer  montanus)  (Kou  et  al.,  2005),  European 
starlings (Sternus vulgaris), pigeons (Columbia livia f. domestica) (Klopfleisch et al., 
2006), parakeets (Psitticula spp.) (Mase et al., 2001) and budgerigars (Melopsittacus 
undulates) (Perkins and Swayne, 2003b). 
2.2.5  Transmission 
2.2.5.1  Virus excretion and route of transmission 
Depending  on  the  species  affected,  excretion  of  virus  normally  occurs  via  the 
respiratory and intestinal tract. Generally in birds the virus is shed in larger numbers 
in the faeces as it preferentially infects cells lining the intestinal tract (Fouchier et al., 
2003b; EFSA, 2006; Olsen et al., 2006) and therefore transmission between hosts 
occurs mainly by faecal contamination of shared water or food. Concentration of 
AIV in the faeces of birds varies from 10
8 EID50 to 10
9 EID50 /g and virus can be 
excreted in the faeces, saliva and nasal secretions (Rappole and Hubalek, 2006). In 17 
 
contrast, human viruses mainly attack the respiratory tract and are shed in respiratory 
discharges/secretions (Rappole and Hubalek, 2006). 
The length and amount of virus excretion differs according to the pathogenicity of 
the virus strain. Virus excretion can be as short as two days post-infection (pi) or as 
long as 17 days pi. For instance, viruses that are classified as highly pathogenic for 
mallard ducks were excreted for up to 17 days post challenge, whereas those of low 
pathogenicity  ceased  to  be  excreted  within  10 days  pi  (Lu  et  al.,  2003a;  EFSA, 
2006).  
Transmission also can occur via manure in the soil, because chicken manure is often 
spread onto fields as fertiliser and then ploughed in, which favours the survival of 
the AIV. The virus has been shown to survive in wet manure within a barn for up to 
105 days (Fitchner, 1987). Another route of transmission is via infected carcasses. 
After experimental challenge HPAI viruses have been isolated from chicken meat. 
For example using HPAI (H5/HP/83 and H5/HP/03) researchers could detect virus at 
concentrations of 10
2.7–3.2 and 10
7.3 EID50/g in breast and thigh meat, respectively 
(Swayne and Beck, 2005). 
2.2.5.2  AI Reservoirs and its prevalence 
It has long been known that wild birds are a reservoir for all influenza viruses. The 
natural reservoirs of influenza A viruses are wild aquatic birds (ducks, terns and 
shore birds) (Brown, 2000; Matrosovich et al., 2000; Bennett and Whiting, 2006) 
which can harbour viruses of all HA and NA subtypes and their combinations (de 
Marco  et  al.,  2003;  Koch  et  al.,  2009).  However,  the  actual  percentage  of  wild 
waterfowl infected with AIV is low with an average of 13% (ranges from 0.4 to 18 
 
45%) (Stallknecht et al., 1990; Sharp et al., 1993; Alfonso et al., 1995; de Marco et 
al.,  2003;  Sabirovic  et  al.,  2004;  de  Marco  et  al.,  2005;  Olsen  et  al.,  2006; 
Lebarbenchon et al., 2007; Stallknecht and Brown, 2007). In contrast to waterfowl, 
in chickens the prevalence varies from 50 to >80% (UCHCPD, 2000; Capua and 
Mutinelli,  2001;  Capua  et  al.,  2002;  Seo  and  Kim,  2004;  Al-Natour  and  Abo-
Shehada, 2005). 
The low prevalence in waterfowl (ducks) is probably due to several reasons. Firstly, 
the fact that they are born with an influenza-fighting gene (RIG-I) that chickens do 
not  have  (Barber  et  al., 2010).  Secondly, the avirulent  nature of  avian influenza 
infection  in  ducks  may  be  the  result  of  virus  adaptation  to  this  host  over  many 
centuries (Webster et al., 1992; Hulse-Post et al., 2005). Alternatively, waterfowl 
may lack a ubiquitous protease(s) that enables cleavage necessary for viral activation 
(Capua and Mutinelli, 2001). 
The prevalence of influenza A depends  on the age, season  and species  affected. 
Young naïve birds are susceptible to infection (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988). For 
instance,  a  study  in  wild  ducks  in  the  Northern  Hemisphere  revealed  a  high 
prevalence of LPAI in young, immunologically naïve birds (Olsen et al., 2006). The 
season  can  also  influence the prevalence of  Influenza A virus. For  example, the 
prevalence of LPAI in wild ducks in the Northern Hemisphere, was found to be 
higher in early winter, whilst in gulls the prevalence was higher during late summer 
and early autumn (Olsen et al., 2006). In ducks, it has been found that the most 
prevalent virus types are H3N8, H6N2 and H4N6 with co-infection amongst wild 
ducks occurring at a rate of 11 to 32% (Sharp et al., 1997).  19 
 
Infected wild waterfowl tend to be asymptomatic and become reservoirs for AIV. 
This  is  probably  because  they  are  natural  hosts  of  LPAI,  which  enable  them  to 
develop immunity against HPAI. Researchers found that transmission of HPAI was 
reduced in a population that had previously experienced LPAI (Van der Goot et al., 
2003a). However, recent findings in Hong Kong demonstrated that H5N1 can be 
highly pathogenic for ducks (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004; IRIN, 2008a). 
2.2.5.3  Interspecies transmission 
2.2.5.3.1  Transmission amongst waterfowl 
There  are  several  factors  that  influence  whether  a  host  will  become  infected. 
According to Wallensten (2006), for an infection to occur, there must be sufficient 
contact between the host and pathogen. Transmission amongst waterfowl may occur 
via several routes. These include: intestinal (faecal-oral route, faecal-water-oral from 
ingestion  of  water,  and  cloacal  uptake  of  water)  (Sturm-Ramirez  et  al.,  2004), 
respiratory, and reproductive (during copulation or egg development in the magnum) 
(Markwell and Shortridge, 1982). This is because the virus can survive in water for a 
long time, e.g. it can survive in lake water for four days at 22°C and more than 30 
days at 0°C (Webster et al., 1992; Wallensten, 2006). Consequently waterfowl have 
a very efficient way to transmit viruses (Webster et al., 1992) to one another.  
Migratory ducks can also shed the virus as they migrate through an area potentially 
spreading  the  virus  to  other  domesticated  and  wild  birds  (Webster  et  al.,  1992; 
Gaidet et al., 2008; Keawcharoen et al., 2008). For example, most migrant birds 
from Southeast Asia, Siberia, Australia and New Zealand usually stop and breed at 
Qinghai Lake (Liu et al., 2005). An outbreak of H5N1 in birds on this lake was 
believed to have been related to the migration of birds.  20 
 
2.2.5.3.2  Transmission from wild waterfowl to domestic poultry 
In  wild  waterfowl,  AIV  replicates  in  the  cells  lining  the  intestinal  tract  and  is 
excreted in high concentrations in the faeces (up to 10
8.7 
EID50/g) (Webster, 1998). 
Therefore, the spread of AIV from wild birds to free ranging poultry mostly occurs 
through the faecal-oral route (Fouchier et al., 2003a; Chen et al., 2006a). 
However  the  role  of  migratory  waterfowl  in  spreading  avian  influenza  has  been 
questioned by some authors, despite the fact that H5N1 has been isolated from wild 
birds  in  China  (Chen  et  al.,  2005)  and  West  Siberia  (L'Vov  et  al.,  2006).  This 
uncertainty is because it is not clear whether infected wild waterfowl can fly long 
distances once they are infected. Some researchers, therefore argue that wild birds 
infected  with  HPAI  virus  may  have  been  infected  locally  rather  than  elsewhere 
(Feare and Yasué, 2006). 
However, there is evidence to support the transmission of HPAI from wild birds to 
domestic poultry through phylogenetic analysis of H5N1 from western Siberia. This 
is based on the fact that there is a close genetic relationship between the H5N1 
strains  isolated  from  poultry  and  wild  migratory  waterfowl  from  Qinghai  Lake 
(Lipatov et al., 2007). These authors demonstrated that the genetics of HPAI H5N1 
from poultry in western Siberia had more than 99% nucleotide similarity with the 
A/barheaded goose/Qinghai/0510/2005 (H5N1). 
Domesticated  waterfowl  are  also  believed  to  be  a  source  of  AIV  for  domestic 
chickens.  For  example  the  H5N1  Korean  HPAI  virus  isolates  from  chickens 
(A/CK/Korea/ES/03)  and  domestic  ducks  (DK/  Korea/EDS1/03)  were  almost 
genetically identical (99.8% nucleotide similarity) (Lee et al., 2005) indicating that 21 
 
they are either infecting each other or are infected from the same source. In Korea all 
of  the  2006–2007  H5N1  subtype  isolates  were  QH/05-like  strains,  which  were 
similar to isolates from wild birds in the local region (Lee et al., 2008), suggesting 
that wild birds may have been the source of infection for domestic poultry (chickens 
and ducks) during that period.  
The  occurrence  of  highly  pathogenic  H5N1  AIV  infection  in  migrant  waterfowl 
indicates that this virus has the potential to be a global threat (Liu et al., 2005). In 
southern China apparently healthy migratory birds were found to be infected with 
H5N1 immediately prior to their migration (Chen et al., 2006a). If birds are infected, 
but  do  not  show  clinical  signs  before  migrating,  it  is  possible  that  they  might 
disseminate the viruses over vast areas of the world (Easterday et al., 1968). 
A study using satellite tracking of a female garganey (Anas querquedula) indicates 
that they can fly over 2,000 km in two days without stopping (Gaidet et al., 2008). A 
recent  study  using  the  same  method  on  228  birds  from  19  species  of  wildfowl 
indicates that individual wildfowl can fly up to 3000 km within four days (Gaidet et 
al., 2010). If a bird was sub clinically infected, it could potentially distribute HPAI 
over a vast distance in a short time. As challenged ducks have been shown to shed 
BH goose/QH/65/05 virus for up to seven days (Chen et al., 2006b), there is the 
potential for rapid dissemination of virus. Furthermore in Europe infected wild birds 
have  been  detected  in  several  countries  without  reports  of  outbreaks  in  poultry, 
thereby  supporting  the  role  of  wild  birds  distributing  virus  (Olsen  et  al.,  2006). 
However the role of wild birds in the dispersal of HPAI H5N1 however remains 
controversial (Fouchier et al., 2006; Rappole and Hubalek, 2006). As HPAI virus is 
rarely  isolated  from  wild  birds,  and  the  domestic  poultry  farm  favours  the 22 
 
proliferation and dissemination of the virus, some authors believe that HPAI arises 
from domestic farms and is spread between farms by human activities (Newman et 
al., 2007) not by wild birds. Furthermore mutation of LPAI virus to HPAI has also 
appeared after introduction of the virus to domesticated birds (Bennett and Whiting, 
2006), which supports the idea that HPAI evolved from LPAI in domestic poultry. 
2.2.5.3.3  Transmission from chickens to humans 
Previously  it  was  thought  that  transmission  of  virus  from  birds  to  humans  was 
unlikely  (Reid  and  Taubenberger,  2003;  Kuiken  et  al.,  2006).  However,  lessons 
learnt from the Spanish influenza and recent outbreaks in Asian countries, e.g. the 
outbreak  in  Hong  Kong  in  1997  where  six  people  died  (Gorman,  1997),  would 
indicate that reassortment between human and avian strains is possible and direct 
spread  of  highly  pathogenic  viral  strains  from  birds  to  humans  is  also  probable 
(Kristensson, 2006). 
Avian influenza A viruses may be transmitted from animals to humans in two main 
ways:  directly  from  a  bird  or  indirectly  through  a  contaminated  environment  or 
intermediate host, such as a pig (OIE, 2002). Analyses of several human outbreaks in 
countries such as Hong Kong, Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Egypt have indicated the 
potential for direct infection of humans from sick domestic poultry (Webster, 2001) 
and  probably  also  wild  birds  (ECDC,  2006).  In  Azerbaijan,  for  instance,  seven 
human cases were thought to result from defeathering a dead swan (direct contact) 
(WHO, 2006). In Indonesia, where more than 100 human cases have been reported, 
most victims had a history of contact with sick poultry (FAO, 2006a; Sedyaningsih 
et al., 2008; FAOAIDE, 2010c). Similarly, 12 confirmed H5N1 cases in Thailand 
also had a history of contact with sick or dead chickens (Chotpitayasunondh et al., 23 
 
2005) and nine out of 10 patients in Vietnam (Hien et al., 2004) had a history of 
touching sick birds (Anonymous, 2004a). Furthermore, the H5N1 outbreak in Hong 
Kong in 1997 was due to direct contact with sick chickens (Gorman, 1997; Mounts 
et al., 1999; Chan, 2002).  
The belief that transmission from chickens to humans is possible was based firstly on 
serological data, which showed that all eight RNA segments were derived from an 
avian influenza A virus (Subbarao et al., 1998); and secondly, from the finding that 
the  sequence  comparisons  of  all  eight  RNA  segments  from  human  and  chicken 
viruses (HK/156 and CK/HK/220 H5N1 influenza viruses) showed greater than 99% 
sequence  identity,  indicating  that  they  had  a  closely
  related  common  ancestor 
(Suarez et al., 1998). In addition, a H5N1 virus isolate from a human, A/HK/156/97, 
displayed the receptor-binding
 properties typical of avian but not of human viruses 
(Matrosovich et al., 1999). These similarities indicate that it is unlikely that another 
mammal had acted as an intermediate host or ―mixing vessel‖ in these instances, but 
that direct transmission had occurred (Claas et al., 1998). 
Several strains of HPAI are known to infect humans: H5N1, H7N3, H7N7 and H9N2 
(Lee and  Lau, 2007).  Being in contact  with  infected birds has  been the primary 
source of influenza A (H5N1) infections in humans in Asia. Direct contact with 
poultry  such  as  handling  fighting  cocks;  playing  with  poultry,  particularly 
subclinically  infected  ducks;  and  consumption  of  duck  blood  or  possibly 
undercooked poultry products have all been implicated in infection of people with 
H5N1 (Beigel et al., 2005). 
The transmission of AIV from domestic chickens to humans has been documented 
for more than 50 years. For example, the strains of the 1957 Asian and 1968 Hong 24 
 
Kong pandemics had HAs derived from an avian virus (Neumann and Kawaoka, 
2006). The pandemic in 1968 was due to the introduction
 of a new influenza subtype 
(H3N2) into the human population, where 6 gene segments from the H2N2 human 
strain,  including  the
  N2  NA  gene,  combined  with  the  H3  HA  and  PB1  genes 
acquired from an avian source (Thompson et al., 2006).  
2.2.5.3.4  Transmission from chickens to pigs and then to humans 
Although progenitors of H1N1 human viruses and H1N1 "classical"
 swine viruses 
have not been unambiguously identified, they are thought to have originated from 
avian virus
 precursors (Matrosovich et al., 2000) and are so called avian-like-viruses 
(Brown, 2000). 
Until recently, it was thought that avian viruses could cross the avian-human species 
barrier  only  via  an  intermediate  host,  such  as  a  pig,  which  possess  tracheal  cell 
surface receptors (α2-3 and α2-6) susceptible to both avian and human influenza 
viruses (Stevens et al., 2006a). This is probably due to internal protein genes of 
human influenza viruses sharing a common ancestor with the genes of some swine 
influenza viruses (Brown, 2000). Even though pigs are susceptible to AI, only the H1 
and H3 and N1 and N2 subtypes, including a unique
 H1N2 reassortment, have been 
isolated from pigs in the field (Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2001). 
Based on the fact that pigs have both receptors, swine influenza can be transmitted 
from  pigs  to  humans.  For  example,  in  1976  swine  influenza  A/New  Jersey/76 
(Hsw1N1) caused severe respiratory illness in 13 soldiers with 1 death in New Jersey 
(Gaydos et al., 2006). In the 1930s, closely related influenza viruses (now known to 
be  H1N1)  were  isolated,  firstly  from  pigs  and  shortly  thereafter  from  humans 25 
 
(Taubenberge and Morens, 2006). Similarly some strains of influenza A such as 
H1N1 and H3N2 can be transmitted from humans to pigs. For example, until 1998, 
only H1N1 viruses circulated widely in the pig population in the USA. However, in 
1998,  H3N2  viruses  from  humans  were  introduced  into  the  pig  population  and 
caused widespread disease among pigs (Spronk, 2001; CDC, 2005).  
2.2.5.3.5  Transmission from chickens to members of the cat family 
Members  of  the  cat  family,  such  as  tigers  (Panthera  tigris),  leopards  (Panthera 
pardus) and domestic cats, are at risk of being infected with HPAI H5N1. Cats can 
be infected by eating infected raw chickens and the virus can then subsequently be 
transmitted  between  cats  (Enserink  and  Kaiser,  2004;  Kuiken  et  al.,  2004; 
Thanawongnuwech et al., 2005). 
2.2.6  Major pathways for the introduction of AI into poultry 
Avian influenza viruses are introduced to domestic poultry primarily through direct 
or indirect contact with infected birds (Wallensten, 2006). As an example, L‘Vov et 
al. (2006) reported seroconversion in 93% of initially healthy chickens housed with 
sick  chickens.  Other  means  of  transmission  are  movement  of  infected  poultry, 
contaminated  equipment,  fomites  or  vehicles  and  exposure  to  contaminated 
infectious organic material and migratory birds (Capua and Marangon, 2006; Fevre 
et al., 2006). It is therefore most likely that the introduction of HPAI to a new zone 
might occur via several pathways as described in the following sections.  
2.2.6.1  Trading of poultry and poultry products 
The main means for spread of AIV in poultry is the movement of poultry and poultry 
products (Webster et al., 2006). Illegal movement of birds may, in some situations, 26 
 
be an important part of the transmission process (Morris and Jackson, 2005). For 
example, in Indonesia several outbreaks in Java and Sumatra were reported to be due 
to the illegal movement of poultry (OIE, 2006a). 
The legal trade of poultry and poultry products should be regarded as safe if the 
importing conditions are based on the recommendations of the World Organization 
for Animal Health (OIE, 2006f). Problems arise, however, with the illegal movement 
and sale of poultry products and the movement of live birds including fighting cocks, 
pet birds or other hobby birds. The movement of these birds is extremely difficult to 
control  and  could  be  a  mode  of  entry  for  HPAI  (Rappole  and  Hubalek,  2006; 
Zepeda, 2006). For example, crested hawk-eagles (Spizaetus nipalensis) smuggled 
into Belgium from Thailand were found to be infected with H5N1 (Van Borm et al., 
2005) and investigations of outbreaks of HPAI in Malaysia suggested that smuggling 
of fighting cocks was the most likely route of entry for the virus (Sims, 2007). 
2.2.6.2  Live bird markets 
In  infected  countries,  live  bird  markets  (LBM)  and  other  traditional  marketing 
systems appear to represent a key factor in the transmission of HPAI H5N1 (Morris 
and Jackson, 2005). This is due to the mixing of several species of poultry from 
various villages or districts in the same place for a period of time. In the market there 
will be cross-contamination between cages and birds of different species, which is 
the most likely explanation of how viruses can jump from one species to another and 
ultimately from farm to farm (Greger, 2007). If chickens are not sold, they are often 
taken  to  different  places  or  returned  home,  further  disseminating  the  virus 
(Appenzeller, 2005; Magalhaes et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is likely that birds sold 
at  LBM  have  already  had  several  owners  prior  to  sale  in  the  market.  In  some 27 
 
developing countries, it is common for people to sell sick chickens in the market 
(Tiongco, 2009). If these birds are infected with HPAI there is a potential for the 
disease to spread to other species and to new regions.  
Mixing  of  species  (ducks  and  chickens)  in  LBM  can  be  a  risk  for  interspecies 
transmission because domestic waterfowl, such as ducks and geese, may be a source 
of AIV for gallinaceous birds (Panigrahy et al., 2002). For example, in 2001 H5N1 
was isolated from apparently healthy geese in an LBM market in Vietnam (Nguyen 
et al., 2005).  
Several studies on AIV in LBM have shown that markets are a highly productive 
source of avian influenza. In New York and New Jersey in 2001, H7N2 was isolated 
from 19.3% of pooled samples from 59.6% of the markets (Bulaga et al., 2003). In 
this US study it was found that the number of days the markets were open each week 
was a significant factor for being H7N2 positive. A similar study conducted in other 
countries revealed the same widespread distribution of some strains of AIV. For 
example, a survey of a Korean market in 2003 detected AIV (H9N2, H3N2 and 
H6N1) in birds at the market (Choi et al., 2005). Furthermore, a study on H9N2 in 
LBM in Southeastern China also revealed that the viruses are widespread in the area, 
especially where quails are sold (Guan et al., 2000). 
Live bird markets have been linked with the emergence of H5 and H7 (Webster, 
2004).  For  example,  since  1996,  five  outbreaks  of  low-pathogenic  H7N2  in 
commercial poultry have been linked to LBM in the north-eastern region of the USA 
(Suarez et al., 1999; Senne et al., 2003). Another instance where an AI outbreak was 
linked  to  LBM  is  the  H5N2  outbreak  in  1983-1984  in  poultry  in  Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, New Jersey and Maryland, which was eradicated in 1984 at a cost of nearly 28 
 
$US 65 million. This virus reappeared in Pennsylvania in January 1986 in poultry 
destined for live markets in the major northern cities (Anonymous, 1986). 
2.2.6.3  Introduction via infected poultry meat (raw and frozen) 
Most strains of AIV are found only in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts of 
infected birds, and not in the muscle. By contrast, some studies have demonstrated 
that highly pathogenic viruses, such as H5N1, could spread to virtually all parts of an 
infected bird, including the skeletal and cardiac muscle (Tumpey et al., 2002; Lu et 
al., 2003b; Lu et al., 2003c; Tumpey et al., 2003; Swayne and Beck, 2005; Das et 
al., 2008a), brain, lungs, kidneys (Perkins and Swayne, 2003a), bone marrow and 
blood (Purchase, 1931). The normal route of transmission of AIV is probably by the 
faecal-oral route or respiratory route, for this reason the virus may be isolated from 
the respiratory tract of infected birds. Lungs are commonly left in poultry carcasses 
and faecal contamination of carcasses can also occur (MacDiarmid, 1991). Avian 
influenza viruses can survive in raw poultry meat and therefore can potentially be 
spread through the marketing and distribution of contaminated food products, such 
as fresh or frozen meat (INFOSAN, 2005; Ejaz et al., 2007). 
Low pathogenic avian influenza viruses may be introduced into a country through 
the trade of poultry carcasses. For instance, LPAI (H10N7) was isolated from duck 
and chicken carcasses smuggled from China into Italy (Beato et al., 2006). The same 
thing could happen with carcasses infected with HPAI. This suggests that special 
attention  must  be  paid  to  any  poultry  meat  imported  from  infected  countries, 
especially meat from ducks since they are silent carriers of the virus (Edan et al., 
2006). 29 
 
Purchase (1931) demonstrated that AIV could survive for 287 days in muscle and 
303 days in bone marrow stored at low temperatures (-0.6 to 3.3ºC). However, he 
could not infect chickens by feeding them with fresh or chilled contaminated muscle, 
although feeding contaminated blood did result in infection. 
While faecal contamination can result in an infected carcass, the virus is heat labile 
with  temperatures  of  56ºC  to  70ºC  for  five  to  15  minutes  destroying  the  virus 
(McDiarmid,  1991;  INFOSAN,  2005;  EFSA,  2006).  Routine  cooking  of  poultry 
products  is  at  a  far  higher  temperature  and  consequently,  to  date,  there  is  no 
epidemiological  evidence  that  people  have  become  infected  following  the  direct 
consumption  of  properly  cooked,  yet  contaminated,  poultry  meat  (MacDiarmid, 
1991; INFOSAN, 2005). However, there is the possibility of cross contamination 
through  poor  hygiene  to  foods  that  are  either  not  cooked  or  have  already  been 
cooked. 
2.2.6.4  Introduction via infected eggs 
Another  possibility  for  the  transmission  of  AIV  is  through  eggs.  Eggs  could  be 
contaminated with AIV before or after oviposition and therefore could have internal 
and/or external  contamination.  In Thailand  AIV (with a viral  titre of 10
4.6-10 
6.2 
ELD50/mL) was recovered from the internal contents of eggs, including a mixture of 
albumen and allantoic fluid, and from  the oviduct  of naturally infected Japanese 
quail (Coturnix coturnix japonica) (Promkuntod et al., 2006). Similar findings were 
reported by Capucci et al. (1985) who isolated H5N2 from the yolk, albumen and 
shell surface of eggs obtained from naturally infected chicken flocks in Pennsylvania 
and Virginia. 30 
 
If eggs are infected, they can frequently enter the animal food chain either as shells 
or as cracked eggs (Capua and Alexander, 2006). Therefore it is possible that table 
eggs from HPAI-infected hens, as well as egg trays and other fomites that may come 
in contact with such eggs, represent a very high risk for the potential spread of HPAI 
virus. 
2.2.6.5  Introduction via migratory birds 
Based on current epidemiological data, wild waterfowl are likely to play a role in the 
avian influenza cycle and could be the initial source for AIV, which may then be 
transmitted  through  contact  with  domestic  poultry  (see  Section  2.2.5.3.2).  This 
potential route is likely to be a problem for many developing countries where a free 
range management system allows the close contact between domesticated poultry 
species and wild birds. In addition natural bird movements cannot be controlled by 
humans (Artois et al., 2009). 
New outbreaks of HPAI in poultry and wild birds in Russia, Kazakhstan, Western 
China and Mongolia (Chen et al., 2006a) may indicate that migratory birds act as 
vectors for the transport of HPAI over long distances. Healthy wild migratory birds 
can travel between 10,000 to 20,000 km (Alerstam et al., 2003) and subsequently 
have contact with either local wild birds or free-range poultry in farms, villages or 
local water bodies. 
2.2.6.6  Introduction via contaminated fomites 
Influenza viruses are easily spread by fomites. The survival of H7N2 on fomites can 
be as long as two weeks (Lu et al., 2003a) and H5N2 can survive in wet manure for 
up to 105 days (Fitchner, 1987). Any fomite that has been contaminated with manure 31 
 
is potentially capable of transmitting the virus. Wang et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
AIV genes could be detected in one of 79 wire bird cages in 9 Chinese LBMs. Guan 
et al. (2000) advised that the collection of faecal samples and cage swabs should 
form a component of any surveillance program for AI. 
Poultry can also become infected through the consumption of food or water that is 
contaminated with the virus (Arzey, 2006). The virus can survive in water at 22°C 
for four days, and at 0°C for 30 days (Rothstein, 2005). Thus, indirect transmission 
via drinking water contaminated by wild birds is possible (EFSA, 2006). 
H5N1  can  replicate  in  the  feather  epidermal  cells  of  domestic  ducks  and  geese 
resulting in feather lesions (Yamamoto et al., 2008). The AIV can survive for up to 
18 days in feathers kept out of the sun (Purchase, 1931). Based on these findings 
feathers of infected birds could also be potential reservoirs and transmit virus to 
healthy chickens. 
2.2.6.7  Introduction of HPAI via mutation from LPAI 
Wild birds, especially waterfowl and shore birds, are known to harbour influenza 
viruses,  which  are  usually  LPAI.  If  these  strains  are  accidentally  introduced  to 
domestic poultry, mutations may result in the formation of a HPAI strain (Bennett 
and Whiting, 2006). The switch from a LPAI virus phenotype is common in wild 
birds and poultry (Fouchier et al., 2006). Experience from other countries, including 
the USA (Pennsylvania) (van der Goot et al., 2003b), Mexico (Garcia et al., 1996) 
and Italy (Banks et al., 2001), shows that large outbreaks can initially begin with 
mild illness in poultry. When the virus is allowed to continue circulating in poultry, 32 
 
it  can  eventually  mutate  (within  6  to  9  months)  into  a  highly  pathogenic  form 
(Bennett and Whiting, 2006). 
Avoidance of contact between poultry and wild birds, especially ducks and other 
waterfowl, can help prevent the introduction of a low-pathogenic virus into domestic 
poultry flocks (Bennett and Whiting, 2006). Similarly, minimising interactions of 
birds  in  LBM  can  help  reduce  the  probability  of  mixing  genes  with  subsequent 
mutation. The presence of LPAI in LBM has been confirmed in several countries and 
in  the  USA  approximately  50%  of  birds  at  LBM  have  been  demonstrated  to  be 
infected with LPAI (H7N2) (Garber et al., 2006). 
In  developing  countries  contact  of  poultry  with  migratory  wild  birds  (and  their 
faeces) cannot be avoided because most chickens are either free-range or backyard 
chickens. Therefore, there will always be a certain level of risk for the introduction 
of AIV, as wild birds (primarily migratory waterfowl) can be infected with LPAI and 
very rarely with HPAI (Sharp et al., 1997). 
2.2.7  Factors influence the survival and transmission of AIV  
Temperature  is  one  of  the  most  important  factors  determining  the  survival  and 
persistence  of  viruses  (Sobsey  and  Meschke,  2003).  Highly  pathogenic  avian 
influenza virus is inactivated at 56°C in 3 hours, at 60°C it is inactivated in 30 
minutes and at 70
oC the virus is killed (OIE, 2002; WHO, 2005). However, the virus 
can be destroyed in just five seconds by microwaves (Elhafi et al., 2004).  
Cooler  temperatures  aid  the  spread  of  the  virus  between  birds  by  extending  its 
survival time in water and manure from days to weeks or even months. For example, 
AIV can survive in manure for 35 days at 4°C, 6 days at 37
oC and in wet manure it 33 
 
can survive for up to 135 days (Fitchner, 1987; DPI, 2005; FEHD, 2005; INFOSAN, 
2005; Martin et al., 2006a). It can survive and remain infectious in lake water from 
four  days  to  many  months  at  17°C  to  22
oC,  and  for  even  longer  at  cooler 
temperatures (0
oC to 4°C) (Webster et al., 1992; Morris and Jackson, 2005; Bennett 
and Whiting, 2006). 
In  carcasses  AIV  can  survive  for  several  days  in  poultry  meat  products  kept  at 
ambient temperatures and up to 23 days if they were refrigerated (DPI, 2005). In 
protein-rich matrices, such as meat and whole eggs, temperatures exceeding 60-65°C 
lead to complete viral inactivation of H5N1 within five minutes (EFSA, 2006). 
Other  factors  that  can  inactivate  and  hence  affect  the  survival  of  AIV  are  pH, 
oxidizing agents and disinfectants. For example AIV is stable over a pH range of 
5.5-8, but its infectivity is destroyed at a pH of two (OIE, 2002; Lu et al., 2003a; 
Martin et al., 2006a).  
The virus can also be inactivated by some chemicals. For example it is inactivated by 
oxidising agents, sodium dodecyl sulphate, lipid solvents and ß-propiolactone (OIE, 
2002). Similarly, it is also inactivated by formalin and iodine compounds  and its 
infectivity can also be destroyed in less than 30 minutes by 70% alcohol (Lu et al., 
2003a). 
2.2.8   Clinical description of avian influenza  
2.2.8.1  Incubation period 
The incubation period for HPAI usually varies between one and four days, however 
it can be as long as 17 days. For instance, based on an experiment conducted using 
BhGoose/QH/1/05, it was found that all eight challenged chickens died within one 34 
 
day of challenge, and seven of eight challenged mice died within three days (Liu et 
al.,  2005).  Others  found  that  challenge  with  A/chicken/Omsk/  14/2005  or 
A/chicken/Tula/4/2005 resulted in the death of all 10 chickens within two days of 
challenge (Lipatov et al., 2007). Similar results were obtained by Promkuntod et al. 
(2006) who demonstrated the death of embryos one to four days after inoculation 
into the chorioallantoic sac. 
2.2.8.2  Multiplication sites and target organs 
Inside  its  host,  the  multiplication  sites  of  AIV  vary  according  to  virulence  and 
availability  of  enzymes  to  help  multiplication.  These  viruses  mainly  affect  the 
respiratory (Murphy et al., 1999; Stevens et al., 2006a) and intestinal tracts (Olsen et 
al., 2006) because multiplication of LPAI virus is aided by trypsin-like enzymes, 
which are abundant in the intestinal and respiratory tracts. On the other hand, HPAI 
can multiply in many parts of the body as the virus has multiple basic amino acids at 
the  cleavage  site  which  are  present  in  many  organs  of  the  body  (Capua  and 
Mutinelli, 2001). 
Depending on the species affected, the replication site for influenza viruses varies. In 
poultry,  multiplication  occurs  in  several  organs,  but  it  mainly  takes  place  in  the 
simple columnar epithelial cells which form crypts in the large intestines, especially 
in  the  colon  (Kida  et  al.,  1980),  pancreas  of  domestic  waterfowl  and  the  brain, 
respiratory tract and spleen of waterfowl (Capua and Mutinelli, 2001; Perkins and 
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2.2.8.3   Clinical signs 
The  clinical  signs  observed  following  infection  with  AIV  vary  according  to  the 
species  affected,  their  age,  and  the  presence  of  other  micro-organisms  and 
environmental factors (Fouchier et al., 2003b). Some birds, such as chickens and 
turkeys, may show clinical signs while wild birds and domestic/wild waterfowl are 
normally  asymptomatic  (Markwell  and  Shortridge,  1982;  Alexander,  2007a). 
Chickens  are  usually  asymptomatic  for  six  to  18  hours  following  experimental 
challenge with H5N1 (Das et al., 2008a). 
The  most  common  clinical  signs  include  torticollis,  tremor,  depression,  dullness, 
coughing,  reduced  feed  intake/anorexia,  diarrhoea,  neurologic  dysfunction, 
reluctance to move, dyspnoea, ruffled feathers, sudden onset of mortality, cyanotic 
combs  and  wattles,  swelling  of  the  intraorbital  sinuses,  nasal  and  oral  cavity 
discharge, oedema of the head, severe congestion of the conjunctivae, conjunctivitis, 
fever, weakness and reduced egg production (Perkins and Swayne, 2001; Mutinelli 
et al., 2003; Perkins and Swayne, 2003b; Selleck et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 2005a; 
Arzey, 2006;  Bennett and Whiting, 2006; Chen et al., 2006a; Klopfleisch et al., 
2006; Tanimura et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007). 
2.2.8.4  Gross pathology 
The  gross  pathology  observed  varies  between  species.  The  lesions  seen  include 
discolouration of the pancreas, congested lungs and trachea, conjunctivitis, sinusitis, 
hepatomegaly, splenomegaly, haemorrhagic enteritis and peritonitis, petechiae on the 
inside of the sternum, abdominal fat, serosal surfaces and in the body cavity, severe 
kidney congestion sometimes with urate deposits in the tubules, haemorrhages and 
degeneration  of  the  ovary,  haemorrhages  on  the  mucosal  surface  of  the 36 
 
proventriculus  particularly  at  the  junction  with  the  gizzard,  haemorrhages  and 
erosions of the gizzard lining, and haemorrhagic foci on the lymphoid tissues in the 
intestinal  mucosa  (Perkins  and  Swayne,  2001;  OIE,  2002;  Kwon  et  al.,  2005b; 
Tanimura et al., 2006; Nakamura et al., 2008). 
2.2.8.5  Case fatality and mortality rate for avian influenza 
The case fatality rate (CFR) in animals depends on the species affected, their age and 
the viral strain involved. For instance, the CFR of LPAI varies from 3 to 8% in 
adults but up to 80% in young chickens (Bean et al., 1985; Mutinelli et al., 2003). 
Mortality  due  to  HPAI  in  chickens,  however,  ranges  from  30  to  100%,  with  an 
average  of  more  than  50%  (Subbarao  et  al.,  1998;  Perkins  and  Swayne,  2001; 
Mutinelli et al., 2003; Nili and Asasi, 2003; Perkins and Swayne, 2003a; Selleck et 
al., 2003; Senne, 2003; Kwon et al., 2005a; Nakatani et al., 2005; Klopfleisch et al., 
2006). Mortality of HPAI in other species varies from 5 to 100% (30% in ostriches, 
50% in turkeys and 12 to 100% in ducks) (Mutinelli et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 2005a; 
Songserm et al., 2006c). 
2.2.9  Differential diagnosis of avian influenza 
There are several poultry diseases that have similar clinical signs to AI. The diseases 
that  have  similar  clinical  signs  include:  fowl  cholera,  some  toxins,  septicemic 
spirochetosis, infectious laryngotracheitis and ND (Swayne and Halvorson, 2008; 
Kaleta and Rülke, 2009). For instance viruses that cause AI and ND are associated 
with transmission from wild to domestic birds, and often display similar  clinical 
signs such as acute respiratory infection that need to be differentiated (Wang et al., 
2008b; Belak et al., 2009). To differentiate AI from other diseases mentioned, a 37 
 
definitive diagnosis must be made by virologic or serologic method (Swayne and 
Halvorson, 2008) as described in Section 2.2.10. 
2.2.10  Diagnosis of Avian influenza 
Diagnosis of AI on clinical signs alone is difficult because some avian diseases as 
mentioned in Section 2.2.9 have similar clinical signs. Therefore, diagnosis must be 
confirmed by the use of laboratory tests. 
The most common samples used to isolate AIV are cloacal and tracheal swabs. The 
virus can be detected in the trachea of chickens six hours after challenge with H5N1 
(Das  et  al.,  2008a).  The  virus  (H5N1)  can  also  be  isolated  from  various 
organs/samples, including nasal swabs, lung lavages, and samples of lung, spleen, 
liver,  heart,  viscera,  brain,  and  skeletal  muscles  (Chen  et  al.,  2006a;  Das  et  al., 
2008a). 
The  most  common  diagnostic  method  used  is  virus  isolation  by  inoculation  of 
material from tracheal and cloacal swabs into the allantoic sac of nine to 11-day old 
specific  pathogen  free  (SPF)  embryonated  chicken  eggs  (Alexander,  2008). 
Haemagglutination of chicken erythrocytes in embryonic fluids harvested 48 to 72 
hours after inoculation is suggestive of AIV (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988).  
Other diagnostic methods include the: agar gel diffusion test (AGD), which can be 
used to confirm the presence of type A specific antigen, such as nucleocapsid or 
matrix antigens (FAO, 2006b); Competitive Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assays 
(C-ELISA) (Snyder et al., 1985; Zhou et al., 1997; Zhou et al., 1998; Beck et al., 
2003);  indirect  ELISA  (Al-Natour  and  Abo-Shehada,  2005);  double  antibody 
sandwich  ELISA  (DAS-ELISA)  (Zhang  et  al.,  2006);  Haemagglutinin  Inhibition 38 
 
assays (HI) (Zarkov, 2007); polymerase chain reactions (PCR) (Payungporn et al., 
2004; Ng et al., 2006; Slomka et al., 2007a; Slomka et al., 2007b); and PCR-ELISA 
(Munch et al., 2001) which can be used to identify specific strains of AIV. The 
agreement between these tests varies, for example, there is good agreement between 
C-ELISA and HI (93 to 99%) (Zhou et al., 1997; Zhou et al., 1998) and between 
DAS-ELISA and virus isolation (98.6%) (Zhang et al., 2006). 
Besides the above diagnostic tools, there are also several rapid tests that can be used 
to detect AI. These include: Anigen® AIV Ag, Biota Flu OIA and Directigen Flu 
A+B (Chan et al., 2002; Lupiani and Reddy, 2005; Boland et al., 2006 ). Each of the 
rapid tests has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include ease of use 
and  results  are  available  in  less  than  one  hour.  However,  these  tests  have  low 
sensitivity  (Se)  and  specificity  (Sp)  compared  with  the  ELISA,  PCR  and  HI. 
Although the ELISA‘s have high sensitivity and specificity, they require a moderate 
level of laboratory facilities, technical skills and access to a spectrophotometer (Chua 
et al., 2007). 
The accuracy of a test can be affected by differences between reference populations, 
sampling strategies, choice of the gold standard and cut-off value for interpretation 
(Greiner and Gardner, 2000). For example, factors affecting the Se and Sp of the 
PCR include the: RNA extraction step; RT-PCR amplification step; and sequence of 
the primers and probe (Suarez et al., 2007). 
As most tests do not have perfect Se and Sp, there can be false positive and/or false 
negative results (Cannon, 2002). Therefore, if a test with less than 100% specificity 
is used in a disease-free region some false positives are likely to occur. Positive 39 
 
results need to be investigated further to confirm either the absence or presence of 
the disease (Martin et al., 2007). 
2.2.11  Prevention and Control of avian influenza 
Methods  for  the  control  of  AI  include:  quarantine  to  minimize  inter-  and  intra-
species transmission; vaccination; and stamping out (Lee et al., 2004). For example 
pigs may act as a mixing vessel to create new reassortments (Fouchier et al., 2003b), 
therefore the mixing of pigs with poultry should be avoided. Although it may be 
important to avoid interspecies transmission (Lekcharoensuk et al., 2006), in reality 
this is impractical. Because of the world-wide interaction between humans, pigs, 
birds  and  other  mammalian  species,  there  is  a  high  potential  for  cross-species 
transmission of influenza viruses in nature (Brown, 2000). 
The primary introduction of AIV to domestic poultry occurs either through direct 
contact with sick birds or indirect contact with contaminated equipment, fomites or 
vehicles (Capua and Marangon, 2007). Therefore, preventive measures are designed 
to reduce contact between domestic poultry, and between poultry and wild birds, 
faeces,  contaminated water and potentially  contaminated fomites  (Webster et  al., 
1992; Bennett and Whiting, 2006). 
Restriction of the movement of live poultry, both within and between countries, is an 
important control measure. However, according to the WHO (2005) these measures 
are not  possible in  rural  areas  in  most developing  countries  where chickens  and 
ducks roam freely and mix with wild birds or share water sources with them. Faecal 
contamination of water supplies is considered a very efficient way for waterfowl to 40 
 
transmit the virus (Markwell and Shortridge, 1982). This suggests that the source of 
water for domesticated poultry should be protected from wild birds.  
Another method of controlling AI is by stamping out. Stamping out involves rapid 
culling of all infected and/or exposed birds, proper disposal of carcasses, and the 
quarantining and rigorous disinfection of farms (van den Berg and Houdart, 2008). 
Some authors have stated that a stamping out policy for infections caused by H5 and 
H7 subtypes is a better control option than vaccination (Capua and Marangon, 2006, 
2007). Stamping out has been successfully applied in countries (such as Hong Kong, 
Japan and Korea) where the outbreaks have been small (Morris and Jackson, 2005). 
However, in geographically dispersed outbreaks, Capua and Marangon (2007) stated 
that management of outbreaks by stamping out alone would be more expensive and 
consequently  it  is  used  in  conjunction  with  other  methods  of  control,  including 
vaccination  and  separation  of  species  in  the market  (Morris  and  Jackson,  2005). 
Stamping out in commercial enterprises (such as broilers or layers) may be easily 
conducted, however, it is difficult to implement with free-range village chickens. 
Vaccination  has  been  shown  to  be  a  powerful  method  to  support  eradication 
programmes,  if  used  in  conjunction  with  other  control  methods  (Capua  and 
Marangon, 2007). Prophylactic vaccination should only be considered when there is 
circumstantial evidence that a country or area is at risk of infection. Vaccination 
against AI reduces transmission of AIV (van der Goot et al., 2005) as vaccinated 
chickens shed less virus (Capua and Marangon, 2006). However, vaccination needs 
to be undertaken along with the implementation of adequate biosecurity measures 
otherwise antigenic variants may emerge which may escape the immune response 
induced by the vaccine  (Lee et al., 2004). A disadvantage of vaccination is that 41 
 
vaccinated infected chickens may not show clinical signs and consequently can act 
as silent carriers (Capua and Alexander, 2006; Capua and Marangon, 2006). 
2.2.12  Distribution of HPAI H5N1 in the world 
There  are  two  main  epidemiological  reasons  for  the  wide  distribution  of  the 
influenza virus. Firstly, the virus has the capacity to emerge and spread in reservoir 
hosts  (avian  or  swine)  through  either  antigenic  drift  or  antigenic  shift  with  the 
potential for subsequent spread to humans (Sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2). Secondly, 
the virus has the capacity to make a quick and unpredictable antigenic shift of viral 
immune targets once the virus has become established in humans (Behrens and Stoll, 
2006).  
The first known strain of HPAI H5N1 (A/chicken/Scotland/59) was isolated from 
flocks of chickens in Scotland in 1959 (Anonymous, 2007a; Manvell et al., 2008). 
The ―current‖ HPAI H5N1 was first isolated in Hong Kong in 1997 (Claas et al., 
1998; Cauthen et al., 2000; Guan et al., 2002), then was absent for a few years until 
in late 2003 and early 2004 outbreaks of H5N1 occurred in eight countries outside 
China,  including  Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Laos,  South  Korea,  Thailand, 
Malaysia  and  Vietnam  (Webster  et  al.,  1992;  Anonymous,  2004a).  Despite 
implementation of extensive control measures in these countries, it has spread from 
Asia to the Middle East, Europe and Africa (Olsen et al., 2006; Pfeiffer, 2006; Capua 
and Marangon, 2007). 
From 2003 to 2010 HPAI H5N1 has spread to more than 60 countries infecting 
domestic and wild birds (Neumann et al., 2010). Of these countries HPAI H5N1 was 
reported in domestic poultry from 51 countries with the high number of confirmed 42 
 
outbreaks in Vietnam, Thailand, Egypt, Bangladesh and Indonesia (OIE, 2010b) (see 
Figure  2.1).  The  rapid  spread  was  believed  to  be  due  to  the  migration  of  sub-
clinically infected migratory birds (Feare and Yasué, 2006). 
2.2.13  HPAI H5N1 in Southeast Asia 
EMPRES (2006) reported that HPAI H5N1 was still circulating in wild birds and 
domestic  poultry  populations  of  most  Asian  countries.  All  ten  Southeast  Asian 
countries have been infected with HPAI H5N1, with three (Vietnam, Thailand and 
Indonesia) having severe outbreaks in poultry (OIE, 2008). In these countries a delay 
in undertaking control measures may have allowed the virus to circulate amongst 
poultry. In Vietnam, for instance, the time between observation and confirmation of 
AI was 82 days in 2004 compared with only nine days in Japan (EMPRES, 2006). 
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Figure  2.1.  A  graph  displaying  the  number  of  outbreaks  of  HPAI  in  51 
countries in poultry from 2003 to 1st October 2010 (source OIE 2010b). 
The HPAI H5N1 viruses have circulated in Southeast Asia for more than a decade 
and have now spread to more than 60 countries (Neumann et al., 2010). According 
to EMPRES (2006), the circulation of HPAI in Southeast Asian countries may be 
due to several factors. 
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These include lack of effective biosecurity, poor management of poultry (70% are 
free range chickens belonging to sector three or four), lack of animal movement 
control and lack of a compensation scheme.  
The impact of a lack of compensation scheme for farmers reporting AI outbreaks has 
been  observed  in  some  countries.  For  example,  in  Thailand,  farmers  received 
compensation  up  to  75%  of  the  market  price.  In  contrast,  in  the  Lao  PDR  and 
Cambodia no compensation was offered (FAO, 2005). In Indonesia compensation 
covered only 10 to 20% of the market value (FAO, 2005; Simmons, 2006) but in 
most cases the compensation was generally not paid (Azhar et al., 2010) and only 
18%  in  Vietnam  (FAO,  2005).  Consequently,  farmers  are  less  likely  to  report 
diseased  chickens  and  may  even  sell  infected  birds,  further  spreading  the  virus. 
Activities to control HPAI, such as slaughter of affected birds and restriction of bird 
movements, have had a negative effect on the poorest families due to the loss of 
birds and markets, low prices and a lack of compensation (FAO, 2005).  
2.2.14  HPAI in Indonesia 
The first outbreaks of HPAI were reported in Indonesia on farms in Central Java 
(Tangerang Regency) and the disease spread to other provinces because the owners 
of sick birds sold them to the adjacent islands of Sumatra, Bali and Kalimantan 
(FAO, 2005; OIE, 2007a). It has been hypothesised that the illegal movement of 
birds, in particular fighting cocks, was responsible for the rapid and wide distribution 
of H5N1 in Indonesia (FAO, 2005; EMPRES, 2006). 
Phylogenetic analysis indicates that all viruses from Indonesia form a distinct sub 
lineage  of  H5N1  genotype  Z,  suggesting  that  the  outbreak  was  likely  to  have 45 
 
originated from a single introduction that spread throughout the country (Smith et 
al., 2006). Based on phylogenetic studies it is believed that the virus originated from 
Hunnan (Wang et al., 2008a). The method of transmission from Hunnan to Indonesia 
remains uncertain but may have been via migratory birds due to the long distance 
between the two places (approximately 3600 km) (Wang et al., 2008a). 
The first AI outbreak in Indonesia was officially reported to the World Organization 
for  Animal  Health  (OIE)  on  the  25
th  February  2004  (Anonymous,  2004b;  FAO, 
2005); however, unofficial reports of disease had been reported in Sumatra and Java 
as early as July and August 2003 (FAO, 2005, 2007b). According to Hartono (2004), 
the peak of the disease was in September 2003, when 14 of 33 provinces reported 
unusual clinical signs of poultry disease related to AI. The disease was reported in 
southern parts of Sukabumi area, West Java in August 2004 and spread throughout 
Java  in  just  five  weeks  (Hartono,  2004).  It  subsequently  spread  rapidly  to  other 
islands including Bali, Kalimantan and Sumatra because of failure to cull infected 
birds and a lack of animal movement control (Butler, 2005). Currently (2010) cases 
of AI have been confirmed in 31 of Indonesia‘s 33 provinces (FAOAIDE, 2010e). 
Various species have been affected by AI in Indonesia including native chickens, 
broilers, layers, pigeons ducks, quails, wild birds, pigs (FAO, 2004; OIE, 2006b; 
Anonymous, 2007b; FAOAIDE, 2008) and humans (WHO, 2008). The first human 
case was reported in July 2005 (Kandun et al., 2006) and a total of 165 cases with 
136 deaths  have been reported  to  May 2010  (WHO, 2010). The majority of the 
victims in Indonesia have been children or young adults (Charnoz and Forster, 2010; 
WHO, 2010). 46 
 
2.2.14.1 Impact of HPAI in Indonesia 
From July 2003 to 25 January 2004 15 to 16 million layers, two million parent stock 
and 86,000 broiler birds either died or were culled because of H5N1 (Hartono, 2004; 
Sedyaningsih et al., 2008). 
The  consumption  of  chicken  meat  decreased  by  20%,  the  price  of  live  chickens 
decreased from Rp.7,600-8,000 to Rp.1,200-2,000 and the export of birds reduced 
from 695,655 broilers and 72,000 day-old chickens in 2003 to nil in 2004. It has 
been estimated that the Indonesian poultry industry lost Rp.7.7 trillion (USD 855 
million) from HPAI (Hartono, 2004; FAO, 2005). 
Furthermore, the disease has resulted in numerous deaths in humans (WHO, 2008). 
It has been estimated that 23% of permanent workers on commercial poultry farms 
in Indonesia lost their jobs and more than 40% of family members were unable to 
continue to work with poultry because of HPAI H5N1 (FAO, 2005). 
2.2.14.2  Control strategies adopted in Indonesia 
The strategies adopted to control HPAI in Indonesia have included: 1) vaccination of 
poultry  in  infected  and  immediately  adjacent  areas;  2)  depopulation  (selective 
culling) with  compensation  in  endemic areas;  3) stamping out  in newly infected 
areas;  4)  restocking;  5)  surveillance  and  trace  back;  6)  improvement  of  farm 
biosecurity; 7) movement control of live poultry and poultry products; 8) improved 
public  awareness;  and  9)  monitoring  and  evaluation  (Anonymous,  2007b;  FAO, 
2007b). However, the main methods relied upon have been vaccination (Simmons, 
2006) and selective stamping out (Hartono, 2004), although Hartono (2004) reported 
that vaccination was primarily restricted to large farms, with few backyard birds 
getting vaccinated. 47 
 
2.2.15  HPAI in Australia 
Australia  is  currently  free  from  virulent  strains  of  AI  (DAFF,  2006);  however 
outbreaks of HPAI have occurred in the past. The virus has been the cause of clinical 
disease in commercial poultry units in Victoria (1976, 1985 and 1992), Queensland 
(1994) and New South Wales (1997). None of the Australian outbreaks has involved 
the H5N1 virus (all H7) (Selleck et al., 2003; DPI, 2005). 
2.2.16   Status of HPAI in Timor Leste 
To  date  no  outbreaks  of  HPAI  been  reported  in  Timor  Leste  (FAO,  2007b; 
FAOAIDE, 2010d). Serologically, however there was a suspicious result from one 
particular survey in 2004. This survey and other survey results will be discussed in 
Chapter Five of this thesis.  
Although there has never been an outbreak of HPAI reported in Timor Leste, the 
country  is  at  risk  of  becoming  infected.  This  may  occur  from  several  sources 
including the entry of illegal live poultry and poultry products. The risk factors that 
may be involved in the introduction of HPAI will be discussed further in Chapters 
Six and Eight of this thesis. In the following chapter the number of poultry and their 
production in Timor Leste is analysed. This information is essential to determine the 
impact of HPAI if it was to enter the country.  
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CHAPTER 3:  PRODUCTION SYSTEM AND MARKET 
CHAIN FOR POULTRY IN TIMOR LESTE 
3.1  Introduction 
Chickens  (Gallus  domesticus)  first  originated  in  Asia  and  were  domesticated  in 
Southeast  Asia  approximately  5,000  years  ago  during  the  bronze  age  (Sherman, 
2002). Although the time when East Timorese people first started to domesticate 
chickens is not known, it is likely that this was also during the Bronze Age. This 
supposition is further supported by archaeological evidence that other domesticated 
animals (such as pig and dogs) were present in Timor Leste between 4500 and 5000 
years ago (Glover, 1971). 
The  poultry  industry  in  Timor  Leste  revolves  primarily  around  chickens  (Gallus 
domesticus) and a few ducks, i.e. Muscovy (Cairina moschata) and laying ducks (A. 
platyrhynchos). The main poultry industry is classified as sector four on the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) grading system (Alders and Amaral, 2006). The 
sector four industry is defined as a traditional system based on free range poultry 
production with minimal biosecurity and the birds and their products are consumed 
locally  (Hanh  et  al.,  2007).  Although,  chickens  are  generally  free-ranging  with 
minimal inputs; they play an important role in the economy of villages in Timor 
Leste. This is because poultry are a very valuable source of dietary protein and of 
cash income (Aube et al., 2007). 
Even though village chickens are important livestock in developing countries in Asia 
and Africa (Gunaratne et al., 1991; Nguyen, 1991; Tadelle et al., 2003; Muchadeyi  
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et  al.,  2004;  Sartika  and  Noor,  2005),  there  are  no  published  reports  about  the 
―industry‖ in Timor Leste based on a sound survey. The aim of the work described in 
this chapter was to: document the productivity of village chickens in Timor Leste; 
determine  farmer-perceived  causes  of  village  chicken  losses;  and  quantify  the 
number of poultry and means for marketing them. This work is important to quantify 
the number of poultry present in districts with different risks for AI which forms the 
basis of a risk analysis to quantify the likelihood of an outbreak of AI in Timor Leste 
and  to  highlight  the  importance  of  poultry  to  farming  households  and  the 
community. 
3.2  Materials and methods 
3.2.1  Map creation 
To display the districts  or locations of surveys and different risk areas  in Timor 
Leste, maps were created using the free software Epi Info (DISSS, 2008). The shape 
file was obtained from the National Statistics Directorate Office of Timor Leste. 
3.2.2  Study areas 
This study was conducted in 76 of the 442 villages across the 13 districts in Timor 
Leste. The map showing the 13 districts is displayed in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure  3.1.  Map  of  Timor  Leste  showing  its  13  districts.  White  areas  are 
Indonesian territory. 
3.2.3  Data collection  
Three different questionnaires were developed and administered to gather data about 
rural poultry production and marketing. The first questionnaire (Appendix One) was 
designed to collect data on poultry production. With this questionnaire, at least two 
villages (sucos) were visited in each district and the questionnaire administered to at 
least  40  households  per  village.  The  second  questionnaire  (Appendix  Two)  was 
designed  to  collect  information  about  live  poultry  marketing.  In  this  study  a 
minimum  of  four  traders  were  interviewed  from  each  market/kiosk 
owners/households of the 76 selected villages. The third questionnaire (Appendix 
Three)  was  designed  to  collect  information  about  marketing  of  eggs  and  was 
administered to at least four egg traders in kiosks/households/markets in each of the 
76 villages. Villages were assigned a number and then selected randomly using the 
random number generator in Microsoft Excel 2007. Information was gathered from 
individual  households  through  interviews.  The  interviews  were  conducted  at  the  
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farmers‘ residences, in kiosks and local markets. All questionnaires for this study 
had been approved by the Murdoch University Human Ethics Committee. 
3.2.4  Statistical analysis and classification of high and low risk districts 
The quantitative data sets were analysed using a range of statistical tests in SPSS 
version 17. After tabulating the data in SPSS, normality tests were performed in 
SPSS  by  plotting  the  data  and  conducting  homogeneity  tests.  If  the  data  were 
normally distributed then differences in poultry production, and marketing of live 
poultry and eggs between high and low risk areas were analysed using ANOVAS. 
For discrete data a chi-square test (χ
2) for independence or Fisher‘s exact test were 
used.  The  95%  confidence  intervals  (CI)  were  calculated  using  Exact  Binomial 
method (Daly, 1992). 
It was assumed that high risk areas were either located adjacent to the border with 
Indonesia  (districts  of  Bobonaro,  Covalima  and  Oecusse)  or  were  the  centre  of 
marketing (Dili) (Figure 3.2). Low risk areas in this analysis were all other districts. 
This  assumption  was  based  on  the  fact  that  HPAI  is  endemic  in  Indonesia 
(FAOAIDE, 2010a). 
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Figure 3.2. Map of Timor Leste showing border districts and marketing centre 
[high risk districts (red)] and non border districts [low risk districts (green)]. 
White is Indonesian territory. 
3.3  Results 
A total of 1089 households were interviewed between October and December 2008 
to determine poultry production (using the first questionnaire, Appendix One). The 
second questionnaire (Appendix Two) on marketing of live poultry was administered 
to 388 respondents and the 3rd questionnaire (Appendix Three) to 390 kiosk owners 
and  those  who  sold  eggs  at  markets  or  households.  No  individual  was  asked  to 
complete more than one type of questionnaire. 
3.3.1  Village poultry production 
3.3.1.1  Composition and size of flocks kept by households 
All 1089 households interviewed kept poultry (village chickens and ducks). Of these 
households,  most  only  kept  village  chickens  (84.2%),  11.3%  kept  both  village 
chickens and one species of Muscovy ducks or laying ducks), 4.1% kept all three 
species  (village  chickens,  Muscovy  ducks  and  laying  ducks),  and  0.4%  kept  
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Muscovy ducks only. The mean ratio of male to female village chickens was 1: 2 
(3547: 6022).  
The average flock size for village chickens in the study areas was 8.89 (range 1 – 76 
birds/household). The mean number of cocks and hens per household was 3.3 and 
5.6 respectively (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Number and gender of chickens in the surveyed villages (n = 76). 
 Poultry type  Total  Percent  Mean  SE 
Male chickens  3547  37      3.30  0.09 
Female chickens  6022  63      5.60  0.21 
Total number of chickens  9569       100  8.89  0.28 
Muscovy ducks  776  86  4.58  0.61 
Laying ducks  124  14   2.64  0.16 
Total number of ducks  900       100   5.58  0.27 
 
3.3.1.2  Number of village chickens per household 
The smallest number of hens was found in Ermera district (2.88) and the largest 
number in Viqueque (29.12) (Table 3.2). The district of Viqueque had by far the 
largest number of cocks and hens.  
The  district  of  Same  had  the  smallest  average  number  of  chickens  (4.3)  and 
Viqueque  the  highest  number  (40.4)  (Table  3.2).  The  mean  number  of  chickens 
owned by households was significantly different between districts (F:145.95, df: 12, 
p= 0.001). The average flock size in the high risk districts (7.3) was significantly 
smaller than that in low risk districts (10.0) (F: 5.3, df: 1, p< 0.000001).  
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Table 3.2. Number of village chickens in the 13 districts 
District  #House 
holds 
surveyed 
Cocks  Hens  Total village chickens 
Mean  SE  Range  Mean  SE  Range  Mean  SE  Range 
Aileu  80  2.49  0.16  1 to 8  4.23  0.27  1 to 19  6.8  0.38  2 to 25 
Ainaro  80  2.34  0.17  1 to 9  3.49  0.22  1 to 10  5.8  0.28  2 to 15 
Baucau  159  2.26  0.17  0 to 15  3.99  0.20  1 to 14  6.3  0.33  1 to 25 
Bobonaro  68  2.17  0.22  0 to 8  3.96  0.34  1 to 20  6.1  0.44  2 to 25 
Covalima  48  1.23  0.22  1 to 8  3.49  0.34  1 to 12  4.7  0.47  1 to 15 
Dili  119  3.18  0.20  1 to 12  3.58  0.22  1 to 20  6.8  0.35  2 to 30 
Ermera  41  1.73  0.21  0 to 6  2.88  0.35  1 to 11  4.6  0.48  1 to 15 
Liquiça  70  2.75  0.20  1 to 8  7.33  0.45  2 to 20  10.1  0.50  3 to 23 
Lospalos  60  5.10  0.42  1 to 15  10.32  0.86  2 to 30  15.4  1.27  3 to 45 
Manatuto  50  2.17  0.20  1 to 7  4.21  0.39  2 to 19  6.4  0.56  3 to 26 
Oecusse  217  4.41  0.20  0 to 12  4.02  0.15  1 to 12  8.4  0.29  2 to 22 
Same  47  1.11  0.22  0 to 6  3.11  0.25  1 to 8  4.3  0.38  1 to 13 
Viqueque  50  11.26  0.69  3 to 19  29.12  1.94  8 to 57  40.4  2.56  11 to 76 
Total  1089  3.30  0.10  0 to 19  5.56  0.21  1 to 57     8.89  0.28   1 to 76  
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3.3.1.3  Poultry production 
The average number of clutches of eggs laid per adult hen per year was 2.65 (range 1 
to 6) with an average of 11 (range 3 to 26) eggs per clutch. The mean hatchability of 
eggs  from  village  chickens  and  Muscovy  ducks  in  this  study  was:  82  and  83% 
respectively  (Table  3.3).  In  contrast  to  hatchability,  survivability  of  both  village 
chickens and Muscovy ducks in this study was lower: 63.6 and 69% respectively. 
The details of laying ducks are as in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Performance of poultry in the surveyed villages. 
Species  Description  *n  Mean  SE  Range 
Village 
chickens 
Eggs produced/clutch  1081  10.86  0.065  3 to 26 
Laying frequency (clutches/year)  1033  2.65  0.023  1 to 6 
Hatchability of eggs (%)   1078  82%  0.005  0 to 100% 
Average number of chickens per 
clutch surviving to adulthood  
1076  5.70  0.07  0 to 12 
Survivability of chickens (%)  1072  63.6%  0.01  0 to 100% 
Muscovy 
ducks 
Eggs produced/clutch  152  12.43  0.23  4 to 20 
Number of clutches laid per year  138  2.02  0.35  1 to 4 
Hatchability of eggs (%)  149     83%  0.01  0 to 100% 
Average number of ducklings per 
clutch surviving to adulthood 
124  7.25  0.31  0 to 18 
Survivability of Muscovy 
ducklings (%) 
123  69%  0.02    0 to 100% 
Layer 
Ducks 
Eggs produced/clutch  72  19.56  0.98  3 to 30 
Number of clutches laid per year   47      2.43   0.79  1 to 3 
Hatchability of eggs (%)  41  78%  0.02  0 to 100% 
Average number of ducklings 
surviving to adulthood 
37  14.59  0.68  6 to 20 
Survivability of ducklings (%)  37  72%  0.02  0 to 100% 
*n is the number of households interviewed that provided an answer to that question. 
3.3.1.4  Loss of poultry from households 
A  range  of  factors  contributed  to  losses  of  poultry  in  Timor  Leste.  The  most 
important  factors  included  predation  (>70%)  and  disease  (>30%)  (Table  3.4). 
Approximately 41.1% (3934/9569) of chickens and 67.9% (610/900) of Muscovy 
and laying ducks died due to all factors combined.  
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Table 3.4. Poultry losses reported by farmers. 
Species  Cause of 
mortality 
#HH (%)  Total lost  Mean  SE of 
mean 
Range 
Village 
chickens 
Disease  523 (48.2)  1289  2.46  0.069  1 to 11 
Predation  839 (77.4)  2258  2.69  0.060  1 to 17 
Bad weather  130 (12.0)  251  1.93  0.081  1 to 6 
Other causes  78 (7.2)  136  1.74  0.084  1 to 4 
Total HH  1084  3934  3.61  0.08  0 to 22 
Muscovy 
and  laying 
ducks 
Disease  54 (31.6)  144  2.67  0.220  1 to 6 
Predation  122 (71.3)  344  2.82  0.149  1 to 10 
Bad weather  26 (15.2)  57  2.19  0.288  1 to7 
Other causes  30 (17.5)  65  2.17  0.401  1 to 12 
Total HH  171  610  4.68  0.211  1 to 21 
Note: Some households (HH) lost birds through more than one cause 
The average number of village chickens lost per farmer from disease, predation or 
bad  weather  was  2.5,  2.7  and  1.9  respectively.  For  ducks  (C.  moschata  and  A. 
platyrhynchos), the mean number of birds lost per year due to disease, predation and 
bad weather was 2.7, 2.8 and 2.2 respectively (Table 3.4). 
3.3.1.4.1  Predators 
Predation appears to be a dominant factor contributing to loss of poultry in Timor 
Leste.  In  village  chickens,  this  factor  accounted  for  77.4%  (839/1084)  of  all 
households  and  represented  23.6%  (2258/9569)  of  the  total  chicken  population 
present in the interviewed households. In ducks (A. platyrhynchos and C. moschata) 
71.3% (122/171) of ducks owning households lost ducks from predation and this 
represented 38.2% (344/900) of the total duck population in the surveyed households 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.4) The most important predators reported by the interviewees were 
dogs, feral cats and pigs, however cannibalism by other birds was also reported by 
some farmers.  
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3.3.1.4.2  Poultry disease 
The second most important factor resulting in death was disease. Some birds died 
from disease in 48.2% (523/1084) of households and 13.5% (1289/9569) of all birds 
died  from  disease.  Disease  was  reported  in  31.6%  (54/171)  of  duck-owning 
households  and  this  represented  16%  (144/900)  of  all  ducks  present  in  the 
households (see Tables 3.1 and 3.4). 
3.3.1.4.3  Bad weather and other factors 
Twelve  percent  (130/1084)  of  households  lost  chickens  and  15.2%  (26/171)  of 
households  lost  ducks  from  bad  weather  (Table  3.4).  Overall  inclement  weather 
accounted for the death of 2.6% (251/9569) and 6.3% (57/900) of all chickens and 
ducks respectively. Other factors that contributed to loss of poultry included children 
killing birds, being stolen or being hit by a vehicle (Table 3.4). 
3.3.1.5  Poultry consumption by households 
Chickens were mainly slaughtered for home consumption and were sometimes sold 
to  generate  income.  Chickens  and  ducks  were  generally  consumed  infrequently 
(monthly  or  less)  (Table  3.5).  Poultry  were  frequently  consumed  during  special 
occasions such as for traditional ceremonies, during Christmas, New Year, special 
religious days (such as All Saints Day) and for the start of the rice and corn harvest. 
Only 5% of households slaughtered chickens every week (mean of 1.2 head - Table 
3.5). 
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Table  3.5.  Frequency  of  consumption  of  poultry  by  interviewed  households 
(n=1089). 
Species   Frequency of 
consumption 
Percentage of 
households 
Mean number of 
birds consumed 
SE  Range 
Village 
chickens 
Weekly  5.1  1.20  0.07  1 to 3 
Monthly  46.7  1.22  0.02  1 to 4 
Other times*  51.1  2.15  0.06  1 to 10 
Muscovy 
and layer 
ducks 
Weekly  2.0  1.33  0.33  1 to 2 
Monthly  50  2.04  0.32  1 to 12 
Other times*  48  1.42  0.17  0 to 10 
*Special events such as traditional ceremonies, Christmas and at harvest. 
3.3.1.6  Loss of eggs 
Of 1089 households, 47.8% (520/1089) reported having lost poultry eggs during the 
preceding year. Eggs were frequently lost by households through breakage (81%) 
and predation (68%) (Table 3.6). Of the 520 households who reported losing eggs, 
25.8% of eggs produced (2829/10953) were lost. 
Table 3.6. Factors causing loss of eggs (n=520). 
 Factor  Households               Eggs lost 
    n  % households  Mean  SE  Range 
Breakage  421  81.0  5.60  0.15  1 to 18 
Predation  355  68.3  6.22  0.16  1 to 18 
Other causes  101  19.4  7.98  0.30  2 to 13 
 
3.3.1.7  Consumption of eggs by households 
Members from all 1089 households interviewed consumed eggs. In Table 3.7 the 
frequency of egg consumption is summarised.  Of the 1069 households that reported 
the  frequency  of  consumption,  a  total  of  5965  hens  were  kept  (average  5.6  per 
household)  which  produced  11637  eggs  (average  10.9  per  household).  Of  these 
households, the number of eggs consumed was 3008 (average of 25.8% of eggs 
produced, range 0 to 100%).  
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Table 3.7. Frequency of egg consumption by 1069 households 
  Number of 
households* 
Percent  Mean number of 
eggs consumed per 
period 
SE  Range 
Weekly  123  12  2.20  0.11  1 to 7 
Monthly  448  42  2.13  0.07  1 to 12 
Consumed at special 
occasions 
716  67  3.36  0.09  1 to 17 
*The number of households exceeds 1069 because some households/respondents provided more than 1 answer 
3.3.1.8  Selling of eggs by households 
Over half (58.8%) of the households had sold village chicken eggs during the year 
prior to the survey. These eggs were sold at an average price of 15 US cents. In 
contrast 76.6% of laying duck owning households sold eggs (average price of 28 US 
cents) and 60.4% of Muscovy owning households sold eggs for an average price of 
36 US cents. Four households interviewed purchased hen eggs from shops and then 
resold them at markets or from small kiosks (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8. Total eggs sold by farmers and their prices 
Egg type  N*  % of  farmers 
selling eggs 
Total eggs sold  Price of each egg 
Mean  SE  Mean (USD)  SE 
Village chicken  1075  58.8  18.4  0.065  0.15  0.002 
Duck   47  76.6  10.3  0.9  0.28  0.01 
Muscovy  169  60.4  10.3  0.58  0.36  0.12 
Laying hens   4  100  17.6  14.19  0.28  0.08 
*Number of households who own that kind of bird 
3.3.2  Marketing of village poultry 
3.3.2.1  Type of traders 
From  388  traders  (and  farmers)  interviewed,  two  types  of  poultry  traders  were 
identified: farmers (73.5% of all traders) who came to the market to sell their own 
poultry for income; and traders who purchased poultry from other people and on-
sold them in the markets (26.5% of all traders).  
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Traders (n = 143) who ―on-sold‖ chickens sourced birds from local markets in the 
same district (35.7%), from a village in the same district (25.9%), from a distributor 
in the same district (5.6%), from a market in another district (21.7%), from a farmer 
in a village in another district (5.5%) or from a distributor in another district (5.6%). 
3.3.2.2  Selling of poultry in the 13 districts 
All (n=388) poultry traders interviewed sold village chickens with an average of 15 
(14.7) village chickens available for selling at the time of interview. A few (2.1%) 
traders sold Muscovy and had an average of 4 (3.8) Muscovy available for sale, 
which they sold at irregular times. Of those who sold village chickens, the frequency 
of  selling  birds  varied  from  daily  to  monthly.  Most  farmers/traders  sold  poultry 
every week (40.2%), 25.8% sold them monthly, 18% sold them daily and 16% sold 
them in other times (irregular times). Farmers who sold poultry daily had on average 
13 chickens for sale and of these four would be sold per day. The farmers/traders 
who undertook weekly poultry trading would have an average of 6.7 birds for sale of 
which four chickens would be sold, whereas those who sold poultry monthly had 10 
chickens for sale of which eight would be sold weekly (Table 3.9). 
The price of village chickens sold differs between village chickens and Muscovy. 
The price of village (3.6 to 8.5 USD) chickens was higher than Muscovy ducks (3.5 
to 5.1 USD). 
3.3.2.3  Selling of poultry in high and low risk districts 
Significantly more village chickens were available for sale from households in low-
risk districts (mean of 16 chickens available for sale per year) than from households 
in high risk districts (11.9) (F: 3.85, df: 1, p= 0.05). In contrast, similar numbers of  
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Muscovy ducks were sold from households in low (4.3) and high risk (3.3) districts 
(F: 0.24, df: 1, p= 0.640).  
Table 3.9. Sale of poultry 
   Number of 
traders (%) 
Mean   SE  Range 
Live birds available for sale every day  70 (18)  13.3  1.8  1 - 70 
Live birds sold every day  70 (18)    3.9  0.6  0 - 40 
Live birds available for sale every week  156 (40.2)    6.7  0.5  1 - 50 
Live birds sold every week  156 (40.2)    4.3  0.3  0 - 30 
Live birds available for sale every month  100 (25.8)  10.2  0.9  1 - 50 
Live birds sold every month  100 (25.8)    8.3  0.6  1 - 28 
Live birds available for sale at other 
intervals 
62 (16)    6.3  0.9  1 - 25 
Live poultry sold at other intervals  62 (16)    5.4  0.8  1 - 25 
The lowest price of a village chicken 
received (USD) 
380 (97.9)    3.6  0.1  1 - 17 
The highest price of a village chicken 
received (USD) 
379 (97.7)    8.5  0.2  2 - 40 
The lowest price of a Muscovy duck 
received (USD) 
7 (87.5)    3.5  0.2  3 - 4 
The highest price of a Muscovy duck 
received (USD) 
7 (87.5)    5.1  0.4  4 - 6 
The mean lowest price obtained by households from the sale of a village chicken in 
the high risk district or border districts (USD 4.0) was significantly higher than for 
households in low risk districts (USD 3.43) (F: 8.57, df: 1, p= 0.004). Similarly the 
mean highest price obtained from the sale of a chicken by households in the high risk 
districts was higher than for households located in the low risk districts (9.4 and 8.15 
USD respectively: F: 5.55, df: 1, p= 0.02). 
In contrast the mean lowest and highest price obtained for the sale of Muscovy ducks 
by households in high risk districts (USD 3.25 and 4.75 respectively) and low risk 
districts (USD 3.83 and 5.67 respectively) (Table 3.10) were similar (F: 2.06, df: 1, 
p= 0.21 for the lowest price; F: 1.5, df: 1, p= 0.28 for the highest price). 
    
62 
 
Table 3.10. Prices of poultry in high and low risk districts (USD). 
Description  Risk category  N  Mean  SE  Range 
The lowest price of a village 
chickens 
Low risk 
district 
261  3.43  0.097  1 to 10 
High risk 
district 
119  4.03  0.220  2 to 17 
Total  380  3.62  0.097   1 to 17 
The highest price of a 
village chicken 
Low risk 
district 
260  8.15  0.269  2 to 25 
High risk 
district 
119  9.39  0.507  2 to 40 
Total  379  8.54  0.245   2 to 40 
The lowest price of a 
Muscovy 
Low risk 
district 
3  3.83  0.167  4 to 4 
High risk 
district 
4  3.25  0.323  3 to 4 
Total  7  3.5  0.218   3 to 4 
The highest price of a 
Muscovy 
Low risk 
district 
3  5.67  0.333  5 to 6 
High risk 
district 
4  4.75  0.595  4 to 6 
Total  7  5.14  0.389   4 to 6 
 
3.3.3  Marketing of poultry eggs  
3.3.3.1  Selling of eggs in 13 districts 
Most (82%, n=390) egg traders interviewed only sold eggs from village chickens 
with an average of 21.4 eggs available for selling at the time of interview. Eleven 
percent of traders interviewed sold eggs only from commercial layer flocks and had 
an average of 198 eggs available for sale. One percent of traders interviewed only 
sold Muscovy eggs with an average of 9.6 available for selling. The remainder of 
respondents (6%) sold eggs from village chickens along with eggs from Muscovy 
ducks or commercial layers. 
Of the egg traders interviewed, 64% sold eggs only produced by their own poultry, 
while the remaining 36% purchased them from other farmers and resold them. Of 
these latter farmers/traders the various sources of eggs is summarised in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3. Source of poultry eggs purchased (n=140). 
Eggs were sold either from the trader‘s/farmer‘s house, kiosks or were transported to 
the local market. Some traders purchased eggs directly from households and then 
resold  them  at  the  local  markets  in  the  same  district  (18%).  Alternatively  some 
traders purchased eggs at their local market from farmers and then resold these eggs 
in another districts (Figure 3.3). 
The frequency of selling poultry eggs varied from daily to monthly. Most farmers 
and traders sold eggs every week (42%), selling an average of 26 eggs per week. 
Twenty six percent of traders sold eggs monthly (average 28.5 sold per month) and 
few (16%) sold  them daily (average  92.3 eggs sold  daily).  Those who sell eggs 
everyday are mostly selling commercial layer eggs in kiosk or shops. The rest of 
respondents (16%) sell eggs in every other time interval (Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11. Frequency of selling eggs from poultry (n=387). 
Frequency  n (traders)  Percent  Mean  SE  Range 
Every day  61   16  92.3  22.1  5 - 720 
Every week  163   42  26.0  2.0  3 - 160 
Every month  100   26  28.5  5.9  3 - 336 
Other times  63   16  31.2  11.3  2 - 600 
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In all districts, the price of eggs sold varied from 14 to 28 US cents. The price for 
eggs from village chickens (14 to 20 cents) and Muscovy ducks (17 to 23 cents) was 
lower than that obtained for eggs from layers (21 to 28 cents - Table 3.12). 
Table 3.12. Price (US cents) of poultry eggs (n=357). 
Source of eggs  Number of 
traders  
Lowest price  Highest price 
Mean  SE  Mean  SE 
Village chickens  277 (78%)  14.2  0.27  20.4  0.3 
Muscovy ducks  30 (8%)  16.8  0.91  23.2  1.03 
Layer ducks  0 (0%)             
Layer chickens  50 (14%)  20.5  0.49  27.7  1.07 
 
3.3.3.2  Selling of eggs in high and low risk districts 
The mean number of eggs sold in high and low risk districts for AIV was similar 
(Table 3.13) (all p values > 0.05).  
Table 3.13. Number of eggs sold from high and low AIV risk districts. 
Type of egg  Status of district  N  Mean  SE  Range 
Village chickens   Low risk   238  21.85  1.49  3-160 
High risk   104  20.35  1.51  4-60 
Total  342  21.39  1.13  3-160 
 Muscovy  Low risk   9  8.11  0.96  4-12 
High risk   14  10.50  1.35  5-20 
Total  23  9.57  0.92  4-20 
Chicken 
commercial 
layers 
Low risk   41  218.05  31.37  30-720 
High risk  8  97.50  40.39  30-360 
Total  49  198.37  27.69  30-720 
 
In contrast the price of some types of eggs did vary between districts (Table 3.14). 
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Table 3.14. Price of eggs in high and low AI risk districts (US cents). 
   Status of 
district  
N  Mean price 
(US cents) 
SE  Range 
Lowest price of 
eggs from village 
chickens  
Low risk   185  13.7
a  0.25  10 - 20 
High risk   92  15.2
a  0.64  10 - 25 
Total  277  14.2  0.27  10 - 25 
Highest price of 
eggs from village 
chickens 
Low risk   184  19.9  0.30  10 - 25 
High risk   92  21.5  0.67  15 - 50 
Total  276  20.4  0.30  10 - 50 
Lowest price of 
Muscovy eggs 
Low risk   17  16.5  1.41  10 - 25 
High risk   13  17.3  1.08  10 - 25 
Total  30  16.8  0.91  10 - 25 
Highest price of 
Muscovy eggs 
Low risk   17  22.4  1.61  15 - 30 
High risk   13  24.2  1.11  15 - 30 
Total  30  23.2  1.03  15 - 30 
Lowest price of 
layer eggs 
Low risk   42  20.6  0.57  10 - 30 
High risk   8  20.2  0.80  16.7 - 25 
Total  50  20.5  0.49  10 - 30 
Highest price of 
layer eggs 
Low risk   42  25.8
b  0.72  20 - 40 
High risk   8  37.5
b  4.23  20 - 50 
Total  50  27.7  1.07  20 - 50 
Superscripts with the same letter are significantly different (P < 0.05) 
3.4  Discussion 
3.4.1  Main poultry industry 
In  Timor  Leste,  there  are  two  forms  of  industry  involving  chickens,  i.e.  village 
chickens and laying hens. Of these two, the most numerous chickens kept by farmers 
are village chickens (mean 8.89 per household) (Section 3.3.1.1). This finding is in 
agreement with the results of the census conducted in 2004 by the National Statistics 
Directorate (Craven et al., 2006). The least numerous type of chickens kept were 
commercial chicken layers. 
In 2004, there were only a few commercial laying hens, i.e. 3711 head (Livestock 
Office data base) and these had been imported from Indonesia. However, since the 
outbreak of HPAI in  Indonesia, the importation into Timor Leste of poultry and 
poultry products from Indonesia has been banned (Dispatch of Ministry Agriculture 
Forestry  and  Fisheries  No.  03/79/GM/III/04).  Commercial  chicken  layers  have  
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recently (end of 2009) been re-established in Timor Leste with a total of 24700 
layers imported from Malaysia (TS, 2010).  
3.4.2  Performance of poultry 
The average number of clutches produced per adult hen per year was 2.6 (range 1 to 
6).  This  finding  is  similar  to  that  reported  in  other  countries  such  as  Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh and Kenya with a range from two to three clutches/hen/year (Menge et 
al., 2005; Mogesse, 2007; Das et al., 2008b). The average number of eggs per clutch 
was 11 (range 3 to 26) which also is similar to that reported by others. For example, 
the mean number of eggs per clutch recorded in Burkina Faso, Western Africa was 
11.8 ± 0.2 (Kondombo et al., 2003), in Tanzania 11.8 ± 3.4 (Mwaluasanya et al., 
2001) and in Zimbabwe 12.4 ± 1.62 to 16.6 ± 1.74. The range in the number of eggs 
produced per clutch reported in this study was wider than that reported from other 
countries. For instance, the range of the number of eggs per clutch in Ethiopia was 9 
- 19 eggs laid/clutch/hen (Mogesse, 2007), in rural Africa 9 to 15 (Kitalyi, 1998a) 
and in Bangladesh 12 to 17 (Das et al., 2008b). 
The mean hatchability of eggs from village chickens and Muscovy ducks in this 
study was:  82.3 and 83.3% respectively. Similar findings have been  reported by 
others (67% in Sri Lanka (Gunaratne et al., 1991), 74% in Indonesia (Sartika and 
Noor, 2005), 75% in Bangladesh (Das et al., 2008b), and 50 to 83% in African 
countries (Kitalyi, 1998a; Mwaluasanya et al., 2001; Missohou  et al., 2002; Tadelle 
et al., 2003; Maphosa et al., 2004) in chickens. Similar hatchability of ducks have 
been reported in Bangladesh (75 to 95%) (Das et al., 2008b) and Kenya 83% (Menge 
et al., 2005).  
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In  contrast  to  hatchability,  survivability  of  the  young  of  village  chickens  and 
Muscovy and layer ducks in this study was 64, 69 and 37% respectively meaning 
only just over half the chicks/ducklings hatched would survive to adulthood (Table 
3.3).  This  finding  is  also  similar  to  that  reported  for  village  chickens  in  other 
countries. Studies in Tanzania reported survivability to the age of 10 weeks of 60% 
(Mwaluasanya et al., 2001) and from 50 to 70% in Kenya (Musiime, 1991; Menge et 
al., 2005). In contrast the survivability of village chickens was reported to be higher 
in Ethiopia (82%) (Mogesse, 2007), but lower, in general, in rural Africa (average of 
33%) (Kitalyi, 1998a). 
3.4.3  The loss of poultry in Timor Leste 
The loss of young chickens in Timor Leste has been estimated to be as high as 60% 
(Copland et al., 2003). In the current study the most important factors resulting in 
loss  of  poultry  in  Timor  Leste  were  predators,  diseases  and  bad  weather  with 
approximately 41.1% of village chickens lost due to these factors combined (Section 
3.3.1.4). These contributing factors are similar to those reported by others; however 
losses from disease are more prevalent in the reports by other researchers outside 
Timor Leste. For example over 90% of the owners of chickens reported deaths in 
some chickens in Ethiopia (Halima et al., 2007). 
Predation was a dominant factor contributing to loss of poultry in the present study. 
This factor accounted for over 70% of all losses for both village chickens and ducks 
(Table 3.4). This is due to the fact that the free ranging management system allows 
village chickens and ducks to be exposed to predators (Copland et al., 2003). The 
second most important factor for mortality was disease (48.2% and 31.6% of all 
loses from village chickens and ducks respectively) (Table 3.4). Although a specific  
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disease/agent was not identified in the current study, it is likely that most disease was 
caused by infection with NDV. This is due to the fact that ND is prevalent in most 
countries (Martin, 1991), including Timor Leste (da Cruz, 2003; Alders and Amaral, 
2006).  In  Nigeria  mortality  due  to  ND  was  reported  to  vary  from  75  to  78% 
(Olabode et al., 1991), in Kenya 80 to 90% (Musiime, 1991), and 90% in Nepal 
(Mishra, 1991). 
Although ND is endemic in Timor Leste, no specific surveys have been undertaken 
for this disease. However some joint surveys conducted by MAF Timor Leste (MAF 
TL)  and  the  Northern  Australian  Quarantine  Services  (NAQS)  for  AI  have 
simultaneously collected samples for testing for NDV. A joint survey in March 2006 
revealed  that  nine  of  124  village  chickens  tested  were  seropositive  for  ND 
(prevalence of 7.2% with 95% CI: 3.4 - 13.3%) and four of 27 sera from ducks were 
positive (prevalence of 14.8% with 95% CI: 4.2 - 33.7%) (NAQS, 2006). The result 
of  a  survey  in  2009  revealed  that  the  overall  seroprevalence  of  ND  was  10.6% 
(38/358) (95% CI: 7.6 - 14.3%) (Antonino do Karmo, personal communication). The 
Timor Leste Government, through the Livestock Division, provides free vaccination 
against ND in an attempt to control this disease. 
Another  factor  contributing  to  losses  in  poultry  included  bad  weather  (12%  of 
households reported that they had lost chickens due to this factor and 15.2% had lost 
ducks)  (Table  3.4).  Climatic  stress  can  lower  poultry  immunity  leading  to  the 
occurrence of disease. The stress associated with the change in weather, especially at 
the change of season, has been reported to affect the immunity of chickens and make 
them  more  susceptible  to  disease  (Hangalapura  et  al.,  2004).  Epidemics  of  ND 
usually occur at times of climatic stress, resulting in a seasonal occurrence of the  
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disease  (Awan  et  al.,  1994).  Climatic  stress  may  include  extremely  high 
temperatures and wet weather. In Timor Leste there is a dry season from July to 
November, with the average temperature in lowland and coastal areas during the day 
ranging from 31 to 33°C (Trainor et al., 2007). However in highland areas (1200 m 
above  sea  level)  the  temperature  varies  between  15  and  21
oC  (de  sa  Benevides, 
2003). As these temperatures are not extreme, it is unlikely that poultry die from 
exposure  to  inclement  weather.  However,  weather  condition  may  impact  on  the 
scavenging feed resource base and so can lead to malnutrition should be inadequate 
feed available to the flock. 
3.4.4  Poultry marketing and their movement between high and low risk 
districts 
In this study the movement of poultry between districts was relatively uncommon. 
Any movement of poultry between districts was most commonly attributed to a few 
traders. The main movement of poultry found in this study was within districts and 
villages by farmers taking birds to their local market. 
Chickens sold for consumption are sourced from live village chickens and frozen 
chickens.  Frozen  chickens  are  imported  from  Brazil,  Australia,  New  Zealand, 
Malaysia and Singapore (QTL, 2008). These are sold as whole frozen chickens in the 
larger supermarkets of the major cities. Village chickens are primarily sold as live 
birds in local markets throughout the entire country. 
More live village chickens were available for selling in low AI risk districts (mean of 
16  chickens  available  for  selling  per  year)  than  in  high  AI  risk  districts  (11.9) 
(Section 3.3.2.3). This could indicate that the potential for the movement of poultry 
from a high risk district to a low risk district is low. The lower number of birds and  
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less frequent movement of poultry in high risk districts is beneficial in the control of 
an outbreak of AI.  Furthermore the price differential  between high and low risk 
districts where the price of chickens was higher in high risk districts also helps direct 
the flow of birds from low to high risk districts (Section 3.3.2.3). The movement of 
poultry has been identified as the major source for the dissemination and spread of 
AI (Morris and Jackson, 2005; Webster et al., 2006). 
However if the price of chickens in  Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) - Indonesia is 
lower than that in border districts of Timor Leste, it could encourage farmers and 
traders in the border areas to purchase chickens illegally from NTT. The purchase of 
chickens (dead or alive) from NTT is banned by the Government of Timor Leste 
(Dispatch No. 03/79/GM/III/04) (MAFP, 2004).  
The price of village chickens in NTT (in 2010) varies from Rp.30,000 (USD 3.31) to 
Rp.60,000 (USD 6.62) with an average of Rp. 45,000 (USD 4.96) (Dr. Maria Geong, 
personal communication). This price is lower than the price of chickens in border 
districts, which ranges from US$ 4 to US$ 9 (Section 3.3.2.3). This price differential 
could encourage the smuggling of chickens from NTT into the border districts of 
Timor Leste. 
The majority (82%) of eggs used by the households (Section 3.3.3.2) originated from 
their  own  village  chickens,  with  the  remaining  mainly  originating  from  eggs 
imported from countries free from infection with HPAI. The countries that are listed 
by Quarantine Timor Leste (QTL) which can export eggs to Timor Leste include 
Australia, Singapore and Malaysia (MAFP, 2004; Alders and Amaral, 2006; QTL, 
2008). However it is also well known that some eggs are illegally traded across the 
border of Timor Leste and NTT (Larsen, 2009). This is likely to arise because of the  
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price differential for eggs between border districts (high risk districts) of Timor Leste 
and NTT. In the high risk districts of Timor Leste the price of commercial layer 
chicken eggs can vary from 15.22 to 37.50 US cents. In contrast in NTT the price 
varies from 11 to 14 US cents with an average of 12 US cents (Dr Maria Geong, 
personal communication). This may result in the smuggling of eggs from NTT into 
Timor Leste. And if these eggs contaminated with faecal material, they have the 
potential role in the spread of HPAI (Cappucci et al., 1985; Capua and Alexander, 
2006; Promkuntod et al., 2006). As there have been no outbreaks of HPAI reported 
in West Timor after October 2004 (Dr. Maria Geong, personal communication), this 
potential illegal movement is, at the time of study, likely to play a minor role in the 
introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste. However if birds or eggs are smuggled from 
other infected regions of Indonesia (such as Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi or Bali where 
the disease is endemic) (FAOAIDE, 2010a) then a significant risk of introducing the 
disease to Timor Leste exists. 
Although the farmers and traders interviewed did not volunteer that they had sourced 
eggs  or  poultry  (especially  fighting  cocks)  through  unofficial  trading  across  the 
border, people (other than those interviewed) living in the border districts reported 
that unofficial trading of eggs and fighting cocks was common. The issue of this 
unofficial trading will be addressed in the risk assessment survey of AI outlined in 
Chapters Eight and Nine. 
3.4.5  The potential impact on households if HPAI is introduced 
If HPAI is introduced into Timor Leste, it will have both direct and indirect impacts 
upon households. These impacts can be seen primarily through a loss of income and 
a loss of available protein for consumption (Diwyanto and Iskandar, 1999). Village  
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chickens are raised by the majority of the rural population in Timor Leste (>80%) 
and  these  birds  represent  an  important  source  of  protein  and  income  for  the 
household. They act as a ―living bank‖ and can be sold when farmers need money. 
Most farmers/traders sold poultry every week (40%) (Section 3.3.2.2), and sold an 
average of 4 birds from the 6.7 available birds for sale (Table 3.9). The average price 
for a village chicken varied but generally ranged from 4 to 9 USD (Table 3.9). Based 
on this information it is estimated that if at least 4 chickens are sold every week, in a 
month a poultry trader could earn between 64 and 144 USD. If HPAI was introduced 
this income could potentially all be lost. 
It is common for farmers to sell chickens to provide money to pay for school fees for 
their children. If AI is present the high initial mortality rate (Elbers et al., 2004) will 
result  in  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  birds  available  for  selling  and  thus  some 
farmers may not be able to send their children to school. Furthermore an outbreak of 
AI will result in a reduction in available protein through a lowered egg production 
and  less  birds  available  for  slaughter.  This  has  the  potential  to  contribute  to 
malnutrition  in  households.  Eggs  are  the  cheapest  source  of  protein  available  to 
farmers as most chickens are raised with minimal inputs (de Alwis, 1991).  
3.5  Conclusions 
This  study  demonstrated  that  poultry,  in  particular  village  chickens,  play  an 
important role as a source of income generation in Timor Leste. However, many 
chickens are lost due to several factors. Losses due to predation and diseases were 
identified as major limitations to village chicken production in Timor Leste. Rural 
poultry  production,  as  a  means  to  combat  poverty,  could  be  increased  if  these  
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constraints  are  properly  targeted  and  overcome,  particularly  if  the  rate  of 
reproduction can be improved and the mortality reduced. 
In general, in terms of management and productivity, the findings of this study are 
similar  to  those  reported  from  other  studies  investigating  traditional  poultry 
production systems. These systems allow village chickens to be in close proximity to 
wild birds and hence increase the risk of transmission of HPAI from wild birds to 
domestic poultry. 
Poultry and eggs are generally marketed weekly and as the price of eggs and poultry 
in AI high risk districts was higher than that of low risk districts it is unlikely that 
products will flow into low risk areas. However there is a potential for movement of 
eggs and poultry from NTT into the border districts of Timor Leste. If NTT is not 
free from HPAI, then there is a potential threat of introducing the disease into Timor 
Leste from these illegal movements. 
The next chapter of this thesis uses data reported in the current chapter to estimate 
the  population  of  village  chickens  in  Timor  Leste,  which  then  will  be  used  to 
calculate the confidence in the country‘s disease freedom (Chapters Five and Seven).  
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CHAPTER 4:  DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS TO 
ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF VILLAGE CHICKENS 
IN TIMOR LESTE 
4.1  Introduction 
Many animals, including poultry, were killed or lost during the independence crisis 
in  1999  (Copland  et  al.,  2003).  Therefore  the  poultry  population  in  1999  was 
estimated as only 350,000, which was only slightly more than the number present in 
1983 (283,000) prior to independence (Rasyaf, 1983). In contrast in the two years 
following the independence crisis, the number had nearly doubled to 671,000 (da 
Cruz, 2003) and in 2004 it was estimated that up to 800,000 birds were present 
(Table 4.1).  
Table  4.1.  Poultry  population  in  Timor  Leste  (source:  Livestock  Office  and 
Statistics Office). 
 
District 
Census 2004            MAF data 2004  Total 
number 
(MAF) 
Chickens (Village 
chickens and 
layers) 
Village 
chickens 
Layers 
(hens) 
Ducks 
Aileu  17353  15543  606  621  16858 
Ainaro  28688  69073  30  2268  71371 
Baucau  73925  71415  0  883  73280 
Bobonaro  70077  63067  168  1275  64510 
Covalima  37622  59245  234  2519  61998 
Dili  59949  90732  1364  6183  98279 
Ermera  50871  26395  175  804  27525 
Lautem  68481  68517  905  1880  69975 
Liquiça  44853  96236  0  311  98116 
Manatuto  23741  17327  209  1304  18840 
Manufahi  31367  27853  20  51  28783 
Oecusse  61977  111418  0  910  111469 
Viqueque  90162  59483  0  1046  60529 
Total  659066  776304  3711  20055  801533 
 
Apart from the data reported in Table 4.1, the number of poultry in Timor Leste has 
not been recently counted or estimated. For the purposes of this thesis, a more recent  
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poultry  population,  other  than  the  last  census  count  in  2004,  is  needed.  This 
population data are specifically required for the analysis of existing animal health 
data to support freedom of HPAI (Chapter Five) and the calculations used in Chapter 
Seven  to  confirm  the  countries  freedom  from  HPAI  by  targeted  surveillance. 
Therefore, in this chapter the creation of a computer model to estimate the number of 
poultry in Timor Leste is reported.  
4.2  Materials and methods 
4.2.1  Data gathering method 
The model produced to estimate the poultry population uses the census base data and 
then calculates the population at subsequent annual intervals. 
Village chicken population data for 2004 was sourced from the National Statistics 
Directorate Timor Leste‘s web site (http://dne.mof.gov.tl/index.htm). In the Statistics 
Office, the chicken population was listed only down to the district level. The model 
of the village chicken population reported in this chapter was developed based on 
this census data from 2004. The model was created using several input variables. 
These variables are described in Table 4.2 and in the subsequent sections.  
4.2.2  Method of calculations 
After collections the data from the 2004 Census and on poultry production (Chapter 
Three) the number of new chickens produced through hatching and the remaining 
number of adults (adults that survive culling, mortality or other loses) during a year 
were calculated to determine the total population at the end of each year.  
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Table 4.2. Variables used to estimate the population of village chickens  
Variables  Source of data 
Chicken population in the district at the 
beginning (C0D ) 
Census 2004 
Chicken population in the village at the 
beginning (C0V) 
Estimated using the number of chickens in a district 
and  the  number  of  households  in  a  village  in  the 
district 
Proportion of females and males  Chapter Three 
Proportion of females that are capable 
of laying eggs 
Targeted surveillance (July 2009) 
The number of eggs that are produced 
per hen/clutch/year 
Chapter Three 
Number of clutches per hen/year  Chapter Three 
Hatchability  Chapter Three 
Number of eggs lost per year  Chapter Three 
Chicken and adult mortality rate  Chapter Three 
Culling rate  Chapter Three 
 
The total population was estimated for the years 2005 to 2009. After the village 
chicken  population  was  estimated  for  each  year,  the  annual  growth  rate  was 
estimated by dividing the number of new chickens added to the existing population 
by the total number of village chickens at the beginning. 
The model was developed in Excel 2007 with the add-in software PopTools version 
3.5 (Hood, 2008). Due to uncertainty most of the input variables were simulated 
using distribution variables in PopTools. The 95% CI of total chickens population in 
district  level  was  calculated  using  Monte  Carlo  analysis  in  PopTools  with  1000 
iterations. 
4.2.3  Description of input variables for the model 
4.2.3.1  Number of village chickens at the start at the district and village level 
There are two sources of population data for chickens in Timor Leste: data from the 
livestock office, MAF; and 2004 census data from the National Statistics Directorate 
Office (NSDO) as described in Table 4.1.  
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The simulations reported in this chapter were based on the census data from 2004. 
This source was chosen as it was believed to be more reliable than other data. The 
existing data from the livestock office are incomplete because of missing data for 
some villages. Moreover, the number of villages listed in the livestock office data 
base (492) did not agree with the current number of villages in Timor Leste (442) 
(Craven et al., 2006). 
According to the 2004 census the number of village chickens was 659,066 (Table 
4.1).  However  as  the  2004  census  data  were  only  available  at  the  district  level 
(Craven et al., 2006), the number of chickens in a village was estimated. The data 
used to estimate the number of chickens in villages were:  
1)  Number of chickens in the district 
2)  The total number of households (THh) in the district (Table 4.3) and villages 
3)  Number of villages in each district. 
All  these  data  were  available  from  the  NSDO‘s  website 
(http://dne.mof.gov.tl/index.htm). Based on the number of chickens and households 
present in the district the average number of chickens per household (CkPHh) was 
calculated (Table 4.3). The total village chicken population (TVCk) in each village 
was  achieved by multiplying THh in  a village by CkPHh in  that village.  It  was 
assumed that the CkPHh for villages in the same district were similar. The number of 
chickens in village ―i‖ (NCkVi) was the product of the number of households in 
village ―i‖ (HouseHi) and the number of chickens per household (Ck/HouseH) in the 
district where village ―i‖ belongs (Equation 4.1). 
]   household per  Chicken    of Number     x     household   of [Number  i
13
1
i
442
1  
d v
i NCkV   Equation 4.1 
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Table 4.3. Number of households, chickens and average number of chickens per 
household in 2004 (Census 2004) 
District  Number of 
households 
(Hh) 
Number of 
chickens 
Average number of chickens 
per household (CkPHh) 
Aileu  7745  17353  2.2 
Ainaro  11527  28688  2.5 
Baucau  22659  73925  3.3 
Bobonaro  18397  70077  3.8 
Covalima  11820  37622  3.2 
Dili  31575  59949  1.9 
Ermera  21165  50871  2.4 
Lautem  12998  68481  5.3 
Liquiça  11063  44853  4.1 
Manatuto  8338  23741  2.8 
Manufahi  8901  31367  3.5 
Oecusse  13659  61977  4.5 
Viqueque  15115  90162  6.0 
Total (Timor Leste)  194962  659066  3.4 
 
4.2.3.2  Proportion of females and males.  
The number of male and female birds was calculated based on the ratio of 0.37:0.63 
from the survey of the chicken population from October to December 2008 (Chapter 
Three). 
After  the  total  village  chickens  (TVCk)  in  each  village  was  calculated,  the  total 
number  of  females  and  males  was  calculated  based  on  the  proportion  of  hens 
(PrpHn) and cocks (PrpCk) as TVCk* PrpHn and TVCk* PrpCk respectively. It was 
assumed that the proportion of cocks and hens remained the same over time and the 
increase in the number of poultry did not influence the proportion or level of culling. 
4.2.3.3  The proportion of hens laying eggs 
The  proportion  of  hens  that  are  capable  of  laying  eggs  was  based  on  the  data 
collected in 2009. In July 2009 of 159 household interviewed, 151 reported having 
female chickens (hens) and hens in lay. In these 151 households 1249 hens were 
owned  of  which  288  were  in  lay  (HIL)  at  the  time  of  interviewing.  The  mean  
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proportion of HIL is 0.2483 (range from 0 - 100%) for individual households. By 
using this data, the proportion of hens in lay (PrpHIL) was modelled using a Pert 
distribution in PopTools as dPertDev(0, 0.2483, 1, 4). The latter number (4) is the 
weighting used in PopTools. 
4.2.3.4  Number of eggs produced per clutch and clutch size per hen/year 
The  number  of  eggs  laid  per  clutch  was  determined  using  data  from  the 
questionnaire administered to 1089 households in 2008 (Chapter Three). Based on 
this survey the number of eggs per clutch ranged from three to 26 with an average of 
11.  The  number  of  eggs  produced  was  therefore  modelled  in  PopTools  as 
dPertDev(3, 11, 26, 4). 
The  number  of  clutches  (NC)  per  hen  per  year  ranged  from  one  to  six  with  an 
average of 2.65 (Chapter Three). The NC was modelled using the Pert distribution in 
PopTools as dPertDev(1, 2.65, 6, 4). 
4.2.3.5  Hatchability 
The average hatchability (Ha) of village chickens is 0.82 with a minimum value of 0 
and a maximum of 1 (Table 3.3). The hatchability was therefore modelled using a 
Pert distribution in PopTools as dPertDev(0, 0.82, 1, 4). 
4.2.3.6  Number of eggs lost per year 
Of the total number of eggs produced, some were lost (breakage, predation or other 
causes).  The  proportion  lost  varied  from  0  to  100%  with  an  average  of  25.8% 
(Section 3.3.1.6). The proportion lost per year was modelled as dPertDev(8.3, 0.258, 
1, 4).  
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Some eggs were consumed and from Section 3.3.1.7, it is known that on average 
25.8%  of  eggs  are  consumed  with  a  range  of  0  to  100%.  The  number  of  eggs 
consumed was therefore modelled in PopTools as dPertDev(0, 0.25.8, 1, 4). 
4.2.3.7  Mortality rate for chicks and adult chickens 
Data for mortality was obtained from the targeted survey in July 2009. From the 159 
household interviews, 113 households reported the mortality of chickens in different 
age groups. A total of 1178 head died consisting of 866 young chickens (chicks and 
growers) and 312 adult birds. The proportion of young chickens dying was 0.6012 
(range 0 to 1) and 0.3635 (range 0 to 1) for adult birds. The mortality of young 
chickens and adults were therefore modelled using PopTools as dPertDev(0, 0.6012, 
1, 4) and dPertDev(0, 0.3635, 1, 4) respectively. 
4.2.3.8  Culling rate 
The culling rate for this analysis was obtained from the results of interviewing 1089 
households (Chapter Three). These households owned a total of 9569 poultry. The 
minimum number of chickens slaughtered per household per month varied from one 
to four with an average of 1.22 (Table 3.5). This means that in a year there will be a 
minimum, average and maximum culling proportion of (1 x 12)/9569 = 0.001, (1.22 
x  12)/9569  =  0.002  and  (4  x12)/9569=0.005  respectively.  The  culling  rate  was 
therefore  modelled  in  PopTools  as  =dPertDev(0.001,  0.002,  0.005,  4).  It  was 
assumed that the culling rate of adult and young chickens (males and females) was 
the same.  
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4.2.4  Calculation of the village chicken population 
4.2.4.1  The number of eggs produced (NEP) in a village 
The  number  of  eggs  produced  (NEP)  in  a  village  was  modelled  as  outlined  in 
Equations 4.2 and 4.3. 
HCLE NC NEPC NEP * *   Equation 4.2 
)) ( ) (( NEPxEC NEPxEL NEP NetNEP   Equation 4.3 
NEP    : Number of eggs produced per year 
NetNEP     : Number of eggs produced per year after adjusting for eggs lost and  
those consumed 
NEPC  : Number of eggs produced per clutch/hen/year 
NC    : Number of clutches 
EL    : Proportion of eggs lost/hen/year 
EC     : Proportion of eggs consumed/year 
HCLE  : Number of hens that are capable of laying eggs/per year 
4.2.4.2  Number of new hatchings, survival of chickens and adult birds 
The number of new birds hatching depends upon the net number of eggs produced, 
the hatchability, the loss of young birds due to mortality and other factors (LcM) and 
the loss of birds due to culling (LCC) for consumption. 
The number of chicks (NChicks) produced is a product of NetNEP and hatchability 
(Equation  4.4).  The  chick‘s  survivability  is  calculated  as  in  Equation  4.5.  Adult 
survivability was calculated by subtracting the total number of birds at the start (C0) 
with the product of CO and the adult mortality plus the product of CO with the 
culling rate (Equation 4.6).  
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) * ( Ha NetNEP NChicks   Equation 4.4 
)) * ( ) * (( CullR NChicks ChicksMort NChicks NChicks ChicksSurv   Equation 4.5 
)) * 0 ( ) * 0 (( 0 CullR C AdultMort C C AdultSurv   Equation 4.6 
NChicks    : Number of chicks 
NetNEP    : Number of eggs produced per year after adjusting for eggs lost 
and those consumed 
NEP      : Number of eggs produced 
Ha      : Hatchability 
ChicksSurv   : Survivability of chicks 
Chicks Mort  : Mortality of young chickens (chicks and growers) 
AdultMort   : Adult mortality 
CullR    : Culling rate 
AdultSurv     : Survivability of adult birds 
C0      : Total number of birds at the beginning  
4.2.4.3  Total number of poultry produced per year 
The total number of chickens produced per year (TCkP/Year) is dependent upon the 
number of chicks and adult birds present at the beginning that survived culling and 
diseases/losses.  It  (TCkP/Year)  is  the  sum  of  the  number  of  Chicks  and  young 
chickens that survived (ChicksSurv) and the number of adult birds that survived 
(AdultSurv) (Equation 4.7). 
AdultSurv ChicksSurv year TCkP/
 
Equation 4.7 
4.2.5  Implementation 
A list of the villages (in 13 districts) present in 2004 was produced and the village 
chicken population was modelled using all the parameters that have been described 
in Sections 4.2.3.1 to 4.2.3.8 in Excel (Table 4.4).  
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4.2.6  Sensitivity analysis 
To  understand  the  influence  of  each  input  on  the  estimation  of  the  population, 
sensitivity analysis was conducted. This was conducted using an advanced spider 
plot  as  described  by  Vose  (2008b).  The  steps  used  were  as  follows:  1)  Set  the 
number of iterations (10,000 for this study); 2) Determine the input distributions to 
be analysed; 3) Determine the cumulative probabilities that are to be tested (in this 
study 1, 5, 25, 50, 75, 95 and 95 percentiles were used); 4) Determine the output 
statistic  that  is  to  be  measured;  5)  Select  an  input  distribution;  6)  Replace  the 
distribution  with  one  of  the  percentiles  specified;  7)  Run  a  simulation  (10,000 
iterations in this study) and record the statistic of the output (the mean values of each 
input after 10,000 iterations were used); 8) Select the next cumulative percentile and 
run another simulation; 9) Repeat this until all percentiles had been run for this input, 
this parameter/input was then put back into the distribution and the next selected 
parameter modelled. 10) Once all inputs had been treated this way, a spider plot was 
produced to see how the output mean was influenced by each input.  
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Table 4.4. Results obtained from a spreadsheet to estimate the number of village chickens in one of the 442 villages in Timor Leste  
  A  B  C  D  E  F  G 
1  Variables  Output   Distribution     Input     Source 
2       
 
Minimum  Most likely  Maximum 
  3  #households    
       
Census 2004 
4  #chickens/district     
       
Census 2004 
5  #Ck/household  =B4/B3 
       
Modelling 
6  Total VC at start
a  =B3 x B5 
       
Modelling 
7  MHInlay  =dPertDev($D$7, $E$7, F7, 4)  Pert  0  0.2483  1  Survey 2009 
8  #eggs/clutch/year  =dPertDev($D$8, $E$8, F8, 4)  Pert  3  11  26  Survey Chapter 3 
9  #clutches/year  =dPertDev($D$9, $E$9, F9, 4)  Pert  1  2.65  6  Survey Chapter 3 
10  culling rate  =dPertDev($D$10, $E$10, F10, 4)  Pert  0.001  0.002  0.005  Survey Chapter 3 
11  Hatchability  =dPertDev($D$11, $E$11, F11, 4)  Pert  0  0.82  1  Survey Chapter 3 
12  Total eggs lost  =dPertDev($D$12, $E$12, F12, 4)  Pert  0  0.2583  1  Survey Chapter 3 
13  Total eggs consumed  =dPertDev($D$13, $E$13, F13, 4)  Pert  0  0.2585  1  Survey Chapter 3 
14  Chick mortality  =dPertDev($D$14, $E$14, F14, 4)  Pert  0  0.6012  1  Survey 2009 
15  Adult Ck mortality  =dPertDev($D$15, $E$15, F15, 4)  Pert  0  0.3635  1  Survey 2009 
16  NEP  =PRODUCT(B8, B9, B7)  
       
Modelling 
17  NetNEP  =B16 - ((B16 x B12) + (B16 x B13) 
       
Modelling 
18  #chicks/year  =B17 x B11 
       
Modelling 
19  #chicks surviving/year  =B18 - ((B18 x B14) + (B18 x B10)) 
       
Modelling 
20  #adults surviving  =B6 - ((B6 x B15) + (B6 x B10)) 
       
Modelling 
21 
Total chickens at the end 
of the year
b  =SUM(B19:B20) 
       
Modelling 
Note: a. Total VC at start for 2005 is 2004, 2006 is 2005, 2007 is 2006, 2008 is 2007, 2009 is 2008. bTotal village chicken at the end of 2004 is total poultry population of 2005, 2005 is 2006, 2006 is 2007, 2007 and 2008, and at 
the end of 2008 is the total chicken population for 2009. Number of village chicken (VC) per household is assumed to be the same for all villages in a district. VC is village chickens, CK is chicken, MHInlay is mature hens in lay, 
NEP is number of eggs produced, NetNEP is net of number of egg produced. Number 4 in Pert distribution is the standard weight used in PopTools. 
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4.3  Results  
4.3.1  Number of village chickens in Timor Leste 
The number of village chickens in each district, as determined by the 2004 census, is 
listed in Table 4.1. Using data from 2004 as the starting point and by using the 
method of calculation described in Table 4.4, the number of village chickens for the 
years 2005 to 2009 were estimated based on the assumption of linear growth in the 
population (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5. Estimated change in the number of village chickens in each district 
for the period 2004 to 2009 
District  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Aileu  17353  23481  31759  42961  58123  78633 
Ainaro  28688  38812  52511  71044  96117  130040 
Baucau  73925  100011  135308  183063  247675  335081 
Bobonaro  70077  94809  128263  173527  234766  317628 
Covalima  37622  50899  68860  93163  126047  170529 
Dili  59949  81107  109731  148458  200848  271731 
Ermera  50871  68827  93114  125975  170434  230573 
Lautem  68481  92651  125349  169588  229438  310412 
Liquiça  44853  60682  82100  111073  150273  203304 
Manatuto  23741  32119  43455  58787  79537  107601 
Manufahi  31367  42432  57411  77670  105082  142172 
Oecusse  61977  83847  113440  153472  207635  280908 
Viqueque  90162  121984  165033  223275  302070  408676 
Total  659066  891661  1206334  1632056  2208045  2987288 
95%CI of 
Total 
    785376 
to 
   982884 
  987018  
   to 
1386018 
1199368  
to 
2002276 
1505215  
to 
2864967 
1854811  
to 
4309407 
 
4.3.2  Number of poultry (village chickens and ducks) 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the poultry industry in Timor Leste mainly involves 
chickens  (G.  domesticus)  and  ducks  (A.  platyrhynchos  and  C.    moschata).  The 
number of chickens has been estimated (Table 4.5), but to calculate the total number 
of poultry (chickens and ducks), the duck population has also to be included. Data on  
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the number of ducks were not available from the NSDO; however, it was available 
from the Livestock Office (Table 4.1). By comparing the total number of ducks with 
the number of village chickens present in 2004, the proportion of ducks to chickens 
per district was calculated (Table 4.6). As there was no differentiation between the 
two species of ducks (A. platyrhynchos and C.  moschata) in the data provided by 
the Livestock Office, a combined total number of ducks was calculated.  
Table 4.6. Proportion of ducks per district in Timor Leste 
Districts  Number of 
chickens in 2004 
Number of 
ducks in 2004 
Percentage of 
ducks compared 
to chickens 
Aileu  17353  621  3.6 
Ainaro  28688  2268  7.9 
Baucau  73925  883  1.2 
Bobonaro  70077  1275  1.8 
Covalima  37622  2519  6.7 
Dili  59949  6183  10.3 
Ermera  50871  804  1.6 
Lospalos  44853  311  0.7 
Liquiça  68481  1880  2.7 
Manatuto  23741  1304  5.5 
Oecusse  31367  51  0.2 
Same  61977  910  1.5 
Viqueque  90162  1046  1.2 
Total  659066  20055  3.0 
Average  50697   1543   3.4 
 
By  using  the  proportion  of  ducks  in  the  districts  (Table  4.6)  and  assuming  this 
proportion remained constant over time, the total number of poultry (chickens and 
ducks)  for  each  district  was  calculated  (Table  4.7).  For  example  the  poultry 
population in Aileu district in 2004 was calculated as follows: 
=Total number of chickens in Aileu in 2004 (Table 4.5) + (Total number of chickens 
in Aileu in 2004 x proportion of ducks in Aileu (Table 4.6).   
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=17353 + (17353 x 3.6%) 
= 17978 
Using the same method, the number of poultry in other districts were calculated as 
presented in Table 4.7 
Table 4.7. Estimated total poultry population (chickens and ducks) 
District  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Aileu  17978  24326  32902  44508  60215  81464 
Ainaro  30954  41878  56659  76656  103710  140313 
Baucau  74812  101211  136932  185260  250647  339102 
Bobonaro  71338  96516  130572  176650  238992  323345 
Covalima  40143  54309  73474  99405  134492  181954 
Dili  66124  89461  121033  163749  221535  299719 
Ermera  51685  69928  94604  127991  173161  234262 
Lautem  68960  93300  126226  170775  231044  312585 
Liquiça  46064  62320  84317  114072  154330  208793 
Manatuto  25047  33886  45845  62020  83912  113519 
Manufahi  31430  42517  57526  77825  105292  142456 
Oecusse  62907  85105  115142  155774  210750  285122 
Viqueque  91244  123448  167013  225954  305695  413580 
Total  678685  918205  1242245  1680640  2273775  3076215* 
*Total number of chicken in 2009 excluding 24700 commercial layers in Ermera district 
4.3.3  Annual poultry growth rate  
Based on the total population estimated in Tables 4.5 and 4.8, the growth rate of 
village  poultry  was  calculated.  The  annual  poultry  growth  rate  according  to  this 
model is 35%. This growth rate was achieved by subtracting the poultry population 
at the beginning (e.g. year 2004) with the total population at the end (e.g. the start of 
year 2005) and dividing this number by the total number of poultry at the beginning 
(year 2004). Based on this annual growth rate, the number of poultry was estimated 
(Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1. Future projection of village chicken population 
4.3.4  Sensitivity analysis 
Based on the sensitivity analyses (Vose, 2008b), it was identified that inputs in order 
of decreasing influence were the number of mature hens in lay (MHinlay), number of 
eggs produced per hen per clutch (Egg/clutch), number of clutches or frequency of 
laying eggs/hen/year (#of clutch), hatchability, culling rate (CullRate), percentage of 
eggs  lost  (Total  egg  lost),  chick  mortality  (ChicksMortal)  and  adult  mortality 
(adultMortal).  
Of these inputs, there were four parameters that had a positive effect (mature hens in 
lay  (mHInlay),  number  of  eggs  per  clutch  (Egg/clutch),  number  of  clutch  (#  of 
clutch) and hatchability (Figure 4.2) on the estimate of the poultry population. In 
contrast, the four input parameters that had a negative influence on the population 
were  culling  rate,  adult  chicken  mortality  (Adult  Mortality  rate),  young  chicken 
mortality, i.e. the mortality of chicks and growers (Chicks Mortality rate), and egg 
lost  rate  (Figure  4.2).  The  inputs  that  have  a  negative  influence  will  reduce  the 
population size and vice versa. 
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Figure 4.2. A spider plot showing the effect of each parameter on the estimated 
total chicken population (2009). 
4.4  Discussion 
Modelling population growth (changes in the size of population) is rarely used in 
domesticated animals, but it has been used in human demographics, epidemiology 
and wildlife management (MacNeil and Cronin, 2004). There are two basic aspects 
in predicting the growth of a population, i.e increases due to births and immigration 
and  decreases  due  to  death  and  emigration  (Tanner,  1966;  MacNeil  and  Cronin, 
2004). In relation to domesticated animals, such as poultry, immigration is equivalent 
to importation and emigration is synonymous with exportation. At the time of data 
collection, Timor Leste did not officially import or export live poultry at the time of 
this thesis was written. Therefore the change in the population size over time will 
depend upon births (hatchings) and deaths (due to disease/losses and consumption). 
Due to the subsistence nature of the production system and limited reliable input 
data,  modelling  village  chicken  production  systems  is  difficult  (Kitalyi,  1998b). 
Nevertheless,  the  number  of  poultry  in  Timor  Leste  was  estimated  through 
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modelling  using  the  inputs  described  in  Sections  4.2.3.1  to  4.2.3.8.  Based  on 
sensitivity  analysis  (Section  4.2.6),  it  was  identified  that  inputs  that  lead  to  an 
increased population include number of eggs per clutch, number of clutches and 
hatchability  of  eggs.  On  the  contrary  inputs  that  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 
population  include  the  mortality  rate  of  chicks,  loss  of  eggs  including  the 
consumption of eggs, adult mortality rate, proportion of mature hens in lay and the 
culling rate. In developing a model for poultry production, the data should preferably 
be from real life flock situations (Johnston, 1991). In this chapter the data used for 
the input variables were mostly gathered from surveys of actual poultry production 
in Timor Leste (Chapter Three). 
According to Kitalyi (1998a) the key factors used to study the feature of village 
chicken flocks are egg production and chick survival. Similarly, these two features 
were identified as important factors in the sensitivity analysis conducted in this study 
(Figure 4.2).  
Given the current proportion of parameters described from Sections 4.2.3.1 to 4.2.3.8 
to estimate the poultry population, the annual growth was 35%. By knowing the 
population growth rate and assuming that the growth rate remains constant, future 
population sizes can be projected (Sibly and Hone, 2002). For example, by using a 
poultry growth rate of 35%, the future population sizes can be estimated for specific 
years, e.g up to 2012 (Figure 4.1) or other years as required. 
In July 2010 a national census was conducted by the Statistics Office of Timor Leste, 
however the results are yet to be published. Once the results are published they can 
be  compared  with  the  estimation  outlined  in  this  chapter  to  validate  the  current 
model.  
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The estimated poultry population can be used to plan future poultry health control 
strategies by the government. This may include prediction of the number of vaccine 
doses required in subsequent years and to declare a country is free from a disease. To 
declare a country free from a disease, the at-risk population size is needed. In the 
following chapter, the poultry population calculated from this chapter, together with 
other parameters, will be used to calculate freedom from HPAI based on existing 
animal health data.  
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CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SURVEILLANCE 
DATA ON AVIAN INFLUENZA IN TIMOR LESTE  
5.1  Introduction 
Historically an outbreak of HPAI has never been reported in Timor Leste. However, 
the infection might occur at any time due to the importation of infected chickens or 
chicken  products  or  from  migratory  birds.  Measures  taken  by  the  Timor  Leste 
Government  via  the  MAF  to  reduce  the  probability  of  introducing  AI  into  the 
country  have been to: halt the importation of poultry  and poultry products  from 
HPAI infected countries including Indonesia (Dispatch no.03/79/GM/III/04) (MAFP, 
2004); strengthen the control of borders; establish a national task force for AI; and 
undertake surveillance and targeted sampling of flocks considered to be at high risk 
for AI. 
In order to monitor the disease status in the country, several serological surveys were 
conducted in Timor Leste between 2000 and 2006. These surveys were joint surveys 
conducted by the Livestock Department of Timor Leste in cooperation with NAQS. 
The last joint survey undertaken was in March 2006 and no subsequent surveys have 
been conducted because of the civil unrest in the country and the lack of resources to 
conduct routine surveillance.  
This chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the existing surveillance data from 
2000 to 2006 in Timor Leste and calculates the confidence level that the country was 
free  of  HPAI.  The  hypothesis  to  be  tested  in  this  chapter  is  that  the  country  is 
infected with HPAI (H0) or the country is free from HPAI (H1).  
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5.2  Materials and Methods 
5.2.1  Method of data collection 
The  existing  data  from  animal  health  surveys  conducted  in  Timor  Leste  were 
obtained from the Australian Quarantine Inspection Services (AQIS), Canberra. The 
surveys were conducted as part of the NAQS and MAF programs to monitor exotic 
diseases for Timor Leste and Australia. The NAQS reports are shared between AQIS 
and MAF. However, due to civil unrest in 2006, the MAF office was abandoned and 
many documents were destroyed. Therefore data regarding AI surveillance in Timor 
Leste  were  obtained  from  the  AQIS  database.  This  data  were  achieved  after 
obtaining permission from MAF Timor Leste and AQIS Canberra. 
To display the survey locations that had been covered by the MAF – AQIS animal 
health joint surveys in Timor Leste, a map was created using the method described in 
Section 3.2.1. 
5.2.2  Methods and procedure of testing samples  
All samples were tested at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL). The 
procedure how samples (sera and swabs) were tested is summarised in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1. Avian influenza test procedure 
5.2.3  Method of calculating confidence intervals 
To determine 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) of a point estimate data, the exact 
binomial method (Daly, 1992) was used, but for distribution data or stochastic data, 
the 95%  CI  were  calculated using  Monte Carlo  simulations with  1000  iterations 
(Hood, 2008). 
5.2.4   Determination of level of disease freedom 
After all survey results were tabulated, the level of HPAI freedom was calculated 
using  FreeCalc  in  Survey  Toolbox  (Cameron,  1999).  Due  to  a  lack  of  samples 
collected prior to 2004, only data from surveys conducted from 2004 to 2006 were 
used to calculate disease freedom. 
The inputs needed to determine this were the test Se and Sp; the population size in 
the relevant years; the minimum expected prevalence if the disease was present; the 
survey sample size; and the number of positive samples. 
Sample type
Sera c-ELISA
Positive HPAI test 
using HIT
Positive
Negative
Negative
Swabs Taqman-PCR
Positive HPAI test 
using RT-PCR
Positive Virus isolation
Virus isolated
Virus is not 
isolated
Negative
Negative 
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The Se and Sp of the two serological assays used (c-ELISA and HIT) and swab 
samples were derived from the mean values reported in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Sensitivity and Specificity of the c-ELISA and HIT 
Test   Sensitivity  Specificity  Author/s 
C- ELISA  90.3% (93/103) (95% CI: 
85.8-93.7%) n=240 chicken 
sera 
100% (137/137) (95%CI: 
98.5-100%) (c-ELISA 
relative to HI) 
Zhou et al. 
(1997) 
C- ELISA  99.4% (172/173) (95%CI: 
97.6-99.9%), n=280 turkey‘s 
blood 
100% (107/107) (95%CI: 
98.7-100%) (c-ELISA 
relative to HI) 
Zhou et al. 
(1997) 
C-ELISA  98.2% (109/111) (95%CI: 
96.5-99.2%), n=465 chicken 
sera 
99.4% (352/354) (95%CI: 
98.2-99.9%), (c-ELISA 
relative to AGID), 
Zhou et al. 
(1997) 
C- ELISA  99.50% (197/198) (95%CI: 
98.8-99.8%), n=917 turkey 
sera 
99.4% (719/715) (95%CI: 
98.7-99.8%) (c-ELISA 
relative to AGID),  
Zhou et al. 
(1997) 
C- ELISA  46.7% (95% (95% CI: 28.4-
65.7%) n=30 samples from 
chicken 
100% (48/48), 95% CI: 92.6-
100%) 
Zarkov ( 2007) 
C- ELISA  54.2% (13/24), (95% CI: 
32.9.74.5%) 
98.2% (53/54) (95% CI: 
90.2-100%), c-ELISA 
relative to HI 
Zarkov ( 2007 
HI  80.6% (24/30), (95%CI: 62.1-
92.7%) 
100% (48/48), (95% CI: 
92.6-100%) 
Zarkov ( 2007) 
TaqMan 
PCR for 
influenza 
A/H5 
subtype 
93.3% (28/30) (95% CI: 77.9-
99.2%) 
97.7% (42/43) (95% CI: 
87.7-99.9%) 
Anonymous 
(2006). 
The 95% confidence intervals (CI) were not available from the articles but were calculated using the exact binomial method. 
Due to variation in the Se and Sp of the c-ELISA, the Se and Sp was modelled using 
a Beta distribution in PopTools (Hood, 2008). From the summary of findings for c-
ELISA (Table 5.1), the Se and Sp were calculated using the Beta distribution. 
Two tests were used for sera: c-ELISA for influenza A and HI to confirm if the 
positive results of the c-ELISA were HPAI. As both tests (c-ELISA and HIT) were 
used for testing the sera, the Se and the Sp of the combined tests were calculated 
assuming the tests  were used in  series.  Interpretation  of tests  in series  was  used  
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because  it  increases  the  specificity  and  is  suitable  for  screening  rare  diseases 
(Weinstein et al., 2005). The Se for the combined tests in series was 73.62% with 
95% CI: 59.64 – 85.38% (Se1 x Se2) and the Sp 99.99% with 95% CI: 99.95-100% 
[1- ((1-Sp1) x (1-Sp2))] (Table 5.2). 
Table  5.2.  Sensitivity  and  specificity  of  the  c-ELISA  and  HI  modelled  in 
PopTools. 
Test   n  x  Alpha  beta  Se of Beta 
distribution 
Combined 
Se
1 (tests 
in series) 
Combined 
Sp
2 (tests 
in series) 
C-ELISA_Se (Se1)  639  598  599  42  0.913 (Se1)  73.62% 
(95% CI 
59.64-
85.38%) 
  
HI_Se (Se2)  30  24  25  7  0.791 (Se2) 
C-ELISA_Sp (Sp1)  141
9 
141
2 
1413  8  0.992 (Sp1)     99.99% 
(95% CI: 
99.95-
100%) 
HI_Sp (Sp2)  48  48  49  1  0.988 (Sp2) 
1: Combined Se is calculated as Se1 x Se2,  2: Combined Sp was calculated as 1-(1-Sp1) x (1-Sp2) 
The Se and Sp of the Taqman PCR for swab samples was derived from the Taqman 
PCR manual for influenza A/H5 subtype, i.e. 93.3% (95% CI: 77.9 – 99.2%) and 
97.7% (95% CI: 87.7 – 99.9%) respectively (Table 5.1) (Anonymous, 2006). The Se 
and Sp of the assays used for testing AI samples are summarised in Table 5.3. 
Table  5.3.  Summary  of  sensitivity  and  specificity  of  diagnostic  tests  used  to 
determine freedom from HPAI 
Sample  Test used  Se (%)  95% CI   Sp (%)  95% CI  Source 
Sera  Combined 
tests* 
73.62  59.64-85.38%  99.99  99.95-100%  Calculated (in 
series) 
Swabs  Taqman 
PCR  
93.30  77.93-99.18%  97.70  87.71-99.94%  Taqman PCR 
manual, 
Anonymous 
(2006) 
*Tests when combined in series. 
Information on the population size was sourced from the calculations described in 
Chapter Four and the minimum expected prevalence (MEP) was set at 10%. This 
figure was based on the fact that HPAI viruses normally cause a very high mortality 
rate  (up  to  100%)  in  a  naïve  poultry  population  (UCHCPD,  2000;  Capua  and  
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Mutinelli, 2001; Capua et al., 2002). The survey sample size and the number of 
positive samples were taken from the existing surveillance data. 
5.3  Results 
5.3.1  Survey locations 
The exact locations where samples were collected for the joint MAF and NAQS 
survey  were  not  available  for  all  surveys  undertaken.  The  locations  were  only 
available for surveys conducted from June 2004 onwards. The surveys from June 
2004 to March 2006 involved collection of samples from birds originating from 10 
of the 13 districts in Timor Leste and from 37 individual sites (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4. Location of poultry sampled from June 2004 to March 2006. Data 
from joint survey by NAQS-Australia and MAF Timor Leste 
Date of 
sampling 
Village  District 
June 2004  Tibar, Libolelo  Liquiça 
Tilomar, Casabauk  Covalima 
Tilomar, Salele  Covalima 
Raihun, Wetaba  Covalima 
Tapo/memo  Bobonaro 
Holsa, Tunubibi  Bobonaro 
Batugade (chefe de suco)  Bobonaro 
Fuiloro  Lospalos 
February 2005  Aileu market  Aileu 
Tirilolo  Baucau 
Beloi,Karau balu  Viqueque 
Bobometo  Oecusse 
Ossu  Viqueque 
Nipane-Sakato  Oecusse 
Usetakeno  Oecusse 
Cunha  Oecusse 
Viqueque Market  Viqueque 
Santa Cruz-Audian  Dili 
June 2005  Acrema, Atauro  Dili 
Aubaon  Manatuto 
Iliheu  Manatuto 
Leohito  Bobonaro  
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Date of 
sampling 
Village  District 
Manatuto  Manatuto 
Natarbora   Manatuto 
Taroman, Fatululic,   Covalima 
March 2006  Cova  Bobonaro 
Maliana  Bobonaro 
Motain  Bobonaro 
Tilomar  Covalima 
Foholulik  Covalima 
Suai  Covalima 
Tulaeduc  Covalima 
Wala  Covalima 
Comoro  Dili 
Becora  Dili 
Taibese  Dili 
Manatuto  Manatuto 
Tono  Oecusse 
Tibar  Liquiça 
 
The locations of the 10 districts that were covered by the NAQS and MAF joint 
survey are shown in Figure 5.2. 
5.3.2  Species targeted and type of samples collected 
Swabs and sera were collected mainly from native and commercial chickens (G. 
domesticus) and ducks (either Muscovy ducks - C. moschata or layer ducks - A. 
platyrhynchos). Samples from commercial chickens were collected only in 2004. 
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Figure 5.2. Map of Timor Leste  showing districts  that had been sampled in 
previous  surveys  (turquoise),  districts  not  covered  (grey)  and  Indonesian 
territory (white). 
5.3.3  Laboratory results  
In total 609 sera and 260 swabs were collected from 522 chickens and 86 ducks. Of 
the 609 sera tested using the c-ELISA, 587 were negative and 22 were positive. Of 
the 22 c-ELISA positive, two were classified as HPAI positive (Table 5.5). Details of 
the surveys conducted are described in the following paragraphs and are summarised 
in Table 5.5. 
In July 2000, sera from 11 chickens were collected and tested at AAHL with a c-
ELISA for AI. No seropositive results were obtained. In June 2001 only one chicken 
was  sampled  and there  was  no report available on the laboratory result  (NAQS, 
2001). In the May 2002 survey only one serum sample was collected for AI testing. 
The result for this sample on the c-ELISA was negative and therefore no further 
HPAI testing was conducted (NAQS, 2002).   
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In April 2003, seven chickens were sampled but only five sera were sent and tested 
using the c-ELISA. They were seronegative for AI. In December 2003, 10 sera were 
sent to AAHL for testing with a c-ELISA. Again all were seronegative (Table 5.5). 
In May 2004, 20 sera were sent to AAHL for antibody detection and six pooled swab 
samples were sent for virus isolation. Each pool was inoculated into the allantoic 
cavity  of  9  to  11  day  old  embryonated  SPF  chicken  eggs  and  no  evidence  of 
haemagglutinating agents was found. However four of the 20 sera were positive for 
antibodies to AI (Table 5.5). These four samples had inhibition levels of 68, 46, 74 
and 62%, which were all above the 40% inhibition cut-off value. This resulted in a 
test seroprevalence of 20% (95% CI: 5.7-43.7%). 
To follow up the suspicious serological results of May 2004, a targeted survey was 
conducted  in  June  2004.  The  survey  involved  targeted  surveillance  of  a  poultry 
commercial  farm  in  Tibar  (Liquiça  district)  and  commercial  chicken  layers  in 
Fuliloro, Lospalos (NAQS, 2004). These commercial units were selected because 
they had imported birds from Indonesia one year prior to the survey (2003). Samples 
were also collected from local village chickens from around the commercial poultry 
farm where clinical signs characteristic of AI  had been reported as well as from 
healthy chickens. In total 153 poultry (ducks and chickens) were sampled of which 
16 were c-ELISA positive (test prevalence of 10.5% - 95% CI: 6.1 - 16.4%). Further 
testing of these 16 c-ELISA positive sera using the HI revealed two positive results 
for HPAI (H5 and H7) (NAQS, 2004) (apparent or test prevalence of 1.3% - 95% CI: 
1.6 - 38.3%) (Table 5.5).  
To follow up the positive results in the survey of June 2004, in 2005 two further 
surveys were conducted. The first survey was in the month of February, where a total  
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of 168 sera and 102 swabs were collected from chickens. Sera from 23 Muscovy 
ducks were also collected for testing (Table 5.5). 
Of the samples tested, only one of the 168 chicken sera tested positive to the c-
ELISA;  however  further  testing  of  this  sample  for  HPAI  (Australian  H5N3, 
Vietnamese H5N1 and Australian H7N3) resulted in a negative result. The c-ELISA 
result gave an apparent (test) prevalence of 0.6% (95% CI: 0 - 3.3%). 
The second survey in 2005 was in June, when 65 samples (45 chicken and 20 duck 
sera) were collected and tested at AAHL. All chicken sera were negative to the c-
ELISA but one of the 20 ducks was positive. Further testing of this positive sample 
against HPAI (Australian H5N3, Vietnamese H5N1 and Australian H7N3) revealed 
a negative result (Table 5.5). The seroprevalence based on the c-ELISA was 5% 
(95% CI: 0.1 - 24.9%). 
In March 2006, a total of 151 poultry were sampled for HPAI testing. All samples 
were negative (Table 5.5) (NAQS, 2006).  
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Table 5.5. Survey results of joint NAQS/MAF sampling 2000-2006 
Date of sample collection  Type of bird  Number 
of poultry 
sampled 
Type of 
sample 
Number 
of 
samples 
tested 
Pathogen 
examined for 
Tests used  Number of 
negative 
results 
Number of 
positive 
results 
July 2000  Village Chicken  11  Sera   11  Influenza A  C-ELISA  11  0 
      Swab    1  Influenza A  VI  1  0 
May 2002  Village Chicken   1  Serum    1  Influenza A  C-ELISA  1  0 
April 2003  Village Chicken   7  Sera    5  Influenza A  C-ELISA  5  0 
April 2003  Muscovy   2  Sera    2  Influenza A  C-ELISA  2  0 
December 2003  Village chicken  10  Sera  10  Influenza A  C-ELISA  10  0 
May 2004  Village chicken  20  Sera  20  Influenza A  C-ELISA  16  4 
       Sera   4  Asian H5N1  HI  4  0 
        Swabs   6  Influenza A  Virus isolation  6  0 
June 2004  Village Chicken  98  Sera  98  Influenza A  C- ELISA  89  9 
          9  H5 and H7  HI  8  1 
   Commercial 
chicken 
41  Sera  41  Influenza A  C-ELISA  37  4 
       Sera    4  H5 and H7  HI  3  1 
   Ducks   14  Sera  14  Influenza A  C-ELISA  11  3 
       Sera    3  H5 and H7  HI  3  0  
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Date of sample collection  Type of bird  Number 
of poultry 
sampled 
Type of 
sample 
Number 
of 
samples 
tested 
Pathogen 
examined for 
Tests used  Number of 
negative 
results 
Number of 
positive 
results 
 February 2005  Chickens      168  Sera      168   Influenza A   C-ELISA      167  1 
      Serum    1  H5 H7  HI  1  0 
      Swabs        12  HI    12  0 
      Swabs        79  Influenza A  VI/HI  79  0 
      Swabs       11  Influenza A  VI/HI  11  0 
  Ducks  23  Sera        23   Influenza A   C-ELISA  23  0 
June 2005  Chicken  42  Sera       45
a   Influenza A   C-ELISA  45  0 
June 2005  Ducks  20  Sera        20   Influenza A   C-ELISA  19  1 
      Sera    H5N1, H5N2 & 
H5N3 
HIT  1  0 
March 2006  Village chicken      124  Sera      124  Influenza A  C-ELISA       124  0 
       Swabs  124  Influenza A  Taqman-PCR  124  0 
   Layer duck  27  Sera  27  Influenza A  C-ELISA  27  0 
        Swabs  27  Influenza A  Taqman-PCR  27  0 
Total     608
b    891
c        867
d  24
e 
a. Some chickens were sampled more than once, b. 522 chickens and 86 ducks, c. 609 sera, 260 swabs and 22 sera samples further tested for HPAI, d. 587 negative sera, 260 PCR negative swab samples and 20 HPAI negative 
test samples, e. 22 c-ELISA positive and 2 HPAI positive. of HIT.  
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5.3.4  Analysis of freedom from disease 
Based on: a Se and Sp for the c-ELISA and HIT of 73.62 and 99.99% respectively 
when the tests are done in series and 93.3 and 97.7% respectively for testing swabs 
using Taqman PCR; a MEP of 10% (Section 5.2.4); the number of samples collected 
(Table  5.5);  and  an  estimated  poultry  population  in  the  surveyed  districts  in  the 
relevant years (Chapter Four), the confidence level of freedom from HPAI in Timor 
Leste  was  calculated  using  FreeCalc  in  Survey  Tool  Box  (Cameron,  1999)  as 
presented in Table 5.6. 
The survey in June 2004 was the only survey that resulted in two HPAI positive 
samples. The calculation of disease freedom based on this particular survey revealed 
that the country was infected at that sampling. 
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Table 5.6. Calculation of disease freedom from the historical data with an MEP of 10% 
Survey period  June 2004  February 2005  June 2005  March 2006 
District  Bobonaro, Covalima, Liquiça, Lospalos  Aileu, Baucau, Dili, 
Oecusse, Viqueque 
Bobonaro, Covalima , Dili, 
Manatuto 
Bobonaro, Covalima, Dili, 
Manatuto, Oecusse 
Number of 
poultry sampled 
98 village chickens, 41 commercial layer chickens, 
and 14 ducks (total 153) 
96 village chickens, 1 duck 
(Total 97) 
43 village chickens, 19 ducks 
(Total 62) 
125 village chickens, 26 
ducks (Total 151) 
Total number of 
biological samples 
collected 
153 sera, 58 swabs (results of swab samples for AI 
were not reported) 
69 sera, 81 swabs  62 sera and 62 swabs   151 sera 
Number of HPAI 
positive samples 
2 sera (prevalence of 1.3%, 95% CI: 0.2 – 4.6%)  0  0  0 
Population in the 
surveyed 
districts* 
226505  423551  274171  486065 
Level of freedom 
based on 
population in 
surveyed areas 
These results are adequate to reject the null 
hypothesis, but not to accept the alternate 
hypothesis. We may conclude that the population 
is not free from HPAI, but the prevalence is less 
than 10%. 
Population is free from 
HPAI at the MEP of 10% 
with 98.878% confidence 
level for sera and 99.486% 
for swabs 
Population is free from HPAI 
at the MEP of 10% with 
confidence level of 98.23% 
for both sera and swab 
samples  
Population is free from 
HPAI at the MEP of 10% 
with 99.99% confidence 
level  
Conclusion  The population is infected, with HPAI but the 
prevalence is less than 10%. 
Population is free from 
HPAI with 98 to 99% 
confidence level 
Population is free from HPAI 
with 98.23% confidence level  
Population is free from 
HPAI with 99.99% 
confidence level 
* Population in surveyed districts is based on poultry population estimation from Chapter Four.  
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5.3.5  The  influence  of  the  minimum  expected  prevalence  on  the 
confidence in disease freedom 
The MEP for this analysis was set at 10%. For the 2004 survey, if the MEP was set 
at between 1 and 5%, the analysis of HPAI freedom indicates that the results are not 
adequate to conclude that the country is free from HPAI. However if the MEP was 
set between 6 and 99%, the results are adequate to reject the H0, but not to accept the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) and conclude that the country is infected (Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.3. A graph showing how the MEP influences the confidence limit of 
HPAI  freedom  on  the  survey  conducted  in  June  2004.  (H0:  The  country  is 
infected with HPAI and H1: the country is free from HPAI). 
If all samples were negative, as the H0 approaches 0% and H1 approaches 100%, the 
results  are adequate to  reject  the H0  and conclude that the  country is  free from 
disease. However in the case of the survey in June 2004, which resulted in two 
positive samples, the status of freedom cannot be concluded. This is due to the fact 
that the Sp of the test used for this analysis is high (99.99%). In this case 0.01% of 
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false  positive  results  would  be  expected  in  non-infected  birds  and  consequently 
nearly every positive result would support that the country is infected.  
5.4  Discussion 
5.4.1  Serological surveys in Timor Leste 
Surveillance for AI in AI-free countries varies slightly according to the conditions of 
each country, but generally every country follows the OIE guidelines in Appendix 
3.8.9 of the OIE Terrestrial Code (OIE, 2006d). According to the OIE (2006d), for 
AI free countries, it is recommended that surveillance should be conducted at least 
every  six  months.  In  Timor  Leste  prior  to  the  year  2006,  a  survey  for  AI  was 
conducted at least every six months in compliance with the OIE guidelines. 
After obtaining independence from Indonesia in 1999, disease surveys were started 
as early as 2000 in Timor Leste (Table 5.5) with assistance from Australia. In the 
early surveillance studies (2000-2003), AI was not the main consideration of the 
surveys and therefore only a few samples were collected and tested from poultry 
(Table 5.5). 
Most samples tested were negative; however a few samples were c-ELISA positive. 
With the exception of one survey, further testing of positive c-ELISA samples for 
HPAI  (Australian  H5N3,  Vietnamese  H5N1  and  Australian  H7N3)  resulted  in 
negative results. The samples that were positive were the result of a survey in June 
2004 when two of 153 samples tested positive on the HI test against avian influenza 
strains H5 and H7 (Table 5.5). By the time this survey was conducted, there had 
been  many  outbreaks  of  HPAI  in  Southeast  Asia.  As  a  result  of  this  pandemic 
sufficient  (153)  samples  were  collected  to  detect  HPAI  if  it  was  present.  These  
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samples were collected from village chickens, commercial layers and ducks. The 
commercial layers had been imported from Indonesia, just prior to the outbreak of 
HPAI in that country. Therefore this survey specifically targeted the commercial 
poultry farm in Tibar and some layers in an agricultural college located in Fuiloro-
Lospalos. 
The low proportion of HPAI (H5/H7) test positive sera in the survey of June 2004 
(2/153) could be expected if the test used did not have a 100% specificity. The tests 
used for testing sera samples were the c-ELISA for influenza A and the HI for HPAI. 
If these tests are used in series, a Se of 73.62% (95% CI 59.64 – 85.38%) and a Sp of 
99.99% (95% CI 99.95-100%) results (see Section 5.2.4). As the Sp of the two tests 
performed  in  series  was  not  100%,  some  false  positive  results  would  eventuate. 
Furthermore the low titres observed against H5 and H7 may have occurred as a result 
of cross-reactions with other subtypes (NAQS, 2004). This was supported by the 
findings that: no further positive results were subsequently found; and no evidence of 
clinical disease was evident in the commercial poultry unit. In addition, if HPAI 
virus is introduced into a naïve poultry population, a significant outbreak would be 
expected with a high morbidity and mortality rate (Martin and Cameron, 2002). 
The positive titres could indicate previous exposure of chickens to HPAI. Anecdotal 
reports of HPAI were reported in 2003 in Indonesia, although it was not officially 
announced/confirmed  until  2004  (Hartono,  2004).  And  the  sera  tested  was  from 
chickens imported from Indonesia. 
There  are several  factors  that might  lead to  false positive test  results.  These are 
cross-contamination  and  cross-reaction  with  other  agents.  Cross-contamination  of 
samples with the agent being tested might occur during sample handling, collection,  
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or processing (Munoz-Zanzi et al., 2006). In the HI test, false-positive results can be 
due to non-specific inhibitors present in the sera tested in the HI antibody test, non-
specific inhibition due to NA steric inhibition in the HI antigen test, or the reference 
antigen may not have been standardized correctly (Pedersen, 2008). 
From  February  2005  to  March  2006,  many  samples  have  been  collected  from 
villages and tested for AI (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Most of the villages selected for 
sampling  were  considered  to  be  at  high  risk  for  AI.  The  surveys  targeted  local 
markets and villages close to the Timor Leste-Indonesian border. Based on the c-
ELISA and PCR results from the surveys no evidence of the presence of influenza A 
or  HPAI  was  found,  although  one  of  20  duck  sera  was  initially  classified  as 
inconclusive but was categorised as negative for H5 and H7 after further testing. The 
negative results from these subsequent surveys further support the assumption that 
the positive results found in 2004 were false positive results. 
5.4.2  HPAI status in Timor Leste based on existing data 
Credible evidence is required to support a statement that a country or region is free 
from  a  disease  (Martin  et  al.,  2007).  In  Timor  Leste  the  only  evidence  that  the 
country was infected was from a single survey in 2004, while all other surveys did 
not  support an infected status  country (Table  5.6).  In addition  the calculation  of 
disease freedom using the method described by Cameron (1999) assumes that the 
samples were collected randomly. In the surveys reported in this Chapter, samples 
were collected by specifically targeting high risk areas and consequently there is a 
higher chance of detecting the disease if present.   
110 
 
The setting of the MEP also influences the confidence in freedom from disease. If 
the  MEP  is  set  to  greater  than  5%,  the  results  are  adequate  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that the country is infected with HPAI. The analysis of most historical 
data (except for the 2004 survey) based on a MEP of 10% indicates that Timor Leste 
was free from HPAI. However these surveys were conducted several years ago and 
more samples need to be collected to confirm the country‘s status for HPAI (Chapter 
Seven). 
According to the records from NAQS Australia and MAF Timor Leste, poultry have 
been  sampled  from  nearly  every  district  of  the  country  (Figure  5.2),  and 
representatives of all of the main poultry species that may be affected by this disease 
have been surveyed. In general, with the exception of a few positive serum samples 
in 2004, there was no evidence of the presence of HPAI in Timor Leste. The results 
of analysis of data after the year of 2004 (2005 to 2006) supported the ongoing 
freedom  of  Timor-Leste  from  HPAI.  However  routine  monitoring  for  HPAI  by 
undertaking regular surveillance at least every six months is important to ensure that 
the free status of a country is maintained. Even though the country is free from 
HPAI, it is also important to identify risk factors that may threaten the HPAI free 
status of a country. This is because HPAI can potentially enter free countries through 
a variety of routes  and  means.  In the next  chapter factors that might  potentially 
contribute to the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste are investigated and the 
country is divided into different regions based on the risk of having an outbreak of 
HPAI.  
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CHAPTER 6:  ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE 
THE POTENTIAL TO BE INVOLVED IN THE 
INTRODUCTION OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN 
INFLUENZA (HPAI) INTO TIMOR LESTE  
6.1  Introduction 
A transboundary disease may be introduced into  a new area because  of specific 
factors  or  events.  In  the  case  of  HPAI,  such  factors  may  include  the  trading  of 
poultry and poultry products, live bird markets, the presence of carrier migratory 
birds, and virus mutation as discussed in Chapter Two. Other factors may include the 
availability of susceptible hosts, the suitability of the environment for the survival of 
the virus, and close proximity to sources of infection such as infected countries. 
While Timor Leste is currently free from HPAI, little is known about factors that 
might be involved in the introduction of the disease into the country. 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  analyse  data  collected  via  a  questionnaire 
distributed to relevant experts to describe pathways or factors that might be involved 
in  the  introduction  of  HPAI  into  Timor  Leste  and  to  determine  the  risk  of  an 
outbreak in different regions and districts of Timor Leste. 
The hypotheses of this chapter are: a) Null hypothesis (H0): All regions/districts in 
Timor Leste have the same risk of having an HPAI outbreak and all pathways of 
introduction contribute to the same risk of having an outbreak in regions and districts 
in Timor Leste, b) Alternative hypothesis (H1): All regions/districts in Timor Leste  
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do  not  have  the  same  risk  of  having  an  HPAI  outbreak  and  all  pathways  of 
introduction do not contribute the same risk of having an outbreak in regions and 
districts in Timor Leste. 
6.2  Materials and Methods 
Data were gathered by a questionnaire (Appendix Four). The questionnaire was sent 
out via e-mail to veterinarians who had knowledge of the country‘s animal health 
system.  These  veterinarians  included  five  from  the  Livestock  Department  and 
Quarantine  of  Timor  Leste,  three  from  NAQS,  one  from  the  School  of  Animal 
Studies, University of Queensland, one from the Department of Primary Industries, 
New South Wales and two from the FAO. The foreign veterinarians included in this 
survey  had  previously  been  or  were  currently  involved  in  Timor  Leste‘s  animal 
health activities. The survey was  conducted between May  and July 2008. Of 15 
questionnaires sent out, 13 (80%) were returned and used in this analysis. 
The questionnaire (Appendix Four), approved by the Murdoch University Human 
Ethics Committee, contained questions which were answered using a six point Likert 
scale (Keown and Hakstian, 1973) using the following options: negligible, very low, 
low, moderate, high, and very high. These qualitative statements then were coded on 
a scale from zero to five. These six Likert scales were then grouped into two risk 
groups (high and low). The high risk group contained scores of four and five and the 
low risk group from zero to three. Based on these two risk categories, odds ratios 
(ORs) and their 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) for individual regions, pathways 
in regions and individual districts of having AI outbreaks were calculated. As OR 
can only be calculated for non-zero values, if any cells contained a zero value then a  
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one was added to all cells in that calculation. The 95% CI of OR was calculated 
using Woolfs‘ method (Kahn and Sempos, 1989). 
Odds  ratios  were  then  interpreted  by  the  method  of  Sheskin  (2004)  where  95% 
confidence intervals including the value one were regarded as not significant, if the 
lower 95% CI was greater than one then the factor was classified as associated with 
disease and when the upper 95% CI was less than one then the factor was classified 
as protective (Sheskin, 2004). 
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS version 17 and Microsoft Excel 2007 
(Microsoft Corp. 1985-2007). The qualitative Likert scale data, such as testing the 
likelihood  of  infection  between  regions  and  districts  and  the  risk  pathways  for 
introduction were analysed using non-parametric tests including the Chi Square test 
(χ
2) for independence and the Fisher‘s exact test (Moore, 2000; Jakobsson, 2004; 
Jamieson, 2004; Moore, 2004). 
The results from the questionnaire, combined with field observations and literature 
research, were used to explore and analyse factors that might be involved in the 
introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste and to classify the regions and their districts 
into different risk categories of having outbreaks of HPAI for the period of 2008 to 
2013. 
To show the location of districts and to classify different risk districts of Timor 
Leste, maps were created using the method described in Section 3.2.1.  
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6.3  Results 
6.3.1  Risk of disease in the three regions of Timor Leste 
Based on the opinions of 13 experts, the relative importance of different regions having 
an outbreak of HPAI was estimated. The median, minimum and maximum risk value 
using the six Likert scale is presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Median, minimum and maximum risk value (Likert Scale 0 to 5) of 
Timor Leste’s three regions. 
Region  Median  Range  Risk category 
West  4  2 - 5  High 
Central  3  1 - 4  Moderate 
East  3  1 - 4  Moderate 
 
The six risk scales were then categorised into two categories and the results for the 
different regions in Timor Leste is presented in Table 6.2.  
Table  6.2.  Number  and  percentage  of  experts  believing  different  regions  of 
Timor Leste will have an outbreak of HPAI* 
Region 
  
Risk  Risk category 
High risk  Low risk 
West region  8 (62%)  5 (38%)  High 
Central region  4 (31%)  9 (69%)  Low 
East region  1 (0.08%)  12 (92%)  Low 
* Regions were categorised as high risk (Likert score 4 or 5) or low risk (Likert score 0, 1, 2, or 3). 
Using  data  presented  in  Table  6.2,  the  OR  and  their  confidence  intervals  were 
calculated. The West region was considered to be 19.2 (95% CI: 1.9 - 196.6) times 
more likely to have an outbreak of AI than the East region and the Central region 
was 5.3 (95% CI: 0.5 - 56.2) times more likely to have an outbreak than the eastern 
region. A map of the three regions mentioned in Table 6.1 are displayed in Figure 
6.1.  
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Figure  6.1.  Map  displaying  Timor  Leste’s  3  regions.  Green  (West),  orange 
(Central) and yellow (East). White is Indonesian territories. 
6.3.2  Risk pathways for the entry of HPAI into the three regions  of 
Timor Leste. 
Although 13 experts completed a questionnaire, only data from 12 were used to 
determine the risk pathways for the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste‘s regions. 
The 13
th expert was unable to score risk pathways of HPAI introduction into the 
different regions. 
The experts ranked the relative importance of different pathways for the introduction 
of HPAI into the West, Central and East regions for the period from 2008 to 2013. 
The median, minimum and maximum risk value on the Likert scale are presented in 
Table  6.3,  the  categorization  of  different  pathways  into  high  and  low  risk  is 
presented in Table 6.4.  
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6.3.3  Overall risk pathways in all regions  
This survey was designed to determine the perceptions of experts on the pathways 
that might be involved in the introduction of HPAI into different regions of Timor 
Leste.  Overall  there  were  significant  differences  in  the  experts‘  perceptions  of 
various pathways for the potential entry of HPAI (χ
2:113.4, df: 18, p < 0.0001). 
In all three regions the smuggling of live birds from Indonesia was classified as the 
most important factor likely to lead to an outbreak (with OR of 33, 23.4 and 13 in the 
West, Central and East regions respectively). The second most important factor was 
fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia (with OR of 22, 17.3 and 7.2 for 
the West, Central and East regions respectively). The third most important factor that 
might  contribute  to  the  likelihood  of  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  in  Timor  Leste  was 
smuggled eggs from Indonesia (with OR of 15.4, 9.8 and 7.2 for the West, Central 
and East regions respectively) (Table 6.5). 
In the West region returning livestock trucks from West Timor, Indonesia (an OR of 
11,  95%CI:  1.1  –  114.1)  was  also  recognised  as  significant  risk  factor  for  the 
introduction of HPAI (Table 6.5). 
There were significant differences in experts‘ perceptions about the risk of having 
HPAI  outbreaks  in  the  three  regions  through  various  pathways  (P  values  for 
pathways for each district < 0.005). 
6.3.4  Risk of individual districts having an outbreak of HPAI 
Districts that were considered to have a high risk of having an outbreak of HPAI 
included Covalima, Bobonaro, Ambeno and Dili (Table 6.7). These districts are all 
located in the West region, except Dili, which is in Central region. The districts that  
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were categorised as moderate risk included: Liquiça, Aileu, Same, and Ainaro from 
the West region and Baucau and Lospalos from the East region. All other districts 
were classified as having a low risk of having an outbreak of HPAI (Figure 6.2).  
 
Figure  6.2. Map of Timor Leste showing districts  that were ranked as  high 
(Red), medium (orange) or low risk (green) for an outbreak of HPAI. White 
areas are Indonesian territory.  
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Table 6.3. Median and range of the score for risk pathways for the introduction of HPAI into the 
West, Central and East regions of Timor Leste 
 Source 
  
West  Central  East 
Median  Range  Median  Range  Median  Range 
Importation of frozen chickens legally from Brazil  1.0  0 - 4  1.0  0 – 4  1.0  0 - 3 
Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia  4.0  2 - 5  4.0  2 – 5  3.5  1 - 5 
Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia  4.0  1 - 5  4.0  2 – 5  3.0  1 - 5 
Contaminated local water sources  3.0  0 - 5  2.0  0 – 4  2.0  0 - 4 
Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry  2.5  1 - 5  2.0  1 – 5  2.0  1 - 4 
Smuggled eggs from Indonesia  4.0  0 - 5  2.5  0 – 5  2.0  0 - 4 
Importation of eggs legally from Malaysia  1.0  0 - 4  1.0  0 – 4  1.0  0 - 5 
Mutation (LPAI mutates to HPAI)   1.0  0 - 4  1.5  0 – 3  1.0  0 - 3 
Natural spread via air  1.0  0 - 4  0.5  0 – 3  0.5  0 - 3 
Legal importation of live poultry  2.0  0 - 4  2.0  0 – 4  2.0  0 - 3 
Tourist/immigrant vehicles  3.0  0 - 4  2.5  0 – 4  1.0  0 - 3 
Illegal importation of frozen chickens   3.0  1 - 4  2.0  1 – 4  2.0  0 - 4 
Legal importation of commercial poultry feed   3.0  0 - 4  2.5  0 – 4  2.0  0 - 4 
Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed  3.0  1 - 5  3.0  1 – 4  2.0  1 - 4 
Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs  2.0  0 - 4  2.0  0 – 5  1.5  0 - 3 
Returning livestock trucks from West Timor, 
Indonesia  
3.5  0 - 5  2.0  0 – 5  1.0  0 - 4 
Swill from aircraft  1.5  0 - 4  1.5  0 – 4  1.5  0 - 4 
Swill from boats   2.0  0 - 4  2.0  0 – 4  2.0  0 - 4 
Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)   3.0  0 - 4  2.0  0 – 3  1.0  0 - 3  
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Table 6.4. Risk categories for different pathways of introducing HPAI into the West, Central and East regions of Timor Leste. 
Source  West (Number of respondents)  Central (Number of respondents)  East (Number of 
respondents) 
HR  LR  RC  HR  LR  RC  HR  LR  RC 
Importation of frozen chickens legally from Brazil  1   11   Low  1  11  Low  0  12  Low 
Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia  9   3   High  8  4  High  6  6  High 
Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia  8   4   High  7  5  High  4  8  Low 
Contaminated local water sources  3   9   Low  1  11  Low  2  10  Low 
Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry  5   7   Low  3  9  Low  3  9  Low 
Smuggled eggs from Indonesia  7   5   High  5  7  Low  4  8  Low 
Importation of eggs legally from Malaysia  1   11   Low  1  11  Low  1  11  Low 
Mutation (LPAI mutates to HPAI)   1   11   Low  0  12  Low  0  12  Low 
Natural spread via air  2   10   Low  0  12  Low  0  12  Low 
Legal importation of live poultry  1   11   Low  1  11  Low  0  12  Low 
Tourist/immigrant vehicles  4   8   Low  3  9  Low  0  12  Low 
Illegal importation of frozen chickens   4   8   Low  1  11  Low  2  10  Low 
Legal importation of commercial poultry feed   2   10   Low  2  10  Low  1  11  Low 
Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed  5   7   Low  2  10  Low  3  9  Low 
Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs  2   10   Low  1  11  Low  0  12  Low 
Returning livestock trucks from West Timor, 
Indonesia  
6   6   Moderate  3  9  Low  1  11  Low 
Swill from aircraft  2   10   Low  1  11  Low  1  11  Low 
Swill from boats   4   8   Low  2  10  Low  3  9  Low 
Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)   4   8   Low  0  12  Low  0  12  Low 
Note: HR, LR, RC are high risk, low risk and risk category respectively  
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Table 6.5. The OR for different potential means of introducing HPAI into the three regions of Timor Leste  
  West 
OR (95% CI) 
Central 
OR (95% CI) 
East 
OR (95% CI) 
Frozen chickens imported legally from Brazil
1  1.0  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  1.0 (0.1 -17.8) 
Live chickens smuggled from Indonesia  33.0 (29 - 374.3)  23.4 (2.3 - 235.5)  13 (1.3 - 128.1) 
Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia  22.0 (2.1 - 236.1)  17.3 (1.8 - 171.7)  7.2 (0.7 - 72.7) 
Contaminated local water sources  3.7 (0.3 - 41.6)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  3.5 (0.3 - 39.1) 
Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry  7.9 (0.8 - 82.1)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1) 
Eggs smuggled from Indonesia  15.4 (1.5 - 161)  9.8 (1 - 96.6)  7.2 (0.7 - 72.7) 
Importation of eggs legally from Malaysia  1.0 (0.1 - 18.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1) 
Mutation (LPAI mutating to HPAI)   1.0 (0.1 - 18.1)  1.0 (0.1 - 17.8)  1.0 (0.1-17.8) 
Natural spread via air  2.2 (0.2 - 28.1)  1.0 (0.1 - 17.8)  1.0 (0.1 -17.8) 
Legal importation of live poultry  1.0 (0.1 - 18.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  1.0 (0.1-17.8) 
Tourist/immigrant vehicles  5.5 (0.5 - 59)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1)  1.0 (0.1-17.8) 
Illegal importation of frozen chickens   5.5 (0.5 - 59)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  3.5 0.3 - 39.1) 
Legal importation of commercial poultry feed   2.2 (0.2 - 28.1)  3.5 (0.3 - 39.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1) 
Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed  7.9 (0.8 - 82.1)  3.5 (0.3 - 39.1)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1) 
Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs  2.2 (0.2 - 28.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  1.0 (0.1 - 17.8) 
Returning livestock trucks from West Timor   11.0 (1.1 - 114.1)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1) 
Swill from aircraft  2.2 (0.2 - 28.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1)  2.2 (0.2 - 27.1) 
Swill from boats  5.5 (0.5 - 59)  3.5 (0.3 - 39.1)  5.2 (0.5 - 54.1) 
Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)
2  5.5 (0.5 - 59)  1.0  1.0 
1is the referent for West region and 2 is the referent for both Central and East regions 
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6.3.5  Risk category for individual districts 
The  risk  of  individual districts  of  having  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  based  on  the  13 
experts‘  opinions  is  outlined  in  Tables  6.6  and  6.7  and  the  OR  calculations  are 
displayed in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.6. Median and range of risk value category of individual districts in 
Timor Leste. 
Region  District  Median  Range 
West  Covalima  4  2 - 5 
Bobonaro  4  2 - 5 
Liquiça  3  1 - 4 
Ermera  2  1 - 4 
Ambeno  4  3 - 5 
Central  Aileu  3  1 - 4 
Same  3  1 - 4 
Ainaro  3  1 - 4 
Dili  4  1 - 5 
East  Manatuto  2  1 - 4 
Baucau  3  1 - 4 
Viqueque  2  1 - 4 
Lospalos  3  1 - 4 
 
Table 6.7. Categorisation of districts into high and low risk. 
Region  Districts  Number of respondents categorising 
districts’ risk as 
Risk group 
High (%)  Low (%) 
West  Covalima  8 (62)  5 (38)  High risk 
Bobonaro  9 (69)  4 (31)  High risk 
Liquiça  4 (31)  9 (69)  Low risk 
Ermera  2 (15)  11 (85)  Low risk 
Ambeno  8 (62)  5 (38)  High risk 
Central  Aileu  2 (15)  11 (85)  Low risk 
Same  1 (8)  12 (92)  Low risk 
Ainaro  1 (8)  12 (92)  Low risk 
Dili  7 (54)  6 (46)  High risk 
East  Manatuto  1 (8)  12 (92)  Low risk 
Baucau  1 (8)  12 (92)  Low risk 
Viqueque  1 (8)  12 (92)  Low risk 
Lospalos  3 (23)  10 (77)  Low risk 
 
Using Viqueque as the comparative (referent) district, the district of Bobonaro had 
the  highest  likelihood  of  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  (OR  27;  95%  CI:  2.6  -  284.7).  
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Similarly the districts of Covalima, Ambeno and Dili were considered to be 19.2 
(95%CI: 1.9 - 196.5), 19.2 (95%CI: 1.9 - 196.5) and 14 (95%CI: 1.4 - 141.5) times 
more likely to be infected than Viqueque respectively (Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8. Odds ratio (OR) and 95% confidence intervals of 13 districts for the 
introduction of HPAI 
Region  District  OR (95% confidence 
intervals) 
West  Covalima  19.2 (1.9 - 196.5) 
Bobonaro  27.0 (2.6 - 284.7) 
Liquiça  5.3 (0.5 - 56.2) 
Ermera  2.2 (0.2 - 27.6) 
Ambeno  19.2 (1.9 - 196.5) 
Central  Aileu  2.2 (0.2 - 27.6) 
Same  1.0 (0.1 - 17.9) 
Ainaro  1.0 (0.1 - 17.9) 
Dili  14.0 (1.4 - 141.5) 
East  Manatuto  1.0 (0.1 - 17.9) 
Baucau  1.0 (0.1 - 17.9) 
Viqueque*  1.0 
Lospalos  3.6 (0.3 - 40.2) 
* Referent/comparative group 
Overall there were significant differences in the experts‘ perceptions about the risk 
of having HPAI outbreaks in individual districts (χ
2: 44.927, df: 12, p< 0.00001).  
6.4  Discussion 
6.4.1  Risk of individual regions having outbreaks of HPAI  
Based on the median risk value, regions in Timor Leste were categorized into high 
and moderate risk (Table 6.1). The risk of the West Region of having an outbreak 
was classified as  ―high‖ (median risk of  four), and the Central and East regions 
categorised as moderate risk (both have a median risk of three) (Table 6.1). The high 
risk ranking of the West region was expected as this region is located adjacent to the 
border  with  Indonesia.  Avian  influenza  is  endemic  in  Indonesia  (Section  2.2.14) 
(FAOAIDE,  2010a),  although  the  disease  has  not  been  reported  in  neighbouring 
NTT, West Timor after October 2004 (Dr. Maria Geong, personal communication).  
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The risk of an outbreak in the West region was 19.2 (95% CI: 1.9, 196.6) times that 
of the East region (Section 6.3.1). 
Surprisingly, this analysis revealed that the East region was considered to have the 
same risk of having an outbreak as the Central region (both moderate risk) as the 
East  region  is  located  distant  from  the  potentially  infected  area  of  Indonesia. 
However in this region in the district of Lospalos, Lake Iralalaru is located. On this 
lake at least 50 wild waterbird species, including large populations of ducks and rails 
are found (Trainor, 2005b) and this may have resulted in the experts ranking this 
region higher. However, Timor Leste is not a favourite place for migratory birds 
because there is not a large amount of food available, there is a lack of suitable 
habitats, and there is unpredictable rainfall resulting in the presence of only a few 
wetlands  in  the  country.  For  example  in  a  study  on  population  estimates  and 
important sites for migratory shorebirds in the East Asian-Australasian flyway, it 
was  reported  that  Timor  Leste  was  not  an  internationally  recognized  site  for 
shorebirds (Bamford and Watkins, 2005).  
6.4.2  Important pathways for the potential introduction of HPAI into 
Timor Leste 
Several important pathways that might be involved in the introduction of HPAI into 
a  country  were  summarised  in  Section  2.2.6.  In  this  chapter  three  important 
pathways that potentially could be involved in the introduction of HPAI into Timor 
Leste were identified: live chickens smuggled from Indonesia; fomites e.g. cages, 
egg trays from Indonesia; and eggs smuggled from Indonesia. 
In this study smuggled live chickens from Indonesia were considered to present the 
greatest single risk for introducing HPAI into Timor Leste. Illegal trading of live  
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poultry has previously been identified as one of the most important risk factors for 
the spread of AI (Check, 2006). 
There are several reasons for live chickens to be smuggled into Timor Leste from 
Indonesia. Firstly, it is cheaper to buy chickens from NTT than locally (IRIN, 2008b) 
(Section  3.4.4).  Secondly,  in  the  border  regions,  it  is  closer  and  easier  to  buy 
smuggled live chickens than to buy live birds from markets/shops from the border 
districts‘ capitals.  
An obstacle to the illegal live chicken trade across the border is the presence of the 
Border Police Unit (BPU). However local smugglers can reportedly bypass the BPU 
as the smugglers are familiar with the area and they know the schedule of the BPU 
patrols (IRIN, 2008b) and people who are involved in the local trading of birds have 
family ties on both sides of the border (ICG, 2010).  
Potentially infected live chickens smuggled from West Timor, NTT could lead to 
infection of local domesticated chickens and ducks and possibly local wild birds. In 
2005, an outbreak of HPAI was suspected in NTT (FAOAIDE, 2005). However, 
according  to  local  animal  health  officers,  even  though  the  chickens  were 
serologically positive in that year, there have been no reported outbreaks of HPAI in 
West Timor after October 2004 (Dr. Maria Geong, personal communication) and it is 
likely that West Timor is currently free of AI. While the Province of NTT remains 
free of HPAI the risk to Timor Leste is lessened, however there is the potential for 
poultry from other infected Indonesian provinces and islands, such as Java and Bali, 
to be illegally imported into West Timor and then transported to Timor Leste.  
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Eggs smuggled from Indonesia were also identified as an important potential source 
of infection. Although there are not many reports regarding the introduction of HPAI 
via eggs contaminated with virus, egg borne transmission is possible (Cappucci et 
al., 1985; Promkuntod et al., 2006). Eggs may be smuggled through sea-ports or 
through the land border into the border districts of Oecusse, Bobonaro and Covalima. 
As with live birds there are two main reasons for this to occur. Firstly it is cheaper to 
buy  such  eggs  in  the  border  areas  and  secondly,  it  is  closer  to  buy  eggs  from 
Indonesia in the border areas than from other more distant sources. However while 
West Timor and the province of NTT remains free of HPAI the risk to Timor Leste 
would be expected to be reduced. 
Fomites carried from Indonesia were also recognised as significant risk practices for 
the West and Central regions (Table 6.4). Contaminated materials can contribute to 
the introduction of AI (Abad et al., 1994; Wang et al., 2006). 
Other risk pathways that might be involved in the introduction of HPAI include 
migratory  birds,  the  legal  importation  of  live  poultry,  the  illegal  importation  of 
frozen chickens and returning livestock trucks from West Timor. The risk of these 
pathways causing HPAI outbreaks were classified as low (Table 6.4). 
Trucks entering Timor Leste are required by law to enter via one of four entry points 
(Salele in Suai, Mota Ain in Bobonaro and Oesilo and Sakato both in Oecusse). At 
these points vehicles are inspected by quarantine staff. Trucks that enter Timor Leste 
are not allowed to carry live poultry or poultry products (MAFP, 2004) and if any 
live poultry or poultry products are found they are required to be destroyed by the 
quarantine officers.  
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The risk of migratory birds being infected and subsequently infecting local poultry 
species resulting in an outbreak in Timor Leste was classified as low in all regions. 
However this risk was higher than that from the legal importation of frozen chickens 
from Brazil (Table 6.4). Transmission from wild birds is related to their behaviour of 
migrating from one area or continent to another and then having direct or indirect 
contact with domestic poultry (Olsen et al., 2006). 
 
Figure 6.3. An example of the destruction of eggs illegally smuggled from NTT 
in Oecusse District 
During migration wild birds may stop at favourable sites, where they can interact 
with local native wild species and may consequently transmit the virus and disease to 
other susceptible birds. In Timor Leste, although some migratory birds are observed, 
mostly are Australian migrants, and in particular pelicans (Figure 6.4). As Australia 
is free from HPAI (Section 2.2.15) these birds should pose no risk to Timor Leste.  
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If these migratory birds were infected, they may have interactions with domesticated 
poultry  either  directly  or  indirectly  through  contamination  of  water  sources  with 
faecal material containing virus (Hinshaw et al., 1980; Brown et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 6.4. Australian Pelicans at Lake Tasi Tolu, Dili – Timor Leste  
However  in  Timor  Leste,  the  role  of  this  pathway  would  appear  to  be  unlikely. 
According to a study on shorebirds on the East Asian-Australasian flyway, there was 
no important sites listed for landing in Timor Leste (Bamford and Watkins, 2005). 
However locally there are a few important wetlands for waterbirds and shore birds 
(Lake Iralalaru, Tasi Tolu, Era Ulu, and Seloi in the districts of Lautem, Dili, Ermera 
and Aileu respectively) (Trainor, 2005b). Of these lakes, two of them are classified 
as the most important sites for waterfowl in the country. The first one, Lake Iralalaru 
(1500 ha), is stated to be the most significant freshwater site in Timor-Leste and 
NTT, where at least 50 waterbird species, including large populations of ducks and  
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rails,  are found.  The second one, Tasi Tolu  Lake, has  high national  biodiversity 
significance  with  53  waterbird  and  coastal  seabird  species  having  been  recorded 
from its saline lakes and mudflats (Trainor, 2005b). 
If AI was introduced into Timor Leste via migratory birds, it could be introduced 
through  shorebirds.  Species  of  migratory  shorebirds  that  have  been  observed  in 
Timor Leste include: Palearctic migrants (common sandpiper - Actitus hypoleucos, 
common greenshank - Tringa nebularia, red-necked stint - Calidris ruficollis, marsh 
sandpiper - Tringa stagnatilis, wood sandpiper  - Tringa glareola, Pacific golden 
plover  -  Pluvialis  fulva  and  whimbrel  -  Numenius  phaeopus);  Austral  winter 
migrants  (Australian  Pratincole  Stiltia  isabella);  and  austral  vagrants  (masked 
lapwing Vanellus miles) (Trainor, 2005a). These birds have been observed to stop for 
feeding before heading to Australia after migrating from the north (Trainor, 2005a). 
If these birds were infected with HPAI and survived until they refuel or transit in 
Timor Leste, there is a possibility that they may infect local wild or domesticated 
birds. 
Shore birds may play a role in introducing AIV because most of the AIV in wild 
birds have  been isolated from  birds  belonging to the order of Anseriformes (e.g 
ducks  and  geese)  or  Charadriiformes  (shore  birds,  gulls,  terns)  (Stallknecht  and 
Shane, 1988; Gilbert et al., 2006). Some shore birds that are observed in Timor Leste 
are from Australia, but AIV has not been isolated from Charadriiformes in Australia 
(Arzey, 2004).  
The potential role migratory birds may play in the introduction of AI into Timor 
Leste therefore is likely to be low. It is possible that Australian migratory birds may 
get infected elsewhere when they migrate out of Australia and may infect birds in  
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Timor Leste, but most Australian Anseriformes remain local or migrate only within 
the Australian continent (Arzey, 2004), which is still free from AI. It is therefore 
unlikely that Australian migratory birds would get infected from other migratory 
birds from infected countries in the Asian region. Even though there have been a few 
HPAI  (H7)  outbreaks  in  Australia  in  the  past  (e.g.  1985,  1992  and  1994),  a 
phylogenetic study of isolates from these outbreaks revealed that the H7 subtypes 
were different from those found in other countries in North America, Europe and 
Africa  (Arzey,  2004)  and  supports  the  hypothesis  that  the  infection  may  have 
originated locally through viral mutation. 
The risk of legal live poultry importation causing an outbreak in Timor Leste was 
classified as low in all regions. The legal trade in poultry and poultry products should 
be regarded as safe if the importing conditions are based on the recommendations of 
the OIE (OIE, 2006f). This is because live chickens are only imported from AI-free 
countries such as Brazil, Singapore, USA, Australia and New Zealand (Quarantine 
Office - Timor Leste‘s data). If imported live chickens were incubating infection 
then  they  could  potentially  introduce  HPAI  into  Timor  Leste,  however  this  is 
unlikely  due  to  the  strong  restrictions  placed  on  the  importation  of  birds  from 
infected countries. 
The  risk  of  an  outbreak  in  Timor  Leste  from  the  illegal  importation  of  frozen 
chickens was also classified as low in all regions. This is due to the fact that Timor 
Leste currently imports frozen chickens only from AI free countries. In addition, the 
likelihood  of  frozen  chickens  being  smuggled  is  low  because  most  residents  of 
Timor Leste would not have the means for keeping these carcasses chilled and it is 
difficult to transport these long distances without appropriate refrigeration facilities.  
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If frozen chickens were smuggled, the AIV may persist in frozen muscle for up to 
287 days and 303 days in bone marrow (Purchase, 1931). However it is unlikely that, 
even if the virus survived, it would be exposed to local domestic birds, as chicken 
meat  is  rarely  deliberately  fed  raw  to  birds  in  Timor  Leste,  however  poultry 
potentially may be exposed if they are fed uncooked household kitchen waste. 
The risk of ―returning livestock trucks from West Timor‖ causing an outbreak in 
Timor Leste was classified as low in all regions. There are several reasons for this: 
firstly,  until  recently  (2010)  there  were  no  trucks  carrying  livestock  from  West 
Timor to Timor Leste. Some livestock (cattle) are trucked from Timor Leste to West 
Timor but the trucks stop at the border areas and the animals are then transferred to 
trucks in Indonesia. Secondly although an AIV was isolated from an outbreak in 
Kupang  and  adjacent  districts  in  Kupang,  this  district  and  Province  is  now 
considered to be free from HPAI (Dr. Maria Geong, personal communication). 
6.5  Conclusions 
Regions in Timor Leste were not considered to have equal risk of experiencing an 
outbreak of HPAI, with the West region that borders Indonesia considered to be the 
region  with  the  highest  risk.  Similarly  certain  districts  (Bobonaro,  Ambeno, 
Covalima and Dili) were recognised as having a greater risk of having an outbreak 
than were others.  
There are many pathways for the introduction of AI into Timor Leste, but the most 
important  pathways  are  the  illegal  importation  (smuggling)  of  live  poultry, 
contaminated fomites carried from Indonesia and eggs smuggled from Indonesia.  
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Maintaining a country free from HPAI relies upon assessing potential risk factors for 
disease  and  implementing  a  program  to  mitigate  against  these  risks.  Confirming 
freedom in a free-country requires undertaking appropriate surveillance and in the 
next chapter the results of a targeted serological surveillance study are presented to 
support the statement that Timor Leste is free from HPAI. 
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CHAPTER 7:  A TARGETED SEROLOGICAL SURVEY 
TO DEMONSTRATE TIMOR LESTE IS FREE FROM 
HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA 
7.1  Introduction 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a highly contagious viral infection in 
poultry (OIE, 2010a, c). The disease was introduced into Southeast Asia (SEA) as 
early as 2003 (FAO, 2007a; Santhia et al., 2009) and is now endemic in the region 
including Timor  Leste‘s neighbour,  Indonesia.  The spread of HPAI in SEA was 
associated  with  the  movement  of  domestic  poultry,  poultry  products,  and  people 
(Eagles et al., 2009). In Indonesia and Malaysia, the unofficial movement of fighting 
cocks was believed to be the most likely source for the introduction and spread of 
HPAI (FAO, 2005; EMPRES, 2006; Sims, 2007; Sims and Brown, 2008). 
Although Timor Leste is geographically located in SEA and its surveillance capacity 
is weak, the country has never had an outbreak of HPAI and is regarded to be a 
HPAI free country by the OIE (FAO, 2007b; FAOAIDE, 2010a, b). However the 
country‘s free status is threatened through the smuggling of live poultry across the 
border.  
Previously several serological surveys have been conducted by the Livestock Office 
in  cooperation  with  NAQS  (Chapter  Five).  Although  most  of  the  results  of  the 
surveys indicated that there was no evidence to support the presence of HPAI in the 
country, there was one particular survey (June 2004), which resulted in questionable 
results.  The  surveys  were  not,  however,  based  on  a  sound  understanding  of  the  
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epidemiology of the disease. Therefore the aim of the study outlined in this chapter 
was to carry out targeted serological surveillance in high risk areas of Timor Leste to 
confirm  the  country‘s  freedom  from  HPAI.  Targeted  surveillance  was  chosen 
because  it  increases  the  level  of  confidence  in  disease  freedom  and  allows  for 
detection of a lower prevalence than with structured random surveys (OIE, 2006c). 
The hypotheses of this study were that the country was infected with HPAI (H0) or 
the country was free from HPAI (H1) at a level equal to or greater than a specified 
MEP  or  design  prevalence  of  2%.  This  MEP  is  designed  to  be  lower  than  the 
analysis of existing data (10%) in Chapter Five, so that more samples are collected 
and hence result in greater confidence in the disease free status. 
7.2  Materials and methods 
7.2.1  Selection of sites 
Districts which were considered as having a high risk of infection were targeted for 
sampling. Selection of these high risk districts was based upon previous findings 
reported in this thesis and discussions with local communities, community leaders, 
and experts. The results of Chapter Six indicated that four of the 13 districts in Timor 
Leste were categorised as high risk of having HPAI outbreaks. These districts were 
Covalima,  Bobonaro  and  Oecusse,  which  are  located  along  the  Timor 
Leste/Indonesian  border  and  Dili,  which  is  the  capital  city  and  the  centre  for 
marketing of poultry and poultry products for all districts. A moderate risk district 
(Lospalos) (Chapter Six) was also selected because it contains the largest lake in the 
country (Iralalaru), where there is the potential for interaction between wild water 
fowl and local poultry.  
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Field trips were conducted to each of these five districts. On arrival at a district a 
meeting with local community leaders and some community members was held to 
identify at least one high risk village or site for sample collection. The site selection 
was based on the following criteria: proximity to the border of Timor Leste and 
Indonesia; proximity to water sources where wild waterfowl may be resident and 
which might interact with local domestic poultry; closeness to local markets where 
different species of poultry from various sites may come into contact with each other 
and; areas near or around cock fighting places which may involve fighting cocks 
moving unofficially across the country‘s border. 
To show the survey locations and to classify different risk districts of Timor Leste, 
maps were created using the method described in Section 3.2.1. The locations of 
sampling in the targeted survey are shown in Figure 7.1. 
.  
Figure 7.1. Survey sites for targeted surveillance in July 2009. Orange (surveyed 
districts), yellow (other districts) in Timor Leste. white is Indonesian territory.  
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7.2.2  Selection of sampled poultry 
Individual  poultry  were  not  randomly  selected.  Sampling  was  targeted  towards 
poultry that, according to discussion with local villagers, were either suspected of 
being smuggled, were sick at the time of sampling, were being sold in the market, 
had the potential to mix with local waterfowl or were involved in  cock fighting 
competitions.  Some  poultry  types,  such  as  jungle  fowls,  ducks,  and  doves  are 
relatively rare, and whenever possible samples were also collected from these birds. 
7.2.3  Collection of samples 
For collection of blood birds were held  upside down with  the wing extended to 
expose the ulna vein and a few small feathers were removed to facilitate viewing of 
the vein. The vein was wiped with a swab containing 70% alcohol and a 25 gauge 
needle attached to a 3 mL syringe inserted into the vein and a maximum of 2 to 3 mL 
of blood collected. Pressure with a piece of cotton wool was then applied to the vein 
at the insertion site of the needle until the bleeding stopped. The blood was then 
transferred to a labelled plain blood collection tube. Samples were allowed to clot at 
room  temperature.  The  clotted  (coagulated)  blood  was  then  fractionated  by 
centrifuging  at  2000  revolutions  per  minute  (rpm)  for  3  to  5  minutes.  After 
centrifugation, the sera were transferred to labelled two mL containers and stored in 
a freezer at -20ºC prior to dispatch to AAHL, Geelong. 
For collection of swabs, sterile cotton swabs were firstly inserted and rubbed on the 
mucosa of the trachea and then were inserted into the cloaca of each bird and gentle 
pressure applied while rotating the swab two or three times on the side of the cloaca. 
After removal of the swab if any large pieces of faeces were present these were 
shaken off. Five swabs from the same location were pooled into a tube containing  
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viral transport medium (VTM). In the field all pooled samples were kept in an esky 
containing  ice  blocks  before  transferring  to  a  fridge  (4
oC)  before  they  were 
dispatched to AAHL. 
7.2.4  Determination of confidence intervals of prevalence 
The prevalence for the sera and swabs and their confidence intervals was calculated 
using exact binomial method (Daly, 1992). 
7.2.5  Sample testing method 
All sera and swabs samples were tested at AAHL using the procedure as described in 
Figure  5.1.  The  strains  of  HPAI  tested  for  included  H5N3  (Australian),  H7N3 
(Australian), H9N2 (Malacca), H5N1 (Indonesian Clade 2) and H5N1 (Vietnamese 
Clade 1). 
7.2.6  Determination of level of disease freedom 
After  all  samples  were  tested,  the  level  of  HPAI  freedom  was  calculated  using 
FreeCalc in Survey Toolbox (Cameron, 1999). Information provided to determine 
this were the test Se and Sp, the population size, MEP, the survey sample size and 
the number of positive reactors. 
As two tests (c-ELISA and HI) were used to test sera, a combined Se and Sp of these 
two tests, when used in series, was calculated as in Section 5.2.4. The combined Se 
and Sp for tests conducted in series was 73.62% (95% CI: 59.64 – 85.38%) and 
99.99 (95% CI: 99.95-100%) respectively. The Se and Sp of the TaqMan PCR used 
for testing the swabs was 93.3 and 97.7% respectively (Anonymous, 2006).  
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To  demonstrate  freedom  of  disease,  the  MEP  has  to  be  set  according  to  OIE 
guidelines; however guidelines are only available for a few diseases (James, 1998; 
OIE,  2006e,  2007b).  For  AI  there  are  no  recommendations  for  the  MEP 
consequently for this survey the MEP was set at 2%. If the probability is less than 
this level, then the population is considered free from the disease  (Martin et al., 
2007). A MEP of 2% is low for an infectious disease such as HPAI. This low value 
was chosen because the smaller the MEP, the more samples will be required to be 
collected resulting in a greater chance of detecting disease if it is present (Cannon, 
2002; Martin and Cameron, 2002). 
7.3  Laboratory results 
In total 358 sera and 64 pooled swab samples were collected and tested at AAHL, 
Geelong,  Australia.  The  samples  tested  were  collected  from  five  districts  as 
summarised in Table 7.2. Two types of biological samples were collected from every 
chicken. The results of the laboratory testing for the 358 sera and 64 pooled swab 
samples are summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
7.3.1  Results of testing sera 
Two inconclusive c-ELISA results (one from Covalima district, Lalawa village and 
another one from Taibesse market in Dili) were tested further with the HIT for HPAI 
strains. All HPAI results were negative to the HIT. The final test results showed no 
evidence of the presence of antibodies to HPAI in any of the samples (Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.1. Source of sera and swabs from various species and districts in Timor Leste. 
Source of samples  District*  Total tested 
(%)  Bobonaro  Covalima  Dili  Lautem  Oecusse 
Sera  Swabs  Sera  Swabs  Sera  Swabs  Sera  Swabs  Sera  Swabs  Sera  Swabs 
Village chickens from 
villages  40  40  32  32  39  14  61  51  22  22  194 (54.2)  159 (44.4) 
Fighting Cocks  19  19  21  21  5  5  6  5  24  24  75 (20.9)  74 (20.7) 
Village chickens at the 
markets  5  5  11  11  21  21  11  11  14  14  62 (17.3)  62 (17.3) 
Ducks  1  1  1  1  12  11  4  3  5  5  23 (6.4)  21 (5.9) 
Doves  0  0  0  0  3  3  0  0  0  0  3 (0.8)  3 (0.8) 
Jungle fowls  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 (0.3)  1 (0.3) 
Total (% of all birds)  65 
(18) 
65 
(18) 
66 
(18) 
66 
(18) 
80 
(22) 
55 
(15) 
82 
(23) 
70 
(20) 
65 
(18) 
65 
(18) 
358 
(100) 
320* 
(89.7) 
*Swabs were only tested from 320 birds due to financial restriction 
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Table 7.2. Laboratory results from testing of sera for AI and HPAI originating 
from birds from various sites 
Species  District  Sites  Total sera  Results c-
ELISA 
Result of 
HIT 
Village 
chickens 
Bobonaro  Tapo  35  Negative   
Holsa  29  Negative   
Covalima  Bei Seuc  30  Negative   
Debos    6  Negative   
Nikir  10  Negative   
Wala    8  Negative   
Lalawa  10  9 negative, 
1 inconclusive 
Negative 
Dili  Hera  24  Negative   
Comoro  19  Negative   
Kuluhun    1  Negative   
Becora    5  Negative   
Taibesse    9  8 Negative,  
1 inconclusive 
Negative 
Halilaran    7  Negative   
Lautem  Bauro  30  Negative   
Com    6  Negative   
Fuiloro  11  Negative   
Mehara  31  Negative   
Oecusse  Naimeco  14  Negative   
Bobometo  11  Negative   
Nipani  25  Negative   
Costa  10  Negative   
Lalisuk    5  Negative   
Total village 
chickens 
   336      
Ducks  Bobonaro  Tapo    1  Negative   
Covalima  Nikir    1  Negative   
Dili  Hera    5  Negative   
Comoro    4  Negative   
Kuluhun    3  Negative   
Lautem  Bauro    4  Negative   
Total ducks     18      
Doves  Dili  Comoro    3  Negative   
Jungle fowls  Covalima  Nikir    1  Negative   
Grand total        358      
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7.3.2  Test results of swabs 
All  swabs  samples  were  negative  on  the  Taqman-PCR  and  therefore  no  further 
testing for HPAI strains was undertaken. The results and sources of the swabs tested 
with the Taqman-PCR are shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. Results from testing 64 pools of swabs (320 individual swabs) 
District  Sites  Number of tested  Test result 
Covalima  Bei Seuc  30  Negative 
Debos    6  Negative 
Nikir  11  Negative 
Wala    9  Negative 
Lalawa  10  Negative 
Bobonaro  Tapo  36  Negative 
Holsa  29  Negative 
Lautem  Mehara  25  Negative 
Bauro  29  Negative 
Com    5  Negative 
Fuiloro  11  Negative 
Dili  Hera  20  Negative 
Comoro  20  Negative 
Kuluhun    4  Negative 
Becora    5  Negative 
Taibesse    5  Negative 
Oecusse  Naimeco  14  Negative 
Bobometo  11  Negative 
Nipani  25  Negative 
Costa  10  Negative 
Lalisuk    5  Negative 
Total             320    
 
7.3.3  Prevalence of AI based on results of testing of sera and swabs  
Using the exact binomial method, the serological prevalence was calculated as 0% 
(95%  CI:  0  –  1.0%)  and  the  prevalence  in  swabs  0%  (95%CI:  0  -  5.6%).  The 
prevalence for the swab samples was calculated from 64 pooled samples containing 
swabs  from  320 individuals.  However since all pools were negative, it could  be  
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assumed that all individual swabs were negative. Based on this number of negative 
individual swabs, the prevalence was 0.0% (95%CI: 0-1.15%). 
7.3.4  Calculation of confidence level of HPAI freedom 
Based  on  the  parameters  described  in  Section  5.2.4,  the  laboratory  results 
summarised  in  Section  7.3  and  information  from  the  previous  chapters,  the 
confidence level of HPAI freedom in Timor Leste was calculated. Based on two 
serological tests being run in series along with the testing of swabs, a MEP of 2%, 
sampling 358 sera and 64 pooled swabs, the finding of no positive results and an 
estimated poultry population in  the surveyed districts (Bobonaro, Covalima, Dili, 
Lautem and Oecusse) of 1,402,726 (Chapter Four), the confidence level of HPAI 
freedom  in  Timor  Leste  was  calculated  using  FreeCalc  in  Survey  Tool  Box 
(Cameron, 1999). Using this program it was concluded that the results of testing 
were adequate to conclude that the country is free from HPAI at the MEP of 2% at 
the 99.52% confidence level. That is the probability of observing positive results in a 
sample of 358 blood samples from a population with a prevalence of 2% is 0.48%. 
The confidence limit for H1 (freedom from HPAI) was calculated by subtracting HO 
from  100%.  As the  H1 value  approaches  100% and the H0  approaches  0%, the 
results are adequate to conclude that the country is free from HPAI. As can be seen 
in Figure 7.2, the H1 approaches 100% and the H0 approaches zero percent at an 
MEP of 2%. If the MEP was reduced to a value less than 2%, the result is not 
adequate to conclude that the country is free from HPAI (Figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2. The influence of MEP on the confidence limits of HPAI freedom. 
H0: the country is infected with HPAI and H1: the country is free from HPAI. 
7.4  Discussion 
Demonstrating  freedom  from  infection  involves  providing  enough  evidence  to 
demonstrate (to an acceptable level of confidence) that infection with a specified 
pathogen  is  not  present  in  a  population  (OIE,  2006c).  Confirmation  of  disease 
freedom can be based on two main things. Firstly the country can be recognized as 
free based on historical evidence i.e. the disease has never previously occurred or 
been  reported  (OIE,  2006c).  Secondly  it  can  be  based  on  serological  surveys 
designed,  typically,  with  a  95%  confidence  level  of  detecting  disease  if  it  were 
present  (Cannon,  2002).  The  serological  survey  in  this  study  was  a  targeted 
surveillance with a 2% MEP at a 95% confidence level. 
Targeted surveillance is a sampling approach where samples (animals or sites) are 
selected for testing or for surveying based on the presence of characteristics that 
indicate  a  higher  probability  of  disease  (Williams  et  al.,  2009).  Targeted 
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surveillance, based on risk, has previously been used to assess the prevalence and to 
document freedom  from some diseases.  For instance, risk based surveillance has 
been  conducted  to:  determine  the  prevalence  of  BSE  in  high-risk  populations  in 
western  France  (Morignat  et  al.,  2002);  confirm  the  freedom  from  non-highly 
contagious diseases such as Enzootic Bovine Leucosis and Brucella melitensis in 
sheep and goats (Hadorn et al., 2002); and also for surveillance for H5N1 avian 
influenza virus in wild birds in Great Britain (Snow et al., 2007) and North America 
(Dusek et al., 2009). 
Demonstration of freedom from a disease has to be determined according to OIE 
standards. According to OIE, one of the procedures to confirm disease freedom can 
be based on historical data (OIE, 2003c, 2006c). The historical HPAI freedom of 
HPAI in Timor Leste is described in the following section. 
7.4.1  The historical absence of HPAI in Timor Leste 
Despite the fact that HPAI is endemic in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, there 
have never been any reported occurrences of HPAI in Timor Leste. This is based on 
serological surveys conducted from 2000 to 2006, targeted surveillance (2009) and 
other evidence as outlined below. 
In Timor Leste, surveys on animal health were first conducted in 2000, although in 
the early years, these surveys were not targeting HPAI. However, since the epidemic 
of HPAI in Asia, especially in Indonesia, the surveys were designed to specifically 
target  poultry  for  HPAI  testing.  These  surveys  were  conducted  by  MAF  in 
cooperation with NAQS and all samples were tested by AAHL, and consequently a 
high confidence in the diagnostic results can be inferred. No evidence of HPAI was  
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found in Timor Leste in these surveys (particularly 2005 to 2006). According to the 
OIE, a country can be considered as a free country when it has been shown that 
HPAI has not been present for at least three preceding years (OIE, 2003c) and these 
results support the hypothesis that Timor Leste is free from HPAI. 
The status of the freedom of Timor Leste from HPAI is also strengthened by the fact 
that the current targeted surveillance failed to detect any evidence of HPAI in the 
country. Although the scientifically based targeted surveillance cannot provide with 
absolute certainty the absence of infection  (Zepeda et al., 2001), it does provide 
adequate evidence that HPAI, if present, is less than the minimum expected/design 
prevalence (OIE, 2006c) of 2%. The main target of these approaches is to prove with 
some degree of certainty that a country is free from a disease (Salman et al., 2003). 
Looking at the nature of HPAI, which is highly contagious and spreads rapidly, the 
design prevalence could be set higher (more than 50%) as if disease was present it 
would  be  expected  to  be  at  a  higher  prevalence  in  an  initially  naïve  population 
(Cameron, 1999). The setting of a lower MEP (2%) in this survey was undertaken 
for two main reasons: firstly, to give stronger evidence that disease is not present 
(Martin and Cameron, 2002) and secondly to allow for a larger sample size which 
consequently  increases  the  chance  of  detecting  disease  if  it  is  present  (Cannon, 
2002). 
Serological surveys in other countries have reported variability in the seroprevalence 
of AI in chickens. For example in Jordan, from a serological survey of 38 breeder-
broiler farms, the overall true flock-level seroprevalence of AI was 71% (95% CI: 55 
- 83%) (Al-Natour and Abo-Shehada, 2005). If such a high prevalence occurred in a 
naïve  poultry  population,  the  mortality  would  be  expected  to  be  high.  Another  
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instance  is  the  outbreak  in  1997  in  Australia,  which  was  caused  by  H7N4  and 
resulted in a mortality of over 90% (Senne, 2003). Consequently the lack of reported 
outbreaks in Timor Leste adds further support to the belief that the country is free 
from HPAI. 
7.4.2  Surveillance of wild birds  
The  presence  of  AI  in  wild  birds  remains  a  problem,  because  wild  birds  are 
considered to be the natural reservoir for LPAI viruses which may mutate to become 
highly pathogenic viruses (Bragstad et al., 2007).  
The only wild bird survey in Timor Leste was conducted in 2009 by FAO through 
the Biosecurity Strengthening Project (BSP) in cooperation with MAF-Timor Leste. 
Twenty six samples were collected from 12 species of wild birds from five local 
lakes  in  the  country.  One  c-ELISA  positive  result  was  obtained  from  these  26 
samples. The positive wild bird was a Pacific black duck (Anas supercilosa), which 
appeared healthy at the time the sample was collected. Further testing for HPAI 
subtype H5 using HIT resulted in a low titre reaction to H5 antigen, indicating past 
exposure to H5 subtype or alternatively cross contamination with another subtype 
(Curran, 2009). If this represents previous exposure to H5 then it is possible that 
HPAI may be introduced into Timor Leste through wild birds (as was identified in 
Chapter Six). Pacific black ducks are known to be a locally common to abundant 
resident and visitor of freshwater lakes and rivers in Timor Leste. They are mostly 
observed in a group of less than 50, but also have been observed in groups of more 
than 1000 in the largest lake in the country (Iralalaru) (Trainor, 2005b).   
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7.4.3  Veterinary services for AI 
In addition to historical records and the targeted sero-surveillance study, specific 
veterinary and public services have been developed to anticipate any incursion of 
HPAI. These include public awareness campaigns and implementation of an early 
detection system. 
Veterinary  services  play  an  important  role  in  the  early  detection  of  and  rapid 
response to an emerging disease occurrence. The challenge for a developing nation, 
such  as  Timor  Leste,  is  to  have  sufficient  manpower  and  infrastructure  in  the 
veterinary services. To overcome a deficiency in trained veterinary personnel other 
practices have been adopted to reduce the potential for HPAI to enter the country. 
One of the practices adopted is the banning of the importation of poultry and poultry 
products from HPAI infected counties since 2004 (Dispatch No. 03/79/GM/III/04) 
(MAFP, 2004). Another practice includes the raising of community awareness about 
the  disease  is  through  extension,  via  pamphlets,  brochures,  radio  and  television 
information.  The  aim  of  this  is  to  ensure  that  the  public  is  aware  of  AI  and  to 
encourage  the  notification  of  any  unusual  poultry  outbreaks/disease  to  the 
authorities. 
According to the OIE (2006a), an early detection system for a disease-free country 
should be composed of: representative coverage of target animal populations by field 
services; the ability to undertake effective disease investigation and reporting; access 
to laboratories capable of diagnosing and differentiating relevant diseases; a training 
programme for appropriate staff (including para-veterinarians and animal livestock 
workers who are involved in the handling of animals); the legal obligation of private 
veterinarians to report to the government; a timely reporting system of disease events  
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to the Veterinary Services; and a national chain of command. Timor Leste has met 
these criteria as described in the following paragraphs. 
In Timor Leste, there are livestock representatives in every district with 14 District 
Livestock Officers (DLO) and 13 DLO assistants in the 13 districts. There are also at 
least  two  quarantine  officers  employed  in  every  high  risk  district  located  in  the 
border area (Bobonaro, Covalima and Oecusse). With help from NAQS, quarantine 
offices in the border districts have been equipped with radios to allow reporting of 
any  unusual  outbreaks  to  the  National  Quarantine  Centre  in  Dili.  The  Livestock 
Office also has trained over 400 Village Livestock Workers (VLWs) who are based 
in nearly every village of the country. These VLWs all have basic training about the 
recognition of AI and how to conduct a routine post mortem. 
The Livestock central office of MAF has drafted a national contingency plan that 
addresses  the  issue  of  HPAI  preparedness,  prevention,  response,  legislation  and 
enforcement  (Alders  et  al.,  2006).  A  national  investigation  team,  composed  of 
government veterinarians working for MAF and the National University of Timor 
Lorosa‘e (NUTL), has also been established. In addition to the livestock national 
contingency plan, a joint national contingency plan for AI has also been established 
by both MAF and the Ministry of Health (MoH) (MoH-TL and MAF-TL, 2005). 
This joint national contingency between MoH and MAF allows the combination of 
experts  to  establish  a  national  investigation  team  which  is  composed  mainly  of 
government veterinarians and medical staff. 
Currently,  there  are  no  laboratories  in  Timor  Leste  capable  of  diagnosing  AI. 
However there is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between MAF and NAQS 
that  allows  veterinarians  from  AQIS  to  assist  MAF  as  required.  The  MoU  also  
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allows samples from Timor Leste to be tested at AAHL. Based on the MoU NAQS 
has provided radio communication in border districts and Quarantine Office in Dili. 
This radio access allows 24 hour a day contact with the national office, allowing 
rapid reporting of any outbreaks. Therefore, when an AI outbreak is suspected and 
reported, a national investigation team, in cooperation with the police, will be in 
command to take any necessary control measures. 
Government veterinarians and other staff have attended training on AI undertaken 
overseas. The knowledge learnt has been transferred to field staff through several 
workshops conducted at the national, district and village level. This included training 
of DLO‘s and VLW‘s about basic recognition of AI and the use of the AI rapid test. 
The AI rapid test is available from the livestock office in each district. Through the 
government staff at the district and village level it is anticipated that if any poultry 
outbreak  occurs  then  the  disease  will  be  detected  and  reported  promptly  to  the 
national livestock office. In addition extension material on HPAI has been provided 
to the village community by the Livestock Office. Farmers are advised to inform the 
Livestock Office of any suspicious cases of deaths in poultry. The Livestock Office 
also distributes posters on AI which contains basic information about the disease and 
helps raise the communities‘ awareness of the disease. 
There are less than 20 veterinarians in Timor Leste and most of these are employed 
by the government. These veterinarians, by law, have an obligation to investigate 
and report any suspicious cases or unusual occurrences of disease (Angot, 2009).  
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7.5  Conclusion 
Based on the above discussion it can be deduced that Timor Leste is currently free 
from HPAI and has the system in place to detect an incursion of HPAI. The freedom 
of HPAI is based on three main facts.  Firstly, HPAI has never been historically 
recognised in the country and complies with the General Surveillance Guidelines of 
the OIE  (Appendix 3.8.1) (OIE, 2006c). Secondly, surveillance conducted by the 
local  MAF  and  NAQS  has  failed  to  demonstrate  the  presence  of  HPAI.  This 
complies with the OIE requirement that a country can be considered free from HPAI 
when it has been shown that HPAI has not been present for at least the preceding 
three years (OIE, 2003c). Thirdly, based on the current study all samples collected 
from the high risk districts were negative for HPAI. Based on these findings it is 
concluded that Timor Leste was free of HPAI at the time of data collection (July 
2009). 
Although the country is free from HPAI, there is a risk of it being introduced. In the 
following  chapter  the  analysis  of  risk  factors  that  might  be  involved  in  the 
introduction  of  HPAI  into  Timor  Leste,  based  on  questionnaires  administered  to 
poultry owners, is discussed.  
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CHAPTER 8:  ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS THAT 
MAY BE INVOLVED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF 
HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA (HPAI) 
INTO TIMOR LESTE: BASED ON TARGETTED 
SURVEILLANCE 
8.1  Introduction 
In Timor Leste, a study that focuses on identifying risk factors likely to be associated 
with  the  introduction  of  HPAI  into  the  country  has  never  previously  been 
undertaken.  Therefore  to  identify  such  risk  factors,  a  targeted  sampling  and 
questionnaire survey in five districts (Suai, Bobonaro, Oecusse, Dili and Lospalos) 
was undertaken in July 2009. This survey involved collection of data on: poultry 
production  and  management  practices  for  native  (village)  chickens,  laying  and 
Muscovy ducks and fighting cocks; and sources of live poultry and poultry products, 
which have the potential to spread HPAI. Biological samples were also collected and 
tested for the presence of AI (results reported in Chapter Seven). 
The questionnaire was designed to identify and quantify risk factors that were likely 
to be involved in the introduction of HPAI into the country and to determine the 
knowledge, attitudes and practices of poultry raisers in the surveyed districts. 
8.2  Materials and methods 
Structured  questionnaires  (Appendix  Five)  were  administered  to  the  owners  of 
chickens  after  biological  samples  had  been  collected  from  their  birds.  The  
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questionnaire had been approved for use by the Murdoch Human Ethics Committee. 
Before the questionnaires were administered, the sera and swabs were collected from 
birds (Chapter Seven). 
8.2.1  Statistical analysis 
The statistical program SPSS version 17 was used to determine the frequency of risk 
factors. 
8.3  Results 
8.3.1  Number of households interviewed  
A total of 159 households were interviewed in the surveyed districts (Table 8.1).  
8.3.2  Analysis of the questionnaire 
Since all samples were negative (Chapter Seven), statistical analyses could not be 
undertaken to link risk factors with infection. Therefore a descriptive analysis was 
undertaken.  
8.3.2.1  Type of animals kept 
There were four main livestock species kept by farmers. Chickens were kept by 99% 
of the households interviewed (n=158), pigs (71%), dogs (40%) and cattle (39%) 
(Table 8.2). The dominant type of animals kept in the surveyed districts was village 
chickens representing 55.8% of all animals owned. On average 13 chickens were 
owned by each household. 
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Table 8.1. Questionnaire respondents in the various villages in 5 districts 
District  Site  Category  Total 
respondents 
Percent 
Bobonaro  Holsa  Village/Market  10  6.3 
Tapo  Village  16  10.1 
Covalima  Bei Seuk  Village  14    8.8 
Debos   Market    4    2.5 
Lalawa  Village    5    3.1 
Wala (Nikir)  Village    8    5.0 
Wala  Village    3    1.9 
Dili  Becora  Market    2    1.3 
Comoro  Village    8    5.0 
Halilaran  Market    3    1.9 
Hera  Village  12    7.5 
Kuluhun  Village    2    1.3 
Taibesse  Market    3    1.9 
Lautem  Bauro  Village  20  12.6 
Com  Village    5    3.1 
Fuiloro  Market    9    5.7 
Mehara  Village  21  13.2 
Oecusse  Bobometo  Village    2    1.3 
Costa  Village    2    1.3 
Lalisu  Village    2    1.3 
Naimeco  Market    3    1.9 
Nipani  Village    5    3.1 
   Total      159       100.0 
 
Pigs  represented  10.7%  of  all  animals  with  an  average  of  3.5  pigs  owned  per 
household.  Fewer  cattle  (9.4%  of  all  animals)  with  an  average  of  5.5  cattle  per 
household,  buffalo  (7.3%  of  animals)  with  8.7  owned  per  household  and  other 
animals (16.8%) including ducks, song birds (doves), dogs, cats, horses and goats 
were owned (Table 8.2).  
    
153 
 
Table 8.2. Type of animals (n=3712) kept in the surveyed households (n = 159) 
Type of 
animal 
Household n 
(%) 
# animals (% 
of all 
animals) 
Mean**  SE  Range 
Chickens  158 (99)  2072 (55.8)  13.1  1.1  1 to 86 
Ducks*   13 (8)  58 (1.6)    4.5  0.6  2 to 10 
Song  birds 
(include: 
Doves) 
6 (4)  118 (3.2)  19.7  16.1  1 to 100 
Dogs  64 (40)  204 (5.5)    3.2  0.3  1 to 14 
Cats  20 (13)  50 (1.3)    2.5  0.4  1 to 7 
Pigs  113 (71)  397 (10.7)    3.5  0.3  1 to 20 
Cattle  62 (39)  349 (9.4)    5.5  0.8  1 to 36 
Horses  24 (15)  86 (2.3)    3.5  0.5  1 to   9 
Goats  20 (13)  107 (2.9)    5.4  0.9  1 to 13 
Buffalo  31 (19)  271 (7.3)    8.7  2.1  1 to 60 
Total    3712 (100%)     
*A. platyrhynchos & Muscovy (C. moschata),** mean number owned in households with that species of animal 
8.3.2.2  Proportion  of  village  chickens  in  different  age  groups  in  the surveyed 
areas 
Of  the  159  households  interviewed,  97  provided  valid  data  to  work  out  the 
proportion of chicks, cockerels, pullets, cocks and hens. These 97 households owned 
1217 village chickens. The proportion of birds are shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3. Proportion of village chickens according to age group in surveyed 
areas (n=97) 
 Type of chicken  Percent of 
all birds  
SE  Range (%) 
Chicks (<3 months)   5.90  0.016  0 to 81.3 
Cockerel (Male 3-12 months)   9.20  0.020  0 to 100 
Pullets (Female 3-12 months)  21.10  0.027  0 to 100 
Cocks (> 12 months)   30.20  0.026  0 to 100 
Hens (> 12 months)  33.70  0.029   0 to 100 
 
8.3.2.3  Reason for keeping poultry 
Most (99.4%) surveyed households kept poultry to generate income through the sale 
of the birds or their products. Approximately half (56%) of the households used  
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poultry or their products as a food source, 9.4% kept them for recreation (fighting 
cocks) and a few (3.7%) kept them for offerings or for breeding purposes (0.6%).  
8.3.2.4  Source of chickens 
From 149 valid responses, most farmers bred their own replacement village chickens 
(44.3%) or purchased them from the local market (25.5%), from other households in 
the same village (14.1%), from households in other villages (8.7%), from unofficial 
markets (6%) and rarely from dealers or from friends and family (both 0.7%).  
8.3.2.5  Poultry housing 
Of the 159 households interviewed, 63.7% kept chickens that were free roaming all 
the time. Some households (25.5%) always kept their birds in cages, others (6.3%) 
allowed their birds to roam freely during the day but caged them at night and 4.5% 
of households kept their birds tied up. 
Ducks (A. platyrhynchos and C. moschata) were kept by 8% of households and in 
these households they made up 2.7% (58/2130) of all poultry (chicken and ducks) 
(Table 8.2). All ducks were free roaming. 
8.3.2.6  Feeding practices 
Approximately one third of village chickens (32.1%) were fed corn only, some were 
supplemented with corn and/or rice but also were required to find their own feed 
(29.6%), some were fed corn and/or rice only (25.2%), and 10% of households fed 
corn or rice along with other products such as coconut, sago, potatoes or leftover 
food/scraps. Only 3.1% of households did not feed their birds making them totally 
reliant on finding their own food (scavenging).  
155 
 
Nearly half of the households with ducks did not feed their ducks but let them find 
their own feed (44%), while another 19% reported that, as well as letting their ducks 
find their own feed, they supplemented them with rice or corn. Only one of the duck 
owning households (8.3%) reported that they grazed their ducks daily in rice fields. 
The remainder (28.7%) of the duck-owning households reported giving their ducks a 
range of feed including rice and kitchen leftovers and premixed commercial feed.  
8.3.2.7  Water source 
Most poultry were provided water sourced from the farmers‘ own well (56%), from 
piped water (20.8%) or were made to find water themselves (17%) (Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4. Source of water for poultry (n=159) 
Water source  Frequency  Percent 
Own well  89  56.0 
Piped or tap water  33  20.8 
Must find water themselves  27  17.0 
River water   5  3.1 
Community well   3  1.9 
Ponds or lakes   1  0.6 
Rain water   1  0.6 
 
8.3.2.8  Poultry marketing 
Of the 156 households which provide valid answers for selling poultry, most (82.1%) 
sold some of their poultry. Of these farmers, approximately half (48.4%) sold them 
at infrequent intervals when they needed money for buying daily necessities, while 
others sold them regularly at annually (10.9), monthly (18.8%), weekly (14.1%), or 
daily (7.8%) intervals. 
Chickens  were  sold  at  a  range  of  places  including  district  permanent  markets 
(37.3%)  (Figure  8.1),  weekly  markets  (32.1%),  to  other  households  in  the  same 
village (11.9%), from home (8.3%), to households in other villages/places (9.7%)  
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and to poultry traders (0.7%). Of the 104 households who took their birds to the 
market, nearly all of them (97%) reported that if all of their poultry were not sold on 
a market day then unsold poultry were taken back to their home. 
Most households (90.3%) reported that their closest market was the ―local market‖ 
while 9.7% were close to an unofficial market. Unofficial markets are illegal markets 
located in the border areas. Because they are illegal the location varies and can be 
situated anywhere along the border area. 
The nearest market to an interviewed household was up to 20 km away, however 
most households lived within 1 to 5 km of a market (35.7%) while some (5.6%) 
actually lived within the market (Table 8.5). Overall, approximately half (52.5%) of 
the surveyed households lived within 5 km of a market. Most households (68.5% of 
all respondents) reported that family members, neighbours or friends worked in the 
market visited their households.  
Table 8.5. Distances of households surveyed to markets (n=143) 
Distance to closest markets   Frequency  Percent 
Live within the market    8    5.6 
Less than 1 km  16  11.2 
1 to 5 km  51  35.7 
6 to 10 km  19  13.3 
11 to 15 km  26  18.2 
16 to 20 km    4    2.8 
More than 20 km  19  13.3 
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Figure 8.1. Poultry for sale at a permanent market in Dili district 
Approximately two thirds  (69%) of  the  households  reported that they  sold  some 
poultry. From households who sold poultry, most reported that they sold chickens 
between the age of one and six months (77.1%) and 21.1% sold birds between the 
age of seven and 12 months and only 1.8% sold poultry that were older than one year 
of age. 
Of the 159 households interviewed, 36 (22.6%) reported selling fighting cocks. Of 
these 75% reported that fighting cocks were normally sold at the age of one to two 
years, 22.2% sold their birds when less than 1 year of age and only one (2.8%) sold 
birds older than 2 years of age. 
Of those who reported the price of chickens sold (including fighting cocks), the price 
received varied from two to 200 USD (Table 8.6) with an average price of US$12.02 
(SE=1.81). 
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Table 8.6. Average price of poultry sold (n=115) 
Average price of poultry sold  Frequency  Percent 
1 to 5 USD  29  25.2 
6 to 10 USD  45  39.1 
11-15 USD  32  27.8 
16 to 20 USD  5  4.3 
Over 20 USD*  4  3.5 
Total  115  100.0 
*including an owner of fighting cocks who reported selling a fighting cock for 200USD 
There were 77 households who reported that they sold poultry for certain events. 
Approximately half (53.2%) reported that chickens  were sold  for Christmas  Day 
celebrations,  while  42.9%  of  respondents  sold  poultry  at  other  times  when  they 
needed  money.  Other  festivals  when  poultry  were  sold  included  New  Year,  All 
Saints Day (November), and Easter (each 1.3%). 
8.3.2.9  Frequency of buying chickens 
The frequency of buying new chickens varied from one household to another with 
approximately one third (32.5%) of households never purchasing chickens. A quarter 
of households (25.2%) purchased chickens at regular intervals (ranging from daily – 
2%,  weekly  –  6.6%,  monthly  –  9.3%  or  annually  -  7.3%).  There  are  42.3%  of 
households who purchased chickens at irregular times, i.e. they purchased chickens 
when they needed birds for consumption or for special occasions such as traditional 
ceremonies or birthdays.  
8.3.2.10 Fighting cocks 
Two  thirds  of  the  households  interviewed  (68.6%)  owned  fighting  cocks.  Most 
fighting  cocks  were  tied  up  (50%)  or  kept  in  cages  (40%),  and  only  10%  were 
allowed to roam freely.  
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New  fighting  cocks  were  most  commonly  obtained  through  breeding  by  the 
households (52.3%) or by purchasing from local markets (27.5%), although some 
households  purchased  them  from  unofficial  markets  (6.4%)  (Table  8.7).  Of  109 
households  with  fighting  cocks,  only  71  (65.1%)  households  reported  that  their 
fighting cocks attended cock fighting competitions.  
Table 8.7. Source of fighting cocks (n=109) 
Source   Frequency  Percent 
Bred by the owner  57  52.3 
Local market  30  27.5 
Unofficial market  7  6.4 
Another village   7  6.4 
Uncertain  4  3.7 
From households in the same village   2  1.8 
Other  2  1.9 
 
The types of birds that are smuggled in for cock fighting are locally known as ―Manu 
Kancingan‖ or ―Manu Filipina‖ (Figure 8.2). This type of rooster is more expensive 
than the local roster (Figure 8.3). 
Of the 71 owners of fighting cocks who attended competitions, most took their birds 
to competitions every week (76.4%), while 13.9% attended competitions daily, 6.9% 
monthly, and the remaining 2.8% attended them at some other frequencies (e.g. 
annually). 
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Figure 8.2. A typical fighting cock that is smuggled into Timor Leste.  
 
 
Figure 8.3. A typical local fighting cock in Timor Leste 
8.3.2.11 Eggs 
One  quarter  of  surveyed  households  (26.4%)  purchased  eggs.  Most  of  these 
households purchased them from markets (59.5%), shops or kiosks (16.7%), direct  
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from households in their village (16.7%) or from other sources such as friends or 
other villages (7.1%). 
8.3.2.12 Song birds and wild birds 
Only seven households kept song birds. Only two types of song birds were kept by 
these households: doves (6) and a parrot (1). 
Of the 155 households, which provided information on whether they had seen wild 
birds  within  their  households,  approximately  half  (52.9%)  had  seen  wild  birds 
around their households, while the remainder had not. Of those who had seen wild 
birds, only 53.5% could name the type of wild birds observed. The most common 
birds observed were finches or sparrows (in local language both are called Manu 
Lin) (observed by 75.9% of households), followed by jungle fowls and wild ducks 
(13.3%).  Other  wild  birds  observed  were  eagles  (4.8%),  pigeons  (2.4%),  quails 
(2.4%) and owls (1.2%). 
Of the households who had seen wild birds, nearly all (98.8%) reported that they had 
observed the wild birds come in close contact with their domestic poultry. Of these 
81  households,  most  observed  wild  birds  (mainly  finches/sparrows)  around  their 
house every day (72.8%). Some households observed them once a month (2.5%), or 
every week (1.2%), while the remainder (23.5%) observed them at a range of times. 
Even  though  wild  birds  were  observed  to  come  in  close  contact  with  local 
domesticated birds, 90% households reported that they never had seen any unusual 
behaviour or signs of sickness in the wild birds, while the remainder of households 
were not sure if the wild birds had shown any unusual behaviour or illness.  
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8.3.2.13 Biosecurity practices adopted 
8.3.2.13.1 How households ensured they were buying healthy birds 
From 109 who purchased chickens, only 108 households provided answers on how 
they  ensured  healthy  chickens  were  purchased.  Most  of  these  (88%) 
checked/examined the birds to ensure they were healthy prior to purchase (Table 
8.8). 
Table 8.8. Methods adopted by households to ensure they purchased healthy 
chickens (n=108) 
Reason  Frequency  Percent 
Check the birds are healthy  95  88.0 
Unsure of what to do  7  6.5 
Only concerned with the price not 
disease 
4  3.7 
I know the seller and trust them  1  0.9 
I buy from safe places  1  0.9 
 
8.3.2.13.2 Quarantine measures adopted for new poultry 
In 109 households who purchased new chickens, 94 of them (86%) reported that they 
separated their new chickens from their existing birds for a period after purchase. Of 
these 94, 59 (63%) always separated them, while 35 (37%) sometimes separated 
them  from  their  current  birds.  Generally,  households  kept  the  new  chickens 
separated from their existing birds for several days after purchase and then allowed 
them to mix. Of the 94 households who separated newly purchased chickens, 66 of 
them reported number of days of quarantine of newly purchased birds. Of these 66 
households, 30 of them kept them separate for less than seven days, 29 separated 
their birds for seven to 14 days, and only seven households separated them for more 
than 14 days.  
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8.3.2.13.3 Management of poultry waste 
Of the 85 households who provided information on the disposal of poultry waste (the 
remains when poultry were slaughtered), approximately half (48.2%) disposed of it 
around the house, 44.7% placed it in a rubbish place, river/pond (3.5%), somewhere 
far from the house (garden) (2.4%) or buried or burnt it (1.2%).  
Of  these  85  households  approximately  two  thirds  disposed  poultry  wastes  of  by 
thrown them on the ground) within 1 to 5 metres (69.5%) of their house, 24.4% 
dispose of it 6 to 10 m from their house and only 6.1% disposed of it further than 10 
m from their house. 
8.3.2.13.4 Cage cleaning  
Of 100 households who used cages for their poultry, only 65 of them reported that 
they  cleaned  those  cages.  Of  these  only  6.2%  cleaned  them  daily,  while  53.8% 
cleaned them weekly and 40% monthly. 
Only 31 households provided data on how they cleaned their poultry cages. Of these, 
35.5%  did  not  use  any  chemical  or  disinfectant  when  cleaning.  Only  3.2%  of 
households used a disinfectant when cleaning, 3.2% cleaned it using detergent, some 
only used water (12.9%) and 19.4% used heat from either the sun or through fire to 
―disinfect‖ the cage. One quarter (25.8%) of the households cleaned the cages by 
sweeping the floor. 
8.3.2.14 Poultry diseases 
The  most  common  diseases  that  interviewees  said  were  present  were  Newcastle 
disease (28.8% of households) and other diseases such as pox and diarrhoea (16.3%). 
Over half of the households either had not seen any disease in their poultry in the  
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previous year (52.3%) or were uncertain if there was any disease in their birds last 
year (2.6%). 
8.3.2.14.1 Clinical signs observed 
Most  (134  of  159)  households  interviewed  reported  some  clinical  signs  in  their 
poultry.  The  main  clinical  signs  observed  by  households  in  chickens  included 
diarrhoea (35.8%), swollen head or eyes (35.1%), blue combs or wattles (30.6%), 
nasal  discharge  (19.4%),  tremor/trembling  (17.9%),  sneezing  (17.2%),  coughing 
(12.7%), sudden death (9.7%), scab or pox on the mouth, combs and wattles (8.2%), 
sleepy eyes or closed eyes (6.7%), twisted neck (5.3%), depression (4.5%), gasping 
(4.5%), paleness (3.7%), shaking head (1.5%) and ruffled feathers (0.7%) 
8.3.2.14.2 Observation of poultry outbreaks and disease reporting by households 
Approximately  half  (44.8%)  of  households  did  not  know  if  there  had  been  any 
disease outbreak in their area, 39% reported that there had been a disease outbreak 
while 16.2% reported that there were no outbreaks. 
Most households (99.4%) responded whether they would or would not report poultry 
diseases  to  an  authority.  Of  these  households,  approximately  two  thirds  (65.2%) 
would not report sick poultry to an authority, 24% would report poultry sickness and 
10.8% were uncertain if they would report diseases or not. 
Of the 38 (24%) households that would report diseases of poultry, most (78.9%) 
would report disease to the VLW, 10.5% would report to MAF staff (such as the 
DLO or veterinarians), 5.3% would report to the local authority (such as village 
chief),  while  5.3%  would  report  to  other  institutions  such  as  non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) or agricultural colleges.  
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8.3.2.14.3 Months when birds were sick or dying 
Although poultry disease was reported to occur throughout the year, diseases were 
reported to be seen by farmers more commonly in the months of May and July (both 
31%),  and  August  (20.7%)  (Table  8.9).  The  months  when  few  chickens  were 
reported to be sick were January to April.  
Similarly, dead birds were observed by households throughout the year, with more 
deaths in the months of May (30.4%), July (23.5%) and August (16.5%) (Table 8.9). 
Table 8.9. Months when birds were reported as being sick or dying. 
Months 
Number of 
households with 
sick chickens, 
n=116 (%) 
Number of households 
with dead chickens, 
n=115 (%) 
January  4 (3.4)  4 (3.5) 
February  5 (4.3)  3 (2.6) 
March  3 (2.6)  2 (1.7) 
April  5 (4.3)  4 (3.5) 
May  36 (31.0)  35 (30.4) 
June  15 (12.9)  11 (9.6) 
July  36 (31.0)  27 (23.5) 
August  24 (20.7)  19 (16.5) 
September  16 (13.8)  8 (7.0) 
October  14 (12.1)  7 (6.1) 
November  9 (7.8)  9 (7.8) 
December  6 (5.2)  5 (4.3) 
Note: Some households gave multiple answers 
8.3.2.14.4 Number of days poultry were sick before dying 
Of the 104 households that reported the number of days their chickens were sick 
prior to dying, most (86.5%) reported that their chickens died within one to three 
days of getting sick, 6.7% died within four to five days and 6.7% died more than 6 
days after getting sick.  
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8.3.2.14.5 Vaccination of poultry against Newcastle disease (ND) 
Approximately  two-thirds  (60%)  of  150  households  that  reported  on  the  use  of 
vaccinations did not vaccinate any of their chickens against ND while 20% reported 
that all of their chickens were vaccinated, 14% had some chickens vaccinated and 
6% were uncertain if their chickens had been vaccinated or not. 
The reasons given for not vaccinating birds included that the vaccinator had not 
come (73.6%), difficulty in catching birds (16.5%), or other reasons such as not 
realising  poultry  required  vaccinating  (3.3%),  insufficient  money  to  pay  staff 
administering the vaccine (2.5%) – even though the vaccine is provided free by the 
Government, farmers were not home at the time of the vaccination program (1.7%), 
vaccines were not available (0.8%) or it was inconvenient to bring the chickens to 
the place of vaccination (0.8%) or because the chickens are healthy (0.8%). 
Only 21 households remembered the time when their birds were vaccinated. Of these 
households approximately three quarters (71.4%) had their chickens vaccinated in 
the current year (2009), 14.3% had their chickens vaccinated in the previous year 
(2008) and 14.3% had them vaccinated two years ago (2007). 
Most vaccinations were conducted by the VLW (52.2%), 32.6% were done by MAF 
staff (veterinarians, DLO, vaccinators), 8.7% by the farmers themselves, and 6.5% 
by other groups such as NGOs and agricultural college students. 
8.3.2.15 Knowledge of farmers about the occurrence of disease 
Most farmers did not know the cause of sickness in poultry (57%), but some reported 
that  disease  was  caused  by  contact  with  other  sick  poultry  (11.4%),  people  or  
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contaminated  equipment  (8.2%),  changes  in  the  weather  (5.7%)  or  contaminated 
feed (5.1%) or water (2.5%) (Table 8.10). 
Table  8.10.  Cause  of  poultry  disease  as  identified  by  surveyed  households 
(n=158) 
Cause  Frequency   Percent 
Unknown  90  57.0 
Contact with sick poultry  18  11.4 
Contact with people or equipment  13  8.2 
Changes in the weather   9  5.7 
Contaminated feed  8  5.1 
Other (not providing offerings, God's destiny)  6  3.8 
Smoke from rubbish burning  4  2.5 
Contaminated water  4  2.5 
Dust/dirt/rubbish  2  1.2 
New poultry  2  1.3 
Not being vaccinated  2  1.3 
 
Measures taken to prevent diseases of poultry varied from one household to another. 
The most common measures taken included vaccination (29.3%), using traditional 
medicine such as the bark of trees, monkey bones or tamarind juice (14.6%), buying 
chickens from a safe source (10.8%), reduced contact with sick chickens (10.2%), or 
by using good hygiene (through routine cleaning, providing clean water and feed) 
(8.3%) (Table 8.11). 
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Table 8.11. Measures taken to prevent poultry diseases by 157 households* 
Method  Number of 
households  Percent 
Vaccination  46  29.3 
Don't know how to prevent poultry disease  45  28.7 
Use traditional medicines  23  14.6 
Acquire poultry from a safe source  17  10.8 
Reduced contact with sick birds  16  10.2 
Good hygiene (Clean feed & water, cage)  13  8.3 
Regular visit by veterinary staff  8  5.1 
Education & awareness about poultry disease  7  4.5 
Early detection of disease  6  3.8 
Antibiotics  6  3.8 
Compensation  3  1.9 
Movement control   3  1.9 
*Some households gave multiple answers 
8.3.2.16 Farmer knowledge about AI 
Less than two-thirds of farmers (59 households), had heard of AI (61%, n=97). Of 
these households, most (99%) reported that they had heard about the disease through 
several  media.  These  are  radio  and  television  (61.5%),  MAF  staff  (DLO‘s, 
Quarantine  officers  and  Veterinarians)  (16.7%),  newspapers  (15.6%),  family  and 
friends (9.4%) and pamphlets, brochures or posters (9.4%) (Table 8.12). 
Table 8.12. Sources of information for households on Avian Influenza (n=96) 
Media   #Households  Percent 
Radio/television  59  61.5 
MAF (DLO, Quarantine officers, 
veterinarians) 
16  16.7 
Newspapers  15  15.6 
Family & friends    9    9.4 
Pamphlets    9    9.4 
Neighbours    7    7.3 
VLWs    7    7.3 
Health staff (MoH)    6    6.3 
Other NGO‘s , priests, community leaders    4    4.2 
Note: Some households gave multiple answers 
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The most common action the respondents would take if they suspected AI in their 
birds included burying dead birds (32.7%), reporting the disease immediately to the 
authorities (24.2%), and burning the affected birds (15%). Some owners did not now 
what they would do (10.5%) and some would do nothing (9.2%) (Table 8.13). 
Table 8.13. Actions taken by 153 households if AI was suspected to be present in 
their birds 
Methods  Frequency  Percent 
Bury birds  50  32.7 
Report to the authorities  37  24.2 
Burn the birds  23  15.0 
Don't know  16  10.5 
Do nothing  14  9.2 
Eat the sick birds  8  5.2 
Use traditional medicines  8  5.2 
Throw the dead birds away  3  2.0 
Give the dead birds away  3  2.0 
Vaccinate against Newcastle disease   2  1.3 
Not eat the sick birds  2  1.3 
Sell the affected birds  1  0.7 
Separate the sick birds  1  0.7 
Clean the bird cage  1  0.7 
Give multivitamins  1  0.7 
Note: Some households gave multiple answers 
Measures  taken to  prevent  household  members from  getting AI varied from  one 
household to another (Table 8.14). Most families would prevent AI by burying dead 
poultry (35.8%), but 20.9% did not know what to do or would do nothing to prevent 
their family from getting AI. Twenty percent (20.3%) would go to hospital, or have a 
health check by a doctor (Table 8.14). 
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Table 8.14. Methods adopted by households to prevent family members from 
getting AI (n=148) 
Methods adopted  Frequency  Percent 
Bury dead poultry  53  35.8 
Seek medical advice  30  20.3 
Not sure what to do  31  20.9 
Not eating sick/dead poultry  22  14.9 
Burn dead poultry   7  4.7 
Report to authorities   3  2.0 
Eat well cooked poultry   5  3.4 
Adopt good hygiene (Clean and disinfect cages and 
house, wash hands) 
 8  5.2 
Not allow children to play with poultry   3  2.1 
Change clothes after touching poultry or their faeces   2  1.4 
Not purchasing live chickens from other countries   1  0.7 
Routinely vaccinate chickens   1  0.7 
Throw dead poultry away   1  0.7 
Use traditional medicines   1  0.7 
Note: Some households gave multiple answers 
8.4  Discussion 
The survey questionnaire was specifically administered in potentially high risk areas 
for AI. The serosurveillance survey (Chapter Seven) failed to detect any evidence of 
infection with HPAI H5N1 in Timor Leste, however the results of the questionnaire 
reported in this chapter identified some important risk factors which potentially may 
contribute to the introduction of the disease into the country and its spread once 
introduced. 
8.4.1  Important risk factors identified 
8.4.1.1  Free range chickens 
It has been shown that animal husbandry practices (such as back yard and free range 
poultry)  influence  the  interspecies  transmission  of  the  influenza  virus  (Webster, 
2002). Most Timorese village chickens are free range or back yard poultry (63.7% in 
this study) and similar findings have been reported by Copland et al. (2003) and  
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Alders & Amaral (2006). Free range chickens are regarded as a high risk population 
for HPAI because they have the potential for close proximity to wild birds (Zepeda, 
2006). This close proximity can occur while chickens are scavenging for feed or 
searching for water (Sections 8.3.2.6 and 8.3.2.7). The close proximity with wild 
birds is a risk because there is evidence that LPAI H5 or H7 viruses from free-living 
wild birds can infect chickens and then mutate into a HPAI form (Alexander, 2003). 
If a bird becomes infected their free movement and interaction with other village 
chickens can result in the rapid spread of virus and infection of other birds in the 
area.  Furthermore  the  presence  of  sick  or  dead  free  range  chickens  may  not  be 
noticed promptly, unlike with an intensive farming system, hence delaying the early 
detection of clinical cases. 
In Timor Leste, few domestic ducks are kept (1.6% of total animals kept -Table 8.2). 
All of these birds are free range and normally live in very close contact with free 
roaming village chickens. Waterfowl are known to be a reservoir of AI (Matrosovich 
et al., 2000; Nguyen et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2006a) and ducks can be infected 
without showing any signs of disease (Markwell and Shortridge, 1982). If a domestic 
duck was infected it would be very easy to transmit infection to village chickens.  
8.4.1.2  The presence of wild birds 
It is recognized that wild birds, especially wild waterfowl and shorebirds, can be 
carriers of AI, and the H5/H7 AI subtypes have the potential to mutate to highly 
pathogenic strains if they become host adapted in domestic poultry (Matrosovich et 
al., 2000;  Nguyen et  al., 2005;  Stevens  et  al., 2006a). The  recently  reported AI 
epidemic  among  wild  birds  and  poultry  in  Russia  may  have  originated  from 
migratory wild waterfowl (geese) (Chen et al., 2006a; Lipatov et al., 2007) that may  
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have shared feed or water sources with free-range poultry. Waterfowl are known to 
be the reservoir or carrier of AIV and it is possible that AIV originated in these avian 
species (Webster et al., 1992). However most wild birds observed in Timor Leste are 
local and non migratory small terrestrial birds. The most common wild terrestrial 
species  observed  by  farmers  in  the  surveyed  areas  included  zebra  finches 
(Taeniopygia  guttata)  and  tree  sparrows  (P.  montanus)  both  of  which  are  called 
―manu lin‖ in  the local language, jungle  fowls (Gallus bankiva),  wild  ducks  (A. 
superciliosa), and eagles which could be one of three species recorded by Trainor 
(2004)  (Hieraaetus  fasciatus,  Accipiter  fasciatus,  or  Falco  moluccensis),  pigeons 
which could be one of the species recorded by Trainor (2004) (Treron psittacea, 
Ducula  cineracea,  Ducula  rosacea  or  Turacoena  modesta)  and  quails  (Coturnix 
ypsilophora). Finches and tree sparrows were the most common wild birds being 
reported by 75.9% of respondents. The terrestrial small birds observed by farmers in 
surveyed  areas  also  have  been  recorded  by  others  in  Timor  Leste  (Trainor  and 
Soares, 2004; Trainor, 2005b; Trainor et al., 2007). 
Small terrestrial birds are potentially important hosts in the ecology of H5N1 because 
they mix freely with other wild and domestic birds (Boon et al., 2007). Some of the 
small  wild  bird  species  observed  in  the  surveyed  areas  have  been  found  to  be 
susceptible to AIV. For example experimental challenge of finches and quails with 
A/chicken/Hong  Kong/220/97  resulted  in  deaths  (Perkins  and  Swayne,  2003a), 
however pigeons were found to be resistant to infection (Boon et al., 2007). In Hong 
Kong, H5N1 has been isolated from terrestrial wild birds including feral pigeons 
(Columba livia) (one positive out of two sampled), tree sparrows (P. montanus) (a 
dead tree sparrow tested H5N1 positive) (Ellis et al., 2004a), crested hawk eagles (S. 
nipalensis) (Steensels et al., 2007) and quail C. ypsilophora). Quail can carry α-2,3- 
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galactose  and  2,6-gal-linked  receptors  and  consequently  could  act  as  a  potential 
mixing vessel for influenza A from animals and influenza B from humans (Wan and 
Perez, 2006). 
8.4.1.3  Unsafe source of poultry 
Although most householders bred replacement birds themselves (44.3%) or acquired 
them  from  a  local  market  (25.5%)  (Section  8.3.2.4)  some  obtained  them  from 
unofficial markets in Indonesia (6%). These few households represent a significant 
risk for the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste, given the endemicity of H5N1 in 
Indonesia (Butler, 2005; FAOAIDE, 2010b). The smuggling of live birds has been 
known to be a means for introducing AI viruses into Europe (Beato et al., 2006). 
Fortunately at this stage the neighbouring province to Timor Leste, NTT has not 
reported  HPAI  since  an  outbreak  in  October  2004  (Dr.  Maria  Geong,  personal 
communication).  
Fighting cocks are an important past time in the country. The results from other 
countries have highlighted the role of cock fighting and dispersion of fighting cocks 
as  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  dissemination  of  HPAI  (Alexander, 
2007b). The movement of  fighting cocks appears to have played a role in the first 
outbreaks in countries such as Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Lao  PDR  (Morris  and  Jackson,  2005).  The  impact  of  the  movement  of  poultry, 
including fighting cocks for trading, has previously been discussed in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.2.6.1). 
Healthy local fighting cocks in competitions do not pose a direct threat, however 
birds  smuggled  from  infected  countries  could  potentially  be  a  serious  problem 
(Zepeda,  2006).  Fighting  cocks  have  reportedly  been  smuggled  across  country  
174 
 
borders  which  can  facilitate  the  introduction  of  H5N1  HPAI.  This  is  because 
farmers, who illegally smuggled fighting cocks are likely to either sell or hide them 
in the face of an outbreak rather than report disease to the authorities, particularly if 
the compensation is only a small proportion of the replacement value of the bird 
(Sims, 2007). 
This targeted survey found that some people purchased their fighting cocks from 
unofficial markets in the border areas (6%). This finding confirms the statement in 
Chapter Three that smuggling of chickens occurs in the border districts and also 
confirms the experts‘ opinion of the role of smuggling live chickens in the border 
districts (Chapter Six). Although this is a small percentage, introduction of only one 
infected bird would be enough to cause an outbreak. Such a bird may attend local 
competitions, be sold at a local market where other live birds are sold or could be 
transported to Dili (the capital city) for sale or for competition in a national cock-
fighting competition. These practices would allow for the rapid spread and dispersal 
of virus. Birds attending cock fighting competitions come from many places and 
infection of these birds would allow the rapid spread of virus to their own and other 
villages and districts. As most owners of fighting cocks attended competitions at 
least once a week, the potential for the rapid distribution of virus is significant. 
Furthermore during the competitions, blood droplets produced during the fight can 
potentially further disperse the virus to other birds and people. Birds which survive 
the competition will return home allowing dispersal of the virus and the potential for 
interaction with village domestic poultry. This is particularly the case in cock fights 
at the national level where attendees not only come from Dili but also from other 
districts. Owners of fighting cocks may also be at increased risk of contracting HPAI  
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as  they  handle  injured  birds  or  could  act  as  transmitters  of  virus  through 
contaminated clothing, footwear or materials used with the fighting cocks. 
8.4.1.4  Lack of poultry disease reporting 
One of the key factors for the rapid identification of AI is early disease detection. For 
early detection to be possible, farmers or poultry owners must promptly report any 
incidents of poultry disease to the relevant authorities. However the results from the 
questionnaire indicate that few farmers (24%) (Section 8.3.2.14.2) reported cases of 
poultry  disease.  To  overcome  this  problem,  extension  and  education  should  be 
frequently undertaken to increase public awareness of new exotic diseases such as 
AI. Farmers and veterinarians need to be aware of such exotic diseases and report 
any cases of unusual disease. In AI free countries, there is a tendency not to report 
suspect cases of AI, because most people are not familiar with the disease (Elbers et 
al., 2006a; Elbers et al., 2006b), particularly if it is similar to other local poultry 
diseases.  Avian  influenza  can  easily  be  confused  with  ND.  For  example  in  the 
Netherlands, where AI had been absent for many decades, field veterinarians were 
not suspicious of the disease when AI (H7N7) first reappeared in 2003, because they 
relied  upon  post-mortem  examinations  which  did  not  show  typical  signs  of  AI 
(Elbers et al., 2004). 
In this study it was found that only some farmers (24%) would report poultry disease 
to  the  authorities.  Most  (78.9%)  of  these  would  report  the  disease  to  a  VLW. 
Currently  there  are  421  VLWs  located  in  442  villages  in  Timor  Leste;  however 
VLW do not have facilities such as telephones or vehicles. Consequently to foster 
disease reporting by farmers it would be good for the government of Timor Leste to 
provide some basic equipment to the VLW. Although MAF staff (e.g. DLOs) are  
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equipped with basic transport and communication equipment, few farmers would 
report directly to a DLO (10.5%). It is therefore suggested that MAF, through the 
DLOs and veterinarians, undertakes routine visits to villages every month to talk to 
farmers and monitor the disease situation in poultry. 
Early detection can be a result of two things. Firstly it could be the result of passive 
surveillance,  where  farmers  and  other  people,  such  as  VLWs  and  DLOs,  report 
poultry disease to the national authority (Livestock Office). Secondly it could be a 
result of routine surveillance. In Timor Leste, it is expected that farmers and other 
relevant parties at the district level would report cases of disease. This is, however, 
currently rare. Active surveillance from the Livestock Office is therefore required; 
however this also is rarely undertaken. When the AI targeted surveillance reported in 
this thesis was conducted (July 2009) this was the first surveillance undertaken in the 
country in the preceding three years. 
If an AI outbreak can be detected promptly, control measures can be implemented 
quickly helping prevent disease spread to other birds or to humans. Early detection is 
a  very  important  component  of  control  and  eradication  programs  (Lupiani  and 
Reddy,  2005).  For  example  prospective  surveillance  provided  early  detection  of 
H5N1 viruses in live poultry markets in Hong Kong which led to the pre-emptive 
intervention before the occurrence of human disease (Guan et al., 2002). In Europe 
early detection in free range birds (domesticated and wild birds) has become the 
main method of tracking the spread of AI (Komar and Olsen, 2008). Factors that 
influence the early detection of an exotic disease include farmer reporting, targeted 
surveillance  to  detect  the  presence  of  HPAI,  appropriate  risk  assessment,  public 
education about the disease and the Se and Sp of the tests used to detect disease.  
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8.4.1.5  Lack of poultry waste management 
In this survey it was found that most households undertake poor biosecurity practices 
for poultry waste arising from the slaughtering of birds for human consumption. 
Almost half (48.2%) threw the waste around the house and this was predominantly 
within 10 metres of the house or threw it into rubbish piles (44.7%). In such places 
free range poultry, dogs and cats would have access to the waste material and if a 
chicken was infected, the virus could easily spread to other free range chickens, and 
potentially even to dogs or cats (Enserink and Kaiser, 2004; Kuiken et al., 2004; 
Thanawongnuwech et al., 2005). Similarly throwing poultry waste into rivers/ponds 
(3.5%) could potentially expose wild life, especially waterfowl, as well as village 
chickens to the virus. It has previously been recommended that poultry carcasses, 
including poultry waste, from an AI outbreak be burnt or buried to destroy the virus 
(Nutsch et al., 2004).  
8.4.1.6  Quarantine practices 
Most  farmers  (63%)  had  a  good  understanding  for  the  need  to  separate  newly 
acquired chickens from their existing poultry (Section 8.3.2.13.2). This separation is 
usually  undertaken  to  ensure  that  the  new  chickens  get  ―to  know‖  their  new 
environment before they are released to minimise bird losses rather than as a reason 
to minimise disease transmission.  
8.4.1.7  Lack of vaccination of poultry 
At the time this data was collected (2009), there was a government ND vaccination 
program. However, most households (60%) surprisingly reported that their chickens 
were not vaccinated against ND. In contrast 69.4% of fighting cocks owners had 
vaccinated their chickens. Householders generally take greater care of their fighting  
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cocks than their free-range chickens and therefore fighting cocks are more likely to 
be vaccinated than village chickens. As this survey particularly targeted higher risk 
practices, including ownership of fighting cocks, it is likely that the percentage of 
households who did not vaccinate their chickens might be even higher if data were 
collected randomly throughout the country. 
The successful control of an exotic disease would depend on early disease detection. 
To facilitate the early detection of AI, most chickens should be vaccinated against 
ND which has similar clinical signs to AI (Belak et al., 2009), which potentially 
could impede the diagnosis of AI (Wang et al., 2008b).  
Although vaccination of birds against ND is free and most farmers were interested in 
getting their chicken vaccinated, few chickens were vaccinated. This was mainly due 
to the fact that either the vaccinator had not come (72.7%) or from the difficulty in 
catching free range chickens (16.5%). A significant amount of money has been spent 
by the Government in implementing an ND control program and the program needs 
to be evaluated in light of the current findings. 
8.4.1.8  Live bird markets 
Research in countries where birds are sold live to consumers showed that live bird 
markets  (LBM) play an important  role in  the dissemination of AIV  (Morris  and 
Jackson, 2005), especially if different species of birds are mixed at the markets. In 
Timor Leste birds sold at LBM are limited to village chickens and fighting cocks. It 
is  rare  for  waterfowl,  such  as  ducks,  to  be  sold  in  these  markets,  and  therefore 
interspecies transmission at the market would not be expected to be high. However 
transmission amongst village chickens could occur at the market and subsequently  
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infection  could  be  transmitted  directly  or  indirectly  to  other  chickens.  This  is 
particularly important as most households (97%) take chickens that remain unsold at 
the end of the day back to their households, taking any new viruses they have picked 
up with  them in  the market  back to  the village where they could  transmit  these 
viruses to other in-contact birds (Appenzeller, 2005; Magalhaes et al., 2010). 
8.4.1.9  Similarity of clinical signs of AI and ND 
The  most  common  clinical  signs  of  poultry  diseases  observed  by  farmers  in  the 
surveyed areas included diarrhoea, swollen head or eyes, blue combs/wattles, nasal 
discharge and trembling (Section 8.3.2.14.1). These clinical signs are characteristic 
of  both  ND  (Zeleke  et  al.,  2005)  and  AI  (Arzey,  2006).  This  difficulty  in 
differentiating between the two diseases may result in a delay in the initial detection 
of the disease, allowing the virus to spread quickly in an area (Elbers et al., 2006a). 
There is some evidence to suggest that negative AI test results of suspected cases 
(FAOAIDE, 2010c) may be as a result of infection with ND. 
8.4.1.10 Lack of farmer knowledge of poultry diseases  
Although poultry are the most numerous livestock kept by East Timorese (Table 
8.2), only 57% of owners knew the causes of sickness in poultry. This could be 
because  farmers  do  not  pay  attention  to  their  chickens  or  because  of  a  lack  of 
suitable extension material about livestock diseases from the relevant government 
staff. It is important that farmers know about the direct and indirect means of disease 
transmission to prevent entry of transmissible diseases to their birds.  
180 
 
8.4.2  Means of communicating AI risk 
Several  forms  of  media  were  identified  as  the  best  means  for  communicating 
information about AI to households. Televisions and radios were the most common 
media form (61.5%) from which information on AI was heard from, as both literate 
and illiterate people can understand this type of media. As the literacy rate for the 
two main languages spoken (Tetum and Indonesian) are 17 to over 80%, followed by 
Portuguese (4.2 to 34.7%) and English (0.7 to 17.7%) (Craven et al., 2006) these 
languages should be used when preparing any extension material.  
The illiteracy rate of Timor Leste is still high with more than half of the population 
in 2004 being illiterate (54%) (Craven et al., 2006). It is important to use local staff 
such as the VLW and DLO to disseminate information and to build a relationship 
with  the  local  community  to  overcome  this  challenge  in  distributing  extension 
material. 
8.4.3  Control and prevention of AI 
Farmers have a good level of knowledge on what to do if AI is suspected (Table 
8.13). However a few farmers would treat the suspected diseased birds or even eat 
them.  Close  contact  with  sick  or  dead  poultry  is  a  significant  risk  for  human 
infection (Chotpitayasunondh et al., 2005; FAO, 2006a; Sedyaningsih et al., 2008). 
Fortunately  only  a  few  farmers  (1.3%)  reported  eating  sick  birds,  however 
anecdotally eating sick or dead chickens is common in villages due to a shortage of 
protein. Eating poultry that were sick or had died from AI is a risk for humans since 
the virus can  be detected in  the muscle and blood, as  well as  in  the faeces  and 
feathers, of birds infected with H5N1 (MacDiarmid, 1991; Tumpey et al., 2002; Lu  
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et al., 2003b; Lu et al., 2003c; Tumpey et al., 2003; Swayne and Beck, 2005; Das et 
al., 2008a). 
8.5  Conclusions 
From the results of the targeted surveillance it is  concluded that Timor  Leste is 
currently free from HPAI, however the country is at risk of becoming infected. Risk 
factors  that  might  contribute  to  the  introduction  of  HPAI  include:  1)  unofficial 
trading of live poultry, especially fighting cocks, across the Timor Leste/Indonesian 
border, 2) the presence of significant numbers of free range chickens which have the 
potential to be exposed to wild birds, 3) failure of farmers to report poultry disease, 
4) lack of vaccination against ND resulting in outbreaks of ND which has a similar 
clinical presentation as AI. 
It is evident that there is a potential risk of introducing HPAI into Timor Leste and 
the next chapter outlines the results from modelling the likelihood of the introduction 
and establishment of HPAI via live chickens smuggled from infected countries into 
Timor Leste.  
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CHAPTER 9:  RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE ENTRY AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN 
INFLUENZA (HPAI) INTO TIMOR LESTE 
9.1  Introduction 
Risk  is  defined  as  the  possibility  of  suffering  harm  from  a  hazard  (Cohrssen  and 
Covello, 1989). Risk analysis involves identifying potential hazards, determining the 
likelihood  of  exposure  to  these  hazards,  and  highlighting  how  the  impact  can  be 
reduced  (OIE,  2003a).  Risk  analysis  in  trade  involves  several  phases:  hazard 
identification;  risk  assessment;  risk  management  (Urbina-Amaris,  2003); 
determining the significance of risk; and risk communication (Cohrssen and Covello, 
1989;  Geering  and  Lubroth,  2002;  OIE,  2003b).  Risk  assessment  deals  with 
evaluating the likelihood and the biological and economic consequences of entry, 
establishment, or spread of a pathogenic agent (OIE, 2003a). There are four steps in 
undertaking  a  risk  assessment:  release  assessment,  exposure  assessment, 
consequence assessment and risk estimation (OIE, 2003b). Guidelines on how to do 
risk assessment are provided by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
(OIE,  2003b,  2004).  There  are  three  methods  of  doing  risk  assessment,  i.e 
qualitative, quantitative (Miller et al., 1993; McDiarmid and Pharo, 2003; Murray, 
2004)  and  semi  quantitative  (BA,  2001).  Risk  assessment  can  be  performed 
quantitatively through probability scenario analysis (Oryang, 2002) or by the use of a 
scenario tree. The process on how to calculate the risk using scenario tree has been 
described by Murray (2004) and Martin et al. (2007).  
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Prior to the work described in this chapter a risk assessment to predict the potential 
for HPAI to be introduced into Timor Leste had not been undertaken. Therefore the 
goal of this chapter was to estimate the probability of the entry and establishment of 
HPAI in Timor Leste as a consequence of the smuggling of live poultry (fighting 
cocks) from Indonesia into the border districts of Timor Leste (Covalima, Bobonaro 
and Oecusse). This pathway was identified as the main potential pathway of HPAI 
entering Timor Leste (Chapters Six and Eight). 
9.2  Materials and methods 
9.2.1  Hazard identification 
Geographically, Timor Leste shares a border with Indonesia where HPAI is endemic 
(Hartono, 2004). While Timor Leste is still free of HPAI, its free status is threatened 
by the smuggling of live chickens between Timor Leste and Indonesia. It is possible 
that HPAI could be introduced to Timor Leste at any time through a number of ways 
as discussed in Chapters Six and Eight. Therefore in this study the hazard was the 
introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste. 
9.2.2  Risk question 
The discussion in this chapter will address a risk question relating to the hazard. The 
question is: what is the risk of entry of highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza 
(HPNAI) virus of H5N1 subtype to Timor Leste resulting in an outbreak through the 
unofficial trading of live chickens (especially fighting cocks) across the border? To 
answer this, an analysis was conducted based on the pathway diagrams (Figures 9.1 
and 9.2) and related data compiled from the scientific literature and through expert 
opinion.  
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9.2.3  Risk quantification method 
The risk assessment in this study was performed quantitatively using a probability 
scenario tree analysis  (Murray, 2004; Martin  et  al., 2007). The quantification of 
values  for  each  input  parameters  in  the  scenario  tree  analysis  was  achieved  by 
interviewing experts as described in Section 9.2.7 and other sources as specified. 
9.2.4  Risk pathways 
The entry for HPAI into the country is via land borders (between Timor Leste and 
Indonesia), seaports or the airport. The probability of entry depends upon several 
pathways  as  discussed  in  Chapters  Six  and  Eight.  The  main  pathways  include: 
importation of live poultry; smuggled live chickens from Indonesia; and smuggled 
eggs  from  Indonesia.  The  entry  of  HPAI  can  occur  via  any  of  these  pathways, 
however  due  to  a  lack  of  data,  only  the  highest  risk  pathway  (smuggled  live 
chickens) was analysed in the model. 
9.2.4.1  Development of possible pathways for the introduction of HPAI through 
the smuggling of live chickens 
Initially risk pathways  were drawn to show the possible ways HPAI could enter 
Timor Leste via infected poultry (Figure 9.1) resulting in a disease outbreak in the 
local poultry (Figure 9.2).   
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Figure 9.1. Release assessment scenario tree outlining how HPAI could be introduced into Timor Leste 
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186 
 
 
Figure 9.2. Scenario tree illustrating exposure assessment and risk of consequences of HPAI 
Destination of 
smuggled chicken
use for consumption
P(Cs)
Waste treatment
Bury/burn
P(Br)
No exposure and therefore no  HPAI outbreak (1)
Not bury/burn
1-P(Br)
Exposed to local 
poultry
Yes
P(Exp)
Ability to infect 
local poultry
Yes
P(InfL)
Causes an HPAI 
outbreak 
(3)
No
1-P(InfL)
No HPAI outbreak (4)
No
1-P(Exp)
No exposure and 
therefore no  HPAI 
outbreak (2)
Not for  consumption
1-P(Cs)
Exposed to local 
poultry
Yes
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The scenario tree was developed based on potential risk factors discussed in Chapter 
Two and others identified in this thesis (Chapters Six and Eight). This scenario tree 
assumes that the introduction of HPAI via the smuggling of poultry occurs through 
the border districts. Although introduction is possible through other districts (such as 
those with other potential risk factors such as lakes and rice fields), these were not 
considered in the current analysis. 
9.2.4.2  Nodes of release assessment (entry) pathways 
Nodes includes in this analysis were poultry infection status [P(Inf)]; asymptomatic 
infected chickens [P(Asymp)]; border police unit (BPU) detection [P(Det)], BPU 
confiscating smuggled chickens [P(Con)], BPU submit chickens to quarantine for 
destruction [P(Sub)] and quarantine destruction [P(Des)]. The flow of these nodes is 
described in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1. Nodes of the scenario tree models leading to HPAI entry  
Node#  Node  Node type  Branches  Next node  Source of data 
1  Poultry infection 
status 
Infection  Infected  2  Veterinarian‘s 
opinion 
Not 
infected 
No entry 
2  Asymptomatic 
Infected chickens 
Risk 
category 
Yes  3  Review Literature 
No  3 
3  BPU detection  Detection  Yes  4  BPU opinion 
No  Entry 
4  BPU confiscating  Risk 
category 
Yes  5  BPU opinion 
No  Entry 
5  BPU submission to 
quarantine 
Risk 
category 
  
Yes  6  BPU opinion 
No  Entry 
6  Quarantine 
destruction 
Risk 
category 
Yes  No entry  Quarantine staff 
opinion 
No  Entry 
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9.2.4.3  Nodes of exposure pathways 
The flow of nodes includes for exposure pathways are described in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2. Nodes of the scenario tree models for exposure leading to an HPAI 
outbreak 
Node#  Node  Node 
type 
Branches  Next node/ 
consequences 
Source of 
data 
1  Poultry destination 
after being released 
Risk 
category 
Consumption  2  Opinion of 
veterinarians 
Not for 
consumption 
3 
2  Waste treatment (by 
burning or burying) 
Risk 
category 
Yes  No exposure, 
no outbreak 
Opinion of 
veterinarians 
No  3 
3  Smuggled chickens 
exposed to other 
chickens 
Risk 
category 
Yes  4  Opinion of 
veterinarians 
No  Limited to 
index case & 
no outbreak 
4  Infected smuggled 
chickens infecting 
other chickens 
Infection 
node 
Yes  Outbreak  Opinion of 
veterinarians  No  Limited to 
index case and 
no outbreak 
 
9.2.5  Scenario tree calculation method 
After the scenario trees were drawn (Figures 9.1 and 9.2), each node‘s branch was 
assigned a probability value. For the risk of entry, every branch of the tree will have 
two terminal outcomes, e.g. probability of not being destroyed by quarantine, which 
resulted in a ―successful entry‖ and the probability of a smuggled chicken being 
destroyed by quarantine resulted in ―no entry‖ (see Figure 9.1). For the probability of 
establishment  in  Figure  9.2,  the  terminal  outcomes  are:  1)  the  likelihood  of  the 
smuggled  chicken(s)  infecting  other  local  chickens  resulting  in  an  ―outbreak‖  of 
HPAI and 2) not infecting other chickens or only limited to the index case with ―no 
outbreak‖. 
The probability for any branch outcome is just the product of all the probabilities for 
the  prior  branches  (Martin  et  al.,  2007).  For  example,  the  probability  of  the  1
st  
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outcome of HPAI entry of the scenario tree branches in Figure 9.1 is calculated as in 
Equation 9.1.  
)) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( Det P x Asymp xP Inf P me FirstOutco P   Equation 9.1 
Using the same method, all branch outcomes for the probability of entry in Figure 
9.1 and the risk of having an outbreak of HPAI in Figure 9.2 were calculated. After 
all branches probabilities were calculated, the probability of entry [P(Entry)] was 
calculated by summing all the branch probabilities from Figure 9.1 that resulted in a 
―successful  entry‖.  Similarly,  the  probability  of  having  an  outbreak  of  HPAI 
[P(Outb)] was achieved by summing all the branch probabilities in Figure 9.2 that 
resulted in an ―outbreak‖ of HPAI. 
9.2.6  Formulation for HPAI risk of entry and outbreak 
9.2.6.1  Probability of entry 
After  summing  all  the  branch  probabilities  from  Figure  9.1  that  resulted  in  a 
probability of successful entry, the probability of n infected chickens smuggled was 
calculated using the Binomial method (Cameron and Baldock, 1998) as in Equations 
9.2 to 9.4. 
The probability all ―n‖ 
infected chickens enter 
Timor Leste (TL) 
n Entry P ) (  
 
Equation 9.2 
The probability no 
infected chickens enter 
TL 
n Entry P )] ( 1 [  
 
Equation 9.3 
 
The probability that at 
least one infected 
chicken enters TL 
n Entry P )] ( 1 [ 1  
 
Equation 9.4 
 
The ―n‖ in Equations 9.2 and 9.4 were calculated as in Equation 9.5.   
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) ( ) ( d nCkInvolve x nSmugglers nCkSmgl
 
Equation 9.5 
Where ―nSmugglers‖ is the number of smugglers and ―nCkInvolved‖ is the number 
of chickens involved in every smuggling activity by every smuggler. 
9.2.6.2  Probability of having an HPAI outbreak 
The  probability  of  exposure  resulting  in  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  [P(Outb)]  was 
calculated by summing all the values of tree branches of the scenario tree in Figure 
9.2 that resulted in an ―outbreak‖. After getting the P(Outb), the probability of ―n‖ 
infected chickens that had contact with local chickens leading to an outbreak was 
calculated using the Binomial method (Cameron and Baldock, 1998) as in Equations 
9.6 to 9.8. 
The probability all ―n‖ infected 
chickens that have contact with 
local chickens result in an outbreak 
in Timor Leste (TL) 
n Outb P ) (  
 
Equation 9.6 
The probability no infected 
chickens that have contact with 
local chickens result in an outbreak 
n Outb P )] ( 1 [  
 
Equation 9.7 
 
The probability that at least one 
infected chicken that had contact 
with local chickens causes an 
outbreak 
n Outb P )] ( 1 [ 1  
 
Equation 9.8 
 
The ―n‖ in Equations 9.6 to 9.8 is the number of chicken exposed [n(Exp)]. The 
number of smuggled chickens exposed was calculated as the product of P(Exp) and 
Equation 9.5 (Equation 9.9). Using this equation the number of smuggled chickens 
exposed in three border districts was calculated.  
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) ( ) ( nCkSmgl x Exp P nExp   Equation 9.9 
 
Where nExp is the number of chickens exposed, P(Exp) is the proportion of chickens 
that are exposed to local chickens and nCkSmgl is the number of chickens smuggled.  
9.2.7  Collection of Data 
The input values used to calculate the probability of HPAI entering Timor Leste 
through smuggled live chickens in this study were based mainly on expert opinion, 
the results from the work described earlier in this thesis and also from other sources 
as  specified if data were not  available.  Initially the experts in the relevant  areas 
(members  of  the  Border  Police  Unit,  Quarantine  and  Veterinary  staff)  were 
interviewed using structured questionnaires (Appendix Six). 
Each expert was asked to provide their opinion on a range of factors, for example the 
number of chicken smugglers in their own districts. For each factor/question they 
were asked to estimate the minimum, average and maximum likelihood value and to 
score their own expertise using a scale of one being the lowest to five being the 
highest. These scores were then used to calculate the expert opinion using a Discrete 
distribution in PopTools (Hood, 2008; Vose, 2008a) as shown in Table 9.3. The 
weight needed for Discrete distributions were derived from the expert‘s scores of 
themselves for each question asked. The output of the Discrete distribution was used 
to determine the risk of the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste. 
9.2.8  Implementation  
After the experts were interviewed, their opinions were entered into Excel 2007 and 
modelled  with  PopTools  (Hood,  2008).  The  method  used  to  model  the  expert 
opinions is shown in Table 9.3. If the experts were asked to give their opinion about  
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a matter, then data on the minimum (Min), most likely (ML) and maximum (Max) 
values were used to describe a Pert distribution in PopTools (dPertDev(Min, ML, 
Max, 4).  The results  of the  Pert distribution, together with  the weight of expert 
opinions (derived from the experts scoring themselves in every question they were 
asked)  were  used  to  calculate  the  final  probability  outcome  using  a  Discrete 
distribution. The Discrete distribution was calculated as dDiscreteDev(x,p), where 
―x‖  is  a  vector  of  values  to  be  selected  and  ―p‖  is  a  vector  of  probabilities  or 
frequencies (Hood, 2008; Vose, 2008a). The vector values to be selected (x) in this 
study was derived from expert opinion in the form of either a Pert distribution or 
from a single fixed value from each expert (Table 9.3). The vector probabilities or 
frequencies (p) are the weight of the experts, which was derived from expert scores 
(ranged from one to five) for every question asked. With one being the lowest score 
of expert knowledge and five the highest score of experts‘ knowledge (David Vose, 
personal communication). 
After all required variables were calculated, their values were incorporated as the 
probabilities for each branch in the scenario trees (Figures 9.1 and 9.2), and then the 
risk of entry and risk of outbreak were calculated as described in Section 9.2.6. 
The prevalence and confidence interval of each parameter was achieved by using the 
exact binomial method and Monte Carlo analysis as described in Section 5.2.3. 
  
193 
 
 
 
Table 9.3. Excel spreadsheet for modelling expert opinions (E.g. number of smugglers smuggling chickens) 
 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  Final distribution 
(Discrete)  1  Variables/questions asked  Expert  Min  Mean  Max  Pert  Weight 
2  Number of smugglers smuggling chickens  1
st           =dPertDev(C2,D2,E2,4) 
 
=dDiscreteDev(F2:Fn,G2:Gn) 
3    2
nd           =dPertDev(C3,D3,E3,4) 
  4    3
rd           =dPertDev(C4,D4,E4,4) 
  n    n
th           =dPertDev(Cn,Dn,En,4) 
 
Note: Final distribution achieved by Discrete distribution, Minimum (Min), Maximum (Max), number 4 in Pert distribution is the standard weight in PopTools  
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9.2.9  Simulation and sensitivity analysis method 
After all data were collected and all relevant data were assigned to scenario tree 
(Figures  9.1  and  9.2)  branches,  then  a  computer  simulation  was  conducted.  The 
simulation of the scenario tree model was run using PopTools software (Hood, 2008) 
with 10,000 iterations. Output variables monitored were the probability that at least 
one infected chicken enters Timor Leste as in Equation 9.4 and the probability that at 
least one infected chicken that had contact with local chickens caused an outbreak 
(Equation 9.8).  
To assess the sensitivity of outputs (mean of Equations 9.4 and 9.8) to variation in 
the input parameters, a sensitivity analysis was  conducted using advanced spider 
plots (Vose, 2008b). The steps used have previously been described in Section 4.2.6. 
9.3  Results 
9.3.1  Experts interviewed and results of interviews 
Ten BPU members, eight quarantine staff and six veterinarians from Timor Leste 
were interviewed. The results of the questionnaires completed by the experts are 
tabulated  in  Table  9.4.  The  distributions  based  on  the  combined  results  of  the 
questionnaire used for each input parameter are provided in Table 9.5. 
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Table 9.4. Summary of the results from the interviewed experts 
Questions 
(source) 
 
Expert 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th 
Number of 
smugglers in the 
surveyed district 
(BPU) 
Minimum  2  2  5  1  4  8  2  2  1  1 
Most Likely  5  10  6  2  5  10  3  3  2  2 
Maximum  10  20  7  3  10  15  5  5  3  3 
Pert distribution  5  10  6  2  5  10  3  3  2  2 
Weight  1  1  3  1  1  1  3  3  1  1 
Discrete distribution  4.9 (95% CI: 1.5-12.4) 
Minimum number 
of chickens 
smuggled by one 
smuggler/month 
(BPU) 
Minimum  2  1  1  1  1  2  1  1  2  1 
Most Likely  4  2  10  2  2  3  2  2  3  2 
Maximum  5  3  12  3  4  4  3  3  4  4 
Pert distribution  4  2  10  2  2  3  2  2  3  2 
Weight  1  2  3  1  1  3  1  3  1  1 
Discrete distribution   3.3 (95% CI: 1.31 - 10.78) 
Probability of the 
BPU detecting 
smuggling (BPU) 
Minimum  1.0%  25.0%  4.0%  10.0%  2.0%  0.0%  2.0%  20.0%  25.0%  25.0% 
Most Likely  2.0%  50.0%  5.0%  15.0%  3.0%  0.0%  3.0%  30.0%  50.0%  50.0% 
Maximum  3.0%  75.0%  8.0%  25.0%  4.0%  0.0%  4.0%  40.0%  75.0%  65.0% 
Pert distribution  2.0%  50.0%  5.0%  15.0%  3.0%  0.0%  3%   30.0%  50.0%  50.0%  
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Questions 
(source) 
 
Expert 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th 
Weight  1  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  1  3 
Discrete distribution  24.6% (95% CI: 0 - 62.4%) 
Probability of 
confiscation 
(BPU) 
Probability  99.0%  25.0%  99.0%  100.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0% 
Weight  5  1  2  5  3  5  5  4  5  1 
Discrete distribution  97.2% (95% CI: 25 - 100%) 
Probability of 
confiscated birds 
being submitted to 
Quarantine (BPU) 
Probability  99.0%  2.0%  99.0%  99.0%  100.0%  95.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0%  99.0% 
Weight  5  1  5  4  5  3  5  5  4  5 
Discrete distribution  96.7% (95% CI: 95 – 100%) 
Probability of 
destruction 
(Quarantine staff) 
Probability  100.0%  99.0%  100.0%  98.0%  99.0%  100.0%  99.0%  100.0%       
Weight  4  5  3  3  4  4  5  5       
Discrete distribution  99.40% (95% CI: 98 - 100%) 
Probability of 
infection 
(Veterinarians) 
Probability  10.0%  1.0%  5.0%  0.0%  5.0%  0.0%             
Weight  1  1  1  3  3  4             
Discrete distribution  2.3% (95% CI: 0 – 10%) 
Probability of 
smuggled 
chickens being 
Minimum  50%  25%  10%  50%  25%  5%             
Most Likely  70%  50%  25%  75%  50%  10%             
Maximum  90%  65%  50%  80%  75%  20%              
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Questions 
(source) 
 
Expert 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th 
released/exposed 
with local 
chickens 
(Veterinarian) 
Pert distribution  70%  50%  25%  75%  50%  10%             
Weight  4  4  3  3  4  3             
Discrete distribution  46.9% (95% CI: 8.3 - 80%) 
Probability of 
smuggled 
chickens infecting 
other birds 
(Veterinarians) 
Minimum  1.0%  5.0%  1.0%  20.0%                   
Most Likely  3.0%  10.0%  2.0%  30.0%                   
Maximum  5.0%  15.0%  4.0%  50.0%                   
Pert distribution  2.0%  12.0%  1.0%  34.0%                   
Weight  1  1  1  4                   
Discrete distribution  20.9% (95% CI: 1.5 - 42.3%) 
Probability of 
smuggled chicken 
being used for 
consumption 
(Veterinarians) 
Probability  0.35  0.05  0.2  0.01  0.03  0.05             
Weight  3  5  4  3  3  5             
Discrete Distribution  10.67% (95% CI: 1- 35%) 
Note: Pert distribution values shown in this table are fixed mean values. It was just copied from excel, after fixed the random number. The Discrete distribution however was achieved by running Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 iterations 
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9.3.2  Summary of input parameters for P(Entry) and P(Outbreak) 
The  probability  of  entry  [P(Entry)]  and  outbreak  [P(Outb)]  of  disease  were 
calculated using a scenario tree as described in Section 9.2.5. Input variables used to 
quantify the risk of the introduction of HPAI in this model are summarised in Table 
9.5. 
Table 9.5. Summary of probability branches of the scenario tree 
Inputs  Source  Mean 
95% CI 
Lower  Upper 
Probability of infection  Expert  2.30%  0%  10% 
Asymptomatic infected chickens  Literature  0.26%  0.2%  0.3% 
Probability of the BPU detecting smuggling  Expert  24.60%  0%  62.4% 
Probability of confiscation  Expert  97.20%  25%  100% 
Probability of submitting birds to quarantine  Expert  96.70%  95%  100% 
Probability of destruction  Expert  99.40%  98%  100% 
Proportion of smuggled chickens consumed  Expert  10.67%  1  35% 
Waste treatment (by burning or burying)  Chapter 8  1.2%  0%  6.4% 
Probability  of  smuggled  chickens  being 
released with local chickens 
Expert  46.90%  8.3%  80% 
Probability of smuggled chickens infecting 
other birds 
Expert  20.90%  1.5%  42.3% 
Number  of  smugglers  in  the  surveyed 
district 
Expert    4.9  1.5  12.4 
Minimum number of chickens smuggled by 
one smuggler 
Expert  3.31  1.31  10.78 
 
9.3.3  Risk of release or entry 
The  role  of  the  BPU  is  to  patrol  the  border  areas  in  Timor  Leste.  If  the  BPU 
encounter smuggling of chickens, they should confiscate them and then forward the 
chickens to quarantine staff, who, by law, should destroy them. 
The probability of infection, detection, confiscation, submission and destroying were 
derived from various experts as described in Table 9.4 and were calculated using the 
methods  described  in  Table  9.3.  The  risk  of  entry  is  calculated  by  assigning  
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probability values (Table 9.5) in the scenario tree‘s branches (Figure 9.1) using the 
method outlined in Section 9.2.5.  
9.3.3.1  Poultry infection status 
This is the probability of infection in the place of origin of the smuggled chickens. 
The  only  place  where  chickens  are  smuggled  through  the  border  areas  is  NTT. 
Therefore the probability of infection in this case is the probability of infection in 
NTT, Indonesia. Two sources for the P(Inf) were used in this analysis. Firstly, by 
interviewing government veterinarians, which resulted in a P(Inf) of 2.3% (95% CI: 
0 - 10%) (Table 9.4). Secondly, the P(Inf) was also calculated using data on the 
seroprevalence for AI in NTT (Table 9.6). Between 2004 and 2007, 2452 sera and 
873 swab samples were collected which resulted in 91 positive sera and 4 viruses 
isolated resulting in a seroprevalence of 3.7% (95% CI: 3.0 – 4.5%) and a prevalence 
for virus isolation of 0.46% (95% CI: 0.1-1.2%) (Table 9.6). 
The minimum sero-prevalence for AI in chickens in NTT from 2004 to 2007 was 
1.2%, with an average of 3.7% and a maximum of 8.6%. The P(Inf) was therefore 
modelled using a  Pert distribution in Poptools as  dPertDev(0%, 3.7%, 8.6%, 4). 
Using 1000 iterations of a Monte Carlo simulation, the above distribution resulted in 
4.2% (95% CI: 1.8 – 6.9%). 
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Table  9.6.  Seroprevalence  and  virus  isolation  in  NTT  (Dr.  Maria  Geong, 
personal communication) 
Year  Total Samples  Positive Result  Prevalence 
Serum  Swabs  Sera  Virus 
isolation 
Sera  Swab 
2004  1370  45  16  1  1.20%  2.20% 
2005    632  231  43  3  6.80%  1.30% 
2006    324  467  28  0  8.60%  0.00% 
2007    126  130  4  0  3.20%  0.00% 
2008    947  330  0  0    0%  0.00% 
Total  3399    1203  91  4     
 
9.3.3.2  Asymptomatic infected chickens 
This node is included because if chickens are infected and showing clinical signs 
they  are  unlikely  to  be  smuggled.  Fighting  cocks  are  expensive  (up  to  US$200) 
(Chapter  Eight)  and  consequently  smugglers  would  not  spend  large  amounts  of 
money  purchasing  sick  birds.  Therefore  it  is  assumed  that  only  chickens  with  a 
healthy appearance are smuggled. However it is possible that if infected chickens 
were not showing any clinical signs (asymptomatic or incubating disease) they could 
be smuggled into Timor Leste.  
The proportion of infected chickens that were not showing clinical signs [P(Asymp)] 
in this analysis was set to be 2.6 x 10
-3 (0.26%). This value was derived from 22,390 
virus (H5N1) positive domestic chickens that were tested over a period of one year 
from a range of places (Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hong Kong, Hunan 
and Yunnan). Of these birds 58 were apparently healthy but were positive for H5N1 
(Chen et al., 2006b). 
9.3.3.3  Detection, confiscation and submission of birds by the Border Police Unit 
Once  chickens  are  smuggled  into  Timor  Leste,  the  only  way  that  they  can  be 
detected is through the BPU patrols. If the BPU detects smuggled chickens, these  
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birds  are  confiscated  and  then  submitted  to  quarantine  staff.  The  probability  of 
detection [P(Det)], confiscation [P(Con)] and submission [P(sub)] in this study were 
derived from experts (BPU) as presented in Table 9.4. As can be seen the [P(Det)], 
[P(Con)] and [P(sub)] are 24.6% (95% CI: 0 – 62.4%), 97.2% (95% CI: 25 – 100%) 
and 96.7% (95% CI: 95 – 100%) respectively (Tables 9.4 and 9.5). 
9.3.3.4  Destruction during quarantine  
It is a legal requirement that quarantine staff destroy any chickens that illegally enter 
Timor Leste (even if they appear healthy). However, the quarantine staff, unlike the 
BPU, are only located at the legal entry points in the border districts of Bobonaro, 
Covalima and Oecusse, and they don‘t patrol the border as do the BPU. 
Smuggled chickens can only be destroyed if they are submitted by BPU members. 
The probability of quarantine destruction [P(Des)] was determined from the opinions 
of quarantine staff (Table 9.4) and had a mean of 99.4% (95% CI: 98 – 100%). 
9.3.3.5  Probability of entry 
The probability of entry was achieved by summing all the values of successful entry 
in the scenario tree in Figure 9.1, which resulted in a P(Entry) of 1.8% (0 – 8.8%) 
when based on a P(Inf) of expert opinion and 3.2% (95% CI: 1.1 - 6.3%) when based 
on the AI (seroprevalence) in NTT. By using this entry probability, the probability of 
n infected chickens smuggled per month was calculated (Equations 9.2 to 9.4). The 
results are shown in Table 9.7. 
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Table 9.7. The results of the calculations to determine the probability of entry  
Description  Formula  Results-1 
Mean (95% CI) 
Results -2 
Mean (95% CI) 
The probability all ―n‖ infected 
chickens enter Timor Leste (TL) 
Equation 9.2  1.14 x 10
-9% 
(0 – 2.29 x 10
-11%) 
2.40 x 10
-10% 
(0 – 4.85x10
-12%) 
The probability no infected 
chickens enter TL 
Equation 9.3  71%
 
(0.39 – 100%) 
37% 
(0 – 82.9%) 
The probability that at least one 
infected chicken will enter 
TL/month 
Equation 9.4  29% 
(0 – 99.7%) 
63% 
(17 – 99.9%) 
Result 1: the probability of entry based on probability of infected [P(Inf)] from expert opinion, result 2 is the probability of entry based on 
P(Inf) from seroprevalence of AI surveillance in NTT 
The  ―n‖  in  Equations  9.2  and  9.4  were  calculated  from  Equation  9.5.  From  the 
interviews with experts (Table 9.4) it was calculated that the number of chicken‘ 
smugglers  [nSmugglers)]  is  4.9  (95%  CI:  1.5  –  12.4).  The  average  number  of 
chickens smuggled by each smuggler on average per month is 3.31 (95% CI: 1.31 – 
10.78).  Therefore  the  total  average  number  of  chickens  smuggled  per  border 
district/month can be calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation as in Equation 9.5, 
which resulted in 17 (95% CI: 3.17 – 60.65) smuggled chickens per month. Since 
there are three border districts the results of Equation 9.5 was multiplied by three in 
the  model,  which  resulted  in  51  (95%  CI:  9.5  -  181.95)  smuggled  chickens  per 
month across the three border districts. 
Using Equations 9.2 to 9.5 and given the P(Entry) and n smuggled chickens, the 
probability of at least one infected chicken entering Timor Leste per month is 29% 
based on the prevalence derived from the opinion of experts and 63% based on the 
seroprevalence of AI from surveillance conducted in NTT.  
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Assuming  that  all  the  input  parameters  used  for  this  modelling  were  correct,  an 
infected chicken would enter Timor Leste every 1.6 months (1/0.63) based on the 
serosurveillance from the NTT and 3.4 months (1/0.29) based on the AI prevalence 
estimated from experts.  
9.3.4  Risk of exposure leading to an outbreak  
9.3.4.1  Probability of being exposed 
This node determines the probability of smuggled chickens having contact with local 
poultry.  This  contact  could  occur  through  them  being  released  with  the  local 
chickens, through selling at markets or through fighting cock competitions in the 
border districts. The probability of local poultry being exposed to smuggled chickens 
[P(Exp)]  was  determined  to  be  46.9%  (95%  CI:  8.3  –  80%)  based  on  expert 
(veterinarians) opinion (Table 9.4). 
9.3.4.2  Probability of chickens being consumed 
If  smuggled  chickens  are  not  released  with  local  flocks  then  they  can  be  either 
slaughtered for consumption or just maintained at the farmers‘ home without having 
contact with other chickens. The probability of being consumed [P(Bc)] was 10.67% 
(95% CI: 1 – 35%) based on expert opinion (Tables 9.4 and 9.5). 
9.3.4.3  Waste treatment 
Handling  and  treatment  of  waste  after  the  chickens  have  been  slaughtered  is 
potentially a very important factor for the spread of AI, as well as other diseases. 
Waste can be treated safely by burning or burying, however it can also be disposed 
of in a bin or in other areas where local chickens may have access to it. If this waste 
is from infected chickens it has the potential to infect other chickens. The probability  
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of chickens‘ waste being treated by burning or burying [P(Br)] was determined to be 
1.2% (95% CI: 0 - 6.4%) in Chapter Eight (Table 9.5). 
9.3.4.4  Probability of infecting local chickens 
This node relates to the probability of the infected smuggled chickens transmitting 
virus to  local  chickens  via direct  contact  resulting in  an outbreak of  HPAI. The 
probability [P(InfL)] obtained from veterinarians‘ opinion was 20.9% (95% CI: 1.5 - 
42.3%) (Table 9.4). 
9.3.4.5  Probability of having an HPAI outbreak 
The  probability  of  exposure  resulting  in  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  [P(Outb)]  was 
calculated by summing all the values of tree branches of the scenario tree in Figure 
9.2 that resulted in outbreaks. The probability of exposure leading to an outbreak 
was estimated to be 17.3% (95% CI: 2.0 – 37.8%) using the P(Inf) based on expert 
opinion and 18.5% (95% CI: 1.9 – 38.1%) based on P(Inf) the serosurveillance for 
AI in NTT. By using these values, the probability of ―n‖ infected chickens that had 
contact with local chickens leading to an outbreak was calculated using the Binomial 
method (Cameron and Baldock, 1998) as in Equations 9.6 to 9.8. The results are 
shown in Table 9.8. 
The ―n‖ in Equations 9.6 to 9.8 was calculated from Equation 9.9. The proportion of 
chickens smuggled that are exposed [P(Exp)] to local poultry was estimated to be 
46.9% (95% CI: 8.3 – 80%) based on the veterinarians‘ opinions (Table 9.4). The 
number of smuggled chickens exposed was calculated as the product of P(Exp) and 
Equation 9.5 as can be seen in Equation 9.9.  
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Table 9.8. The probability of having an outbreak of HPAI 
Description  Formula  Results-1 
Mean (95% CI) 
Results-2 
Mean (95% CI) 
The probability all ―n‖ infected 
smuggled chickens cause an 
outbreak of HPAI 
Equation 9.6  0.8%
 
(1.11 x 10
-74 –8.7%) 
0.7% 
(5.2 x 10
-86 – 9.8%) 
The probability no infected 
smuggled chickens cause an 
outbreak of HPAI 
Equation 9.7  26% 
(0 – 89.8%) 
24% 
(0 – 89.3%) 
The probability that at least one 
infected chicken causes an 
outbreak of HPAI 
Equation 9.8  74% 
(9.4 – 100%) 
75% 
(11 – 100%) 
Result 1: is the probability of having HPAI outbreak based on P(Inf) from expert opinion and Result 2 based on P(Inf) of NTT AI sero 
prevalence  
Using  Equation  9.9  the  number  of  smuggled  chickens  exposed  in  three  border 
districts was calculated as 23.58 (95% CI: 2 – 99) chickens/month and 23.61 (95% 
CI:  2  –  107)  for  the  P(Inf)  from  expert  opinion  and  NTT  serosurveillance  data 
respectively.  Using  these  values  (n=23.58  and  23.61  chickens/month),  the 
probability of at least one outbreak being caused by exposure to an infected chickens 
is 74% (95% CI: 9.4 – 100%) for the P(Inf) from expert opinion and 75% (95% CI: 
11  –  100%)  for  the  P(Inf)  calculated  using  the  serosurveillance  data  from  NTT 
(Table 9.8). 
If all the input parameters used for this modelling are correct, then an outbreak of 
outbreak would occur, on average, every 1.3 months (1/0.75) using the P(Inf) from 
the serosurveillance data in NTT and every 1.4 months (1/0.74) using the P(Inf) from 
the experts‘ opinion.   
206 
 
9.3.5  Sensitivity analysis 
9.3.5.1  Risk of entry parameters 
Of the inputs used to calculate the risk of HPAI entering Timor Leste, three have a 
significant positive impact on the successful entry of an infected chicken into the 
country:  the  number  of  chickens  smuggled  by  a  smuggler  [n(CkInvolved)];  the 
number of smugglers [n(Smugglers)]; and the probability of infection in a smuggled 
chicken  [P(Inf)].  If  any  of  these  probabilities  increase  then  the  probability  of 
chickens infected with HPAI entering Timor Leste is raised. 
Factors  such  as  BPU  detection  [P(Det)],  BPU  confiscating  [P(Con)],  BPU 
submission [P(Sub)] and quarantine destroying [P(Des)] all have a negative impact 
on the probability of HPAI entry. Consequently if these probabilities are decreased 
the probability of entry is increased (see Figure 9.3). 
  
Figure 9.3. A spider plot showing the influence of the input parameters on the 
risk of having at least one infected chicken  entering Timor Leste  (based  on 
P(Inf) of NTT AI serosurveillance study) 
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9.3.5.2  Risk of exposure and consequences 
Of the five inputs parameters used, four input parameters had a significant influence 
on the probability of at least  one infected chickens  causing an outbreak in  local 
poultry [P(Outb): the number of chickens smuggled by a smuggler [n(CkInvolved)]; 
the  number  of  smugglers  [n(Smugglers)];  the  probability  of  a  smuggled  chicken 
being  exposed  to  local  poultry  [P(Exp)];  and  the  ability  of  smuggled  chicken 
infecting local poultry [P(InfL)]. The input parameter that had the least impact on an 
outbreak  is  the  probability  of  being  consumed  [P(Bc)].  Of  these  five  input 
parameters,  the  n(CkInvolved)  had  the  greatest  impact  on  the  entry  of  infection 
resulting in an outbreak (Figure 9.4).  
  
Figure 9.4. A spider plot showing the influence of the input parameters on the 
probability of having an outbreak of HPAI in Timor Leste (produced by using 
P(Inf) from NTT AI serosurveillance study). 
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9.4  Discussion 
9.4.1  Risk of entry 
Nusa  Tenggara  Timur  (NTT)  -  Indonesia  is  the  most  likely  source  of  HPAI 
transmission  into  Timor  Leste.  In  Indonesia  31  of  the  33  provinces  have  been 
infected with HPAI (Forster, 2009; FAOAIDE, 2010a), including NTT. However the 
disease  is  considered  to  be  endemic  only  in  the  islands  of  Java,  Sumatra  and 
Sulawesi, and probably also Bali, with only sporadic outbreaks reported from other 
islands (FAOAIDE, 2010a). In NTT the last confirmed outbreak of HPAI was in 
October  2004  (Dr.  Maria  Geong,  personal  communication),  although  some 
seropositive results have been obtained up until 2007 (Table 9.6). These results may 
be false positive results or may indicate previous exposure to HPAI.  
The presence of seropositive chickens in NTT could result from several reasons. 
Firstly, the HPAI virus can be maintained in local domestic waterfowl and wild birds 
(Matrosovich et al., 2000; Nguyen et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2006a); secondly, the 
seropositive chicken would result from vaccination against HPAI; thirdly the virus 
could be introduced through live chickens smuggled from other endemic regions of 
Indonesia, however the local laws in  NTT prohibit the introduction of live adult 
chickens  (Dr.  Maria  Geong,  personal  communication);.  If  some  infected  live 
chickens  were  smuggled  into  NTT  from  other  endemic  areas  of  Indonesia,  they 
would pose a threat to poultry in both NTT and Timor Leste. 
To  control  HPAI,  Indonesia  has  implemented  a  vaccination  program  along  with 
other control measures. However, a low vaccine coverage has been achieved (less 
than 40%) (Sumiarto and Arifin, 2008) resulting in low haemagglutination inhibition 
(HI)  antibody  titres  (Bouma  et  al.,  2008).  This  is  primarily  as  a  result  of  the  
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difficulty in catching and vaccinating all chickens in a village (Poetri et al., 2009). 
To prevent infection from HPAI and its subsequent transmission and spread in a 
population,  the  vaccination  coverage  should  be  between  60-80%  (Sumiarto  and 
Arifin, 2008). Similarly, it has been suggested that at least 90% of birds need to be 
vaccinated to reduce the probability of an outbreak by 50% (Savill et al., 2006). Low 
coverage of vaccination could contribute to the silent spread of the virus. It is argued 
that even if a vaccine is effective in individual birds, the silent spread can occur 
because of incomplete protection at the flock level (Savill et al., 2006). In Indonesia, 
significant numbers of birds do not show an immune response to AI which may 
indicate that either the birds were not vaccinated or there was poor application of the 
vaccine (FAOAIDE, 2004). Even chickens that are properly vaccinated can shed 
AIV and infect others during the first few days following vaccination (Pfeiffer et al., 
2010). Consequently if chickens were smuggled from infected areas in Indonesia 
into Timor Leste in the first week after they had been vaccinated, infection could still 
enter the country. This is because as birds are not protected from infection until 18 
days after vaccination (Ellis et al., 2004b) and vaccines cannot completely prevent 
the replication of AIV (Marangon et al., 2008).  
In  NTT  vaccination  is  not  implemented  (Dr.  Maria  Geong,  personal 
communication).  Active  surveillance  undertaken  in  NTT  from  2004  to  2007 
indicates  an  overall  seroprevalence  of  3.7%  (95%  CI:  3.0  –  4.5%)  and  a  virus 
prevalence  of  0.46%  (95%  CI:  0.1-1.2%)  (Table  9.6).  The  most  recent  survey 
conducted in 2008, however revealed no positive results indicating a seroprevalence 
of 0% (0 – 0.4%) (Table 9.6).  
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In this study it was assumed that only apparently healthy chickens, which are not 
showing any evidence of clinical disease, were smuggled. Poultry that are either 
incubating the disease, are infected with LPAI or are asymptomatic are potential 
agents for the introduction of AI into a country or region (Algers et al., 2008). The 
role of asymptomatic but infected chickens is important for spreading the disease in 
a country, such as Indonesia, which implements vaccination (Ellis et al., 2004b). 
This was confirmed by Simmons (2006) who reported seropositive but healthy birds 
from  a  number  of  districts  in  Lombok.  Chickens  have  been  shown  to  be 
asymptomatic for six to 18 hours following experimental challenge with H5N1 (Das 
et  al.,  2008a),  however  after  this  period  the  proportion  of  chickens  displaying 
clinical  signs  is  high.  Infected  birds  will  not  display  clinical  signs  during  the 
incubation phase of the disease which is generally from one to four days (Liu et al., 
2005; Lipatov et al., 2007). A bird smuggled during this time (especially a fighting 
cock) could introduce the disease.  
It is very hard to detect smuggling activities in the border areas. This is because the 
smugglers are local people who know the area very well. Furthermore the BPU do 
not patrol the border continuously and therefore it is highly probable that unofficial 
undetected  movements  of  birds  occur.  The  probability  of  the  BPU  detecting  the 
smuggling of poultry is estimated to be low 24.6% (95% CI: 0 – 62.4%) (Table 9.4). 
This value could only be increased by increasing staffing levels in the border region. 
In contrast the probability of confiscation and submission to quarantine staff by the 
BPU are both very high (99% -Table 9.4). As quarantine staff are only located at the 
legal entry points into Timor Leste, the quarantine staff must rely upon the BPU to 
detect, confiscate and submit smuggled chickens for destruction.  
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9.4.2  Probability of entry 
After assigning all the probability values in Table 9.5 into the scenario tree (Figure 
9.1), the probability of entry of infected live chickens was calculated as 1.8% (0 – 
8.8%) based on a P(Inf) of expert opinion and 3.2% (95% CI: 1.1 - 6.3%) based on 
the AI (seroprevalence) in NTT. Given this probability and the estimated entry of 51 
smuggled  chickens  per  month,  the  probability  of  at  least  one  infected  chicken 
entering into Timor Leste is 29% based on the prevalence derived from the opinion 
of experts and 63% based on the seroprevalence of AI from surveillance conducted 
in  NTT.  This  means  that  Timor  Leste  should  already  have  had  several  infected 
poultry  enter.  However,  as  there  have  been  no  reports  of  infected  poultry  as 
confirmed by surveillance and a lack of reported disease outbreaks, it is likely that 
the prevalence in NTT is at least below 1%.  
This model indicates that if the prevalence of AI in West Timor is not zero, and 
smuggling  activities  continue,  as  outlined  by  the  results  from  the  interviews 
conducted (Table 9.4), then HPAI-infected chickens will undoubtedly enter Timor 
Leste. 
Three important factors (the number of chickens involved in each smuggling activity 
[n(CkInvolved)], the number of smugglers [n(Smugglers)], and the infection status 
of smuggled chickens (P(Inf)) affect the outcome of the model (Figure 9.3). The 
number of smugglers may be reduced by increasing the effectiveness of the BPU or 
by  improving  public  awareness  about  the  danger  of  smuggling  chickens  and  its 
potential  contribution  to  the  introduction  of  HPAI  into  Timor  Leste.  The  last 
sensitive  factor  [P(Inf)]  is  an  important  factor,  but  it  is  the  one  that  is  least 
controllable by Timor Leste. This depends upon the country/region from where the  
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smuggled chickens originate, in this case NTT. If NTT is free of HPAI and chicken 
smuggling from other endemic areas in Indonesia into NTT does not occur, then AI 
infected chicken would not enter Timor Leste. Otherwise according to the current 
scenario, at least one infected chicken would enter Timor Leste between once every 
1.6  (based  on  the  sero-surveillance  from  the  NTT)  to  3.4  months  (based  on  the 
prevalence from experts) 
9.4.3  Risk of establishment 
If chickens  are smuggled, they can either  be released with local chickens or are 
eaten.  It  is  unlikely  that  fighting  cocks  would  be  eaten,  but  would  be  used  for 
fighting  cock  competitions.  At  competitions,  fighting  cocks  can  have  potential 
contact and exposure with many other fighting cocks from other places. Similarly 
other  chickens  that  are  smuggled  into  the  country  have  a  high  likelihood  of 
contact/exposure with local poultry through being released with local chickens or by 
being sold in a local market.  
If smuggled chickens are slaughtered then it is possible that other birds are infected 
through the inappropriate disposal of slaughter-waste (Chapter Eight) (Sumiarto and 
Arifin,  2008).  Burning  or  burying  waste  is  required  to  remove  potential  contact 
between the virus and free-range local village chickens. 
In this model the probability of infected smuggled chickens infecting local chickens 
was  20.9%  (95%  CI:  1.5  –  42.3%).  This  probability  may,  in  fact,  be  higher  as 
poultry,  especially  chickens,  are  highly  susceptible  to  AI  especially  in  naïve 
populations (Martin and Cameron, 2002).   
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9.4.4  The probability of having an outbreak 
Based  on  this  scenario  tree  modelling,  the  probability  that  at  least  one  infected 
chicken causing an outbreak is
: 74% (95% CI: 9.4 – 100%) for the P(Inf) from expert 
opinion  and  75%  (95%  CI:  11  –  100%)  for  the  P(Inf)  calculated  using  the 
serosurveillance  data  from  NTT  (Table  9.8).  That  is  for  every  100  smuggled 
chickens approximately 74 to 75 would be able to cause an outbreak in Timor Leste.  
If the smuggling of chickens continues and the prevalence of AI in NTT is not zero, 
Timor Leste should already have had outbreaks of HPAI. Based on the model, it was 
estimated at least one HPAI outbreak should occur on average every 1.3 months 
(using the P(Inf) from the serosurveillance data in NTT) and every 1.4 months (using 
the P(Inf) from the expert‘ opinion). As no outbreaks have occurred it is likely that 
the prevalence in NTT is less than 1%. This is supported by the fact that there have 
been no HPAI outbreaks in Timor Leste, and no evidence of outbreaks in NTT since 
October 2004 (Dr. Maria Geong, personal communication). 
As the number of chickens smuggled and the number of smugglers influence the 
probability of having an outbreak (Figure 9.4), actions are needed to reduce them. 
The  number  of  chickens  involved  in  a  smuggling  activity  and  the  number  of 
smugglers can only be reduced by improving the detection capability of the BPU. 
However this is challenging as the smugglers are very familiar with the terrain and 
the timing of patrols by the BPU (IRIN, 2008b). Another method of reducing the 
smuggling of fighting cock is by banning cock fighting competitions, however this 
may lead to illegal fighting cock competitions. It is likely that the most important 
method is by improving education and this is likely to be successful through the 
implementation of good biosecurity practices by farmers. If farmers are encouraged  
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to  isolate  their  local  chickens  from  other  poultry/birds  and  to  quarantine  newly 
introduced poultry the risk of exposure to their birds would be reduced.  
9.4.5  The impact of risk of HPAI in Timor Leste 
If there is an outbreak of HPAI in a free country it can have a major impact on the 
export of poultry and poultry products. However this is not a significant factor in 
Timor Leste, as no poultry or poultry products are exported. However the impact on 
the domestic economy could be significant, particularly to village poultry producers 
and the consumers. Poultry are an important source of income and protein to farmers 
and  consumers  would  be  faced  with  increased  prices  for  chickens  and  eggs. 
Furthermore  the  costs  of  implementing  control  procedures  are  likely  to  be  high. 
Other impacts could include the effects on endangered wild-bird species and public 
health concerns. 
In late 2009 one commercial layer farm was established in the district of Ermera with 
the capacity to produce up to 15,000 eggs/day (TS, 2010). If HPAI is introduced it 
potentially would have a significant financial impact on this newly established farm. 
This would flow on to the community through increased costs of eggs  (and live 
birds) and decreased earnings for poultry traders. 
In the following final chapter the overall findings from this thesis will be interpreted 
and discussed.  
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CHAPTER 10:  GENERAL DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
10.1  Introduction 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) caused by Influenza A is a transboundary 
disease that has had a significant impact on the poultry industry as well as being 
potentially fatal for humans. Although it has spread to many countries in the world, 
Timor Leste has, to date, remained free from the disease (FAOAIDE, 2010b). To 
maintain the free status, it is important to identify risk factors that may be involved 
in the introduction of HPAI into Timor Leste so that suitable control and preventive 
measures can be put in place. The research described in this thesis therefore focused 
on  confirming  that  Timor  Leste  was  free  from  HPAI  and  the  identification  of 
potential risk factors that might be involved in the diseases introduction.  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the main findings of this research and focus on 
four main topics: the epidemiology of HPAI relevant to the risk of introducing the 
disease into Timor Leste; the current HPAI status of Timor Leste; risk factors that 
potentially  may  be  involved  in  the  introduction  of  HPAI  into  the  country;  and 
evaluating the risk of entry leading to an outbreak of HPAI into Timor Leste.  
10.2  Discussion 
10.2.1  AI epidemiology 
Although AIV can infect several species, from birds to mammals, (Subbarao and 
Shaw, 2000; Keawcharoen et al., 2004; Songserm et al., 2006a; Songserm et al.,  
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2006b; Leschnik et al., 2007) they mainly infect wild and domesticated birds. Wild 
waterfowl  are  important  in  the  disease  as  they  can  harbour  and  act  as  natural 
reservoirs for influenza A viruses of all known HA and NA
 subtypes (Matrosovich et 
al., 2000; Nguyen et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2006a).  
The  primary  routes  of  infection  occur  through  faecal  contamination  of  food  and 
water as well as by aerosol (Murphy et al., 1999; EFSA, 2006; Olsen et al., 2006; 
Rappole and Hubalek, 2006; Stevens et al., 2006b). As AIV can be shed in saliva, 
nasal secretions and faeces (Fouchier et al., 2003b; Rappole and Hubalek, 2006), 
there is the potential for transmission via fomites.  
Although chickens are susceptible and usually develop clinical signs (Markwell and 
Shortridge, 1982; Alexander, 2007a), asymptomatic infection can occur (Das et al., 
2008a). The common clinical signs of AI (Arzey, 2006; Bennett and Whiting, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2006a) are similar to those of ND (Belak et al., 2009) and in this study 
were  similar  to  those  reported  by  farmers  in  the  surveyed  districts  (Section 
8.3.2.14.1).  As  ND  is  endemic  in  Timor  Leste,  if  AI  was  introduced  it  may  be 
difficult to diagnose it on the presence of clinical signs alone (Wang et al., 2008b). 
To  overcome  this  problem,  the  vaccination  coverage  against  ND  should  be 
increased,  as  currently  this  is  low  (Section  8.3.2.14.5)  despite  the  fact  that 
vaccination is provided freely by the government. 
To monitor or detect AI, several diagnostic methods are used (see Section 2.2.10). 
However  Timor  Leste  currently  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  diagnose  HPAI, 
although in the event of a suspected outbreak samples can be sent to Australia and 
recently, with the support of United States Agency for International Development  
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(USAID), AI rapid tests (Anigen® AIV Ag) have been acquired to screen AI in local 
poultry. 
There are three main control measures that can be adopted to control and prevent the 
spread of AI if the disease were introduced. Firstly the opportunities for interspecies 
transmission needs to be reduced; secondly there needs to be reduced direct and 
indirect contact between non- infected poultry and infected poultry, their products or 
materials involved in poultry production; and thirdly, restrictions on the movement 
of poultry need to be implemented.  
Poultry systems that allow different poultry species to mix, in particular waterfowl 
and chickens, (Brown, 2000; Matrosovich et al., 2000; Bennett and Whiting, 2006; 
Koch et al., 2009) can facilitate disease transmission. Faecal contamination of water 
supplies  is  considered  a  very  efficient  way  for  waterfowl  to  transmit  the  AIV 
(Markwell  and  Shortridge,  1982).  However  this  is  impractical  in  developing 
countries such as Timor Leste, where most poultry (chickens and ducks) are free 
range (Section 8.3.2.5). The practice of keeping free range poultry is an important 
risk factor for AI, because poultry can be in contact with wild birds.  
In Timor Leste, the most common wild bird observed by households to be in close 
contact with domestic birds were zebra finches (T. guttata) and tree sparrows (P. 
montanus)  (Section  8.3.2.12).  If  these  birds  were  infected  with  AI,  they  could 
potentially facilitate the transmission of AI because they mix freely with other wild 
and domestic birds (Boon et al., 2007). 
Restriction of the movement of live poultry, both within and between countries is an 
important  control  measure  for  minimising  the  transmission  of  AI.  Restriction  of  
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movement within countries is difficult to enforce in most developing countries where 
chickens and ducks roam freely and mix with wild birds or share water sources with 
them  (WHO,  2005).  Movement  between  countries  can  be  enforced  by  banning 
importation of poultry from infected countries. However this will not prevent the 
illegal smuggling of chickens from infected countries. In Timor Leste some people 
do smuggle fighting cocks from Indonesia (Section 8.3.2.4) and this practice may 
facilitate the introduction of AI into Timor Leste. 
10.2.2  HPAI status in Timor Leste 
The status of HPAI freedom in Timor Leste was confirmed in this study based on 
two sources of data. Firstly, on the analysis of existing animal health survey data 
(2004-2006) and secondly, on targeted surveillance conducted in 2009. 
No evidence of HPAI was found in Timor Leste in these surveys (particularly 2005 
to 2006 and 2009). According to the OIE, a country can be considered as a free 
country when it has been shown that HPAI has not been present for at least the 
preceding three  years (OIE, 2003c)  and these  results  support the hypothesis  that 
Timor Leste is free of HPAI. 
However two samples from June 2004 were HPAI positive. These positive results, 
were questionable because of: the low proportion of HPAI (H5/H7) test positive 
sera, which could potentially result from using a test without a 100% specificity, or 
because of serological cross-reactions with another subtype (NAQS, 2004; Munoz-
Zanzi et al., 2006); there was no evidence of clinical disease in poultry which would 
be expected if the virus was introduced into a naïve poultry population (Martin and 
Cameron, 2002); and the titres could indicate past exposure to HPAI. Analysis of  
219 
 
other time periods (2005 to 2006) for existing data revealed that Timor Leste was 
free from disease at a MEP of 10% with a confidence level greater than 98% (Table 
5.6). 
Due to the questionable results from the historical data, a targeted surveillance study 
(Chapter  Seven)  was  conducted.  The  results  of  this  targeted  surveillance  further 
confirmed and strengthened the conclusion that Timor Leste was free from HPAI at 
the  time  of  study.  Although  targeted  surveillance  cannot  provide  with  absolute 
certainty  the  absence  of  infection  (Zepeda  et  al.,  2001),  it  provides  adequate 
evidence that HPAI, if present, is less than the minimum expected/design prevalence 
(OIE, 2006c), which was set at 2%. The MEP for targeted surveillance was set lower 
(2%) than the analysis of the existing data (10%). This lower MEP provides stronger 
evidence that disease is not present (Martin and Cameron, 2002) and allows for a 
larger sample size which consequently increases the chance of disease detection, if 
present (Cannon, 2002). 
By using information on poultry population (Chapter Four), test Se and Sp (Chapter 
Five), a MEP of 2%, sample size and laboratory results, it was concluded that the 
country was free from HPAI at a MEP of 2% at a 99.52% confidence level. 
10.2.3  Risk factors involved in HPAI introduction 
While the evidence suggested that HPAI is not present in Timor Leste, the country is 
at risk of having an outbreak. Maintaining a country free from HPAI relies upon 
assessing potential risk factors for disease and implementing a program to mitigate 
against these risks. The risk factors identified include: the unofficial trading of live 
poultry (smuggling live poultry especially fighting cocks) and eggs across the Timor  
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Leste/Indonesian border; the presence of significant numbers of free range chickens 
which have the potential to be exposed to wild birds; the failure of farmers to report 
poultry disease and the  poor vaccination coverage against ND which has similar 
clinical signs to AI (Chapters Six and Eight). Of these risk factors, smuggling live 
chickens from Indonesia is likely to constitute the greatest single risk for introducing 
HPAI into Timor Leste. This was confirmed by both expert opinion (Chapter Six) 
and  a  questionnaire  survey  administered  to  farmers  (Chapter  Eight).  Households 
which purchase chickens from unofficial markets pose a significant risk to Timor 
Leste‘s freedom from HPAI.  
Others have reported that smuggling of other birds (such as falcons and eagles) is 
one of the most important factors in the spread of AI (Van Borm et al., 2005; Check, 
2006). Smuggling of birds other than poultry,  however has  not  been reported in 
Timor Leste, but the smuggling of chickens, especially fighting cocks, is a major 
concern to the Timor Leste‘s Government (IRIN, 2008b). The smuggling of poultry 
carcasses can also serve as an important pathway for the introduction of the disease 
into a country (Tumpey et al., 2002; Mase et al., 2005), however this has also not 
been reported in Timor Leste. 
The smuggling of fighting cocks can be minimised by increased public awareness 
about the dangers of introducing HPAI from Indonesia (FAOAIDE, 2010a) and by 
increasing the number of patrols by the BPU.  
The  risk  of  contact  with  free  range  chickens  is  difficult  to  minimise  due  to  the 
traditional farming practices adopted. However, failure to report outbreaks of poultry 
disease and a low coverage of ND vaccination (Chapter Eight) can be overcome by  
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developing  suitable  extension  and  education  material  and  an  appropriate  ND 
vaccination calendar. 
10.2.4  Category of risk areas in Timor Leste 
This study found that the risk of an outbreak of HPAI was highest in all districts in 
the West region (Covalima, Bobonaro and Oecusse) that borders Indonesia, and in 
the capital of Timor Leste, Dili (Table 6.7), due to the marketing of commodities, 
including live poultry, from all districts. This signifies that if an AI outbreak was to 
occur it would likely to occur in these districts. Surveillance for AI must therefore be 
targeted  to  these  districts  in  order  to  enhance  the  early  detection  of  any  disease 
incursion. 
10.2.5  Risk of entry into Timor Leste 
The probability of HPAI entry into Timor Leste was found to be between 1.8 and 
3.2% (Section 9.3.3.5). Given this probability of entry and the number of smuggled 
birds of 51 (95% CI: 9.5 to 181.95)/month, the probability of at least one infected 
chicken entering Timor Leste was 29 to 63% which equates to an average of 15 to 32 
infected  chickens  from  every  51  chickens  smuggled  per  month.  This  number  is 
surprisingly high and if true, outbreaks should have already occurred in Timor Leste. 
As other data indicates to the contrary it is likely that the prevalence in NTT is low 
and certainly below 1% and probably approaching 0%. 
The sensitivity analysis of the model indicated that the number of chickens smuggled 
per  smuggler  [n(CkInvolved)],  the  number  of  smugglers  [n(smugglers)]  and  the 
probability of infection in  smuggled chickens  [P(Inf)] influenced the outcome of 
having an HPAI outbreak (Figure 9.4). Of these, public awareness could help reduce  
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the former two along with increased BPU staffing and facilities. In contrast little can 
be done by Timor Leste to reduce the probability of infection in smuggled chickens, 
as this is dependent upon the prevalence of AI in NTT. 
10.2.6  HPAI prevention in Timor Leste 
Based on the risk factors identified in this study, there are four main things that can 
be done to prevent HPAI entering Timor Leste: firstly, increased public awareness 
about the dangers of introducing HPAI via smuggled live birds or eggs; secondly 
increase detection of smugglers in the border areas; thirdly, banning of fighting cock 
competitions; and fourthly increasing ND vaccination coverage. 
It  is  known  that  the  smuggled  roosters  (Figure  8.2)  are  used  for  cock  fighting 
competitions. The roosters are smuggled into the country, because people cannot buy 
them from within the country. It is probably better if the government of Timor Leste 
through MAF, purchase the type of roosters that are commonly smuggled in and 
breed them and make them available for sale to the public.  
10.3  Conclusions 
This study has shown that Timor Leste is highly likely to be free from HPAI and has 
identified risk factors that might be involved in the potential introduction of HPAI 
into the country.  
The risk modelling in this study indicates that Timor Leste will most likely have an 
outbreak of HPAI if live chicken smuggling and BPU detection are maintained at the 
present level and if the prevalence of HPAI in NTT is not zero. It is recommended 
that control and preventive measures are taken to mitigate against these factors. In 
particular the role of the BPU in detecting chicken smugglers needs to be enhanced  
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and the level of public awareness about the dangers of smuggling chickens needs to 
be increased and improved. 
10.4  Limitations of the study and the need for further studies 
The finding of this study indicated that it is likely that NTT, particularly the NTT 
districts that border Timor Leste, is also free from HPAI. To follow up this finding, a 
joint  study  between  Timor  Leste  and  NTT  involving  targeted  surveillance  is 
required.  
A major problem associated with modelling of the likelihood of entry of HPAI via 
the  smuggled  chickens  is  that  the  number  of  chickens  involved,  the  number  of 
smugglers,  and  the  probability  of  detection,  confiscation  and  submission  are 
uncertain.  Modelling  the  risk  of  entry  in  this  study  was  based  mostly  on  values 
obtained from experts. It is possible that these estimates were incorrect and further 
information should be collected to confirm the estimates. The number of experts, 
especially  from  the  BPU  was  limited.  Consequently  in  the  future,  if  more  BPU 
members can be interviewed, the biases associated with this study could be reduced.  
This research was based on targeted surveillance, which is suitable for rare diseases 
but not for common or endemic diseases. Consequently this survey design could also 
be used for other rare or exotic diseases in Timor Leste including Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) and Rabies.  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for the poultry industry 
Instructions: 
Please tick (√) /circle the appropriate options (a, b, c etc and/or fill in the necessary 
information as required 
 
A. Interviewer details 
Interviewer‘s Name  : 
Telephone/mobile  : 
Email          : 
 
B. Respondents details 
Date of interview  : 
Name/owner  : 
District /Sub district  :  
Village/Suco  : 
GPS  : 
Telephone  : 
Occupation  : 
Highest education  : 
 
Please select or fill in appropriate answers! 
1. Did your hen lay eggs last year? a. Yes   b. No 
 
2. If yes to question 1, how many eggs did one hen lay?......................... 
 
3. How many eggs hatched?................How many chicks survived?.............. 
 
4. If all your chicks did not survive, what caused the losses?  
a.  Disease  
b.  Predators 
c.  Bad weather,  
d.  Other……………….(specify) 
 
5. How often are chickens slaughtered for consumption? 
a.  weekly  
b.  monthly  
c.  other……………….(specify) 
 
6. Do you have ducks? a. Yes   b. No 
 
7. Type of ducks: a. Muscovy b. Laying ducks 
 
8. Did your ducks lay eggs last year? a. Yes   b. No 
 
9. If yes to question 8, how many eggs did one duck lay?......................... 
a.  Muscovy………………………eggs  
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b.  Laying ducks…………………eggs 
10. How many egg hatched?............How many survived?......................... 
a.  i). Muscovy……………eggs, survive…………..ducklings 
b.  ii). Laying ducks……….eggs, survive………… ducklings 
 
11. If all your ducklings did not survive, what caused the losses?  
a.  Disease  
b.  Predators 
c.  Bad weather 
 
12. How often are ducks slaughtered for consumption? 
a.  Weekly  
b.  Monthly  
c.  Other……………….(specify) 
 
13. Did you sell poultry eggs last year? a. Yes    b. No 
 
14. If you sold eggs last year, how many did you sell, please complete the table. 
Species  Number of eggs sold  Price /per eggs 
Village chicken     
Duck/Muscovy     
Layers     
Other, specify……..     
 
15. Did you lose any eggs last year? a. Yes   b. No 
 
16. If you lost eggs, what caused the losses? 
a.  Broken  
b.  Eaten by predator  
c.  Stolen   
d.  Other………..(specify) 
 
17. How often did you consume eggs from your own poultry?.....and  
  how many…… 
 
18. What kind of food do you feed to your chickens and ducks?  
a.  Corn   
b.  Rice 
c.  Kitchen left overs 
d.  No feed given just rely on scavenging  
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for poultry marketing 
Respondent‘s details  
Date of interview  : 
Name/owner  : 
District /Sub district  :  
Village/Suco  : 
GPS  : 
Telephone  : 
 
Please answer by selecting the options (A, B, C etc), specify and fill in the gaps 
according to information required. 
 
1. What kind of poultry are you selling? 
Species  Total number 
Village chickens  ............................. 
Muscovy ducks  ........................... 
Ducks  ............................. 
Other (specify species name and total 
number……………….. 
…………………… 
 
2. Do you sell your own chicken? A. yes  B. No 
 
3. If the answer is ―No‖ to question 2, where did you buy chickens from? 
  A. Local market in this district (market name)…………………………….. 
  B. Farmers in villages in this district (village name)……………….. 
  C. Distributor in this district 
  D. Market in other districts (specify market name)………………………… 
  E. Buy them from farmers in villages in other districts (name of villages)… 
  F. Distributors in other district (district name)……………………………. 
 
4. How often do you sell poultry in this market & how many? 
Frequency of selling   #available for selling  Total sold 
A. Every day     
B. Every week     
C. Every month     
D. Other, specify…………     
 
5. What is the lowest and highest price of your poultry? 
Species  Lowest price ($)  Highest price ($) 
Village chickens  .............................  .................... 
Muscovy ducks  ...........................  ....................... 
Ducks (layer)  .................................  ..........................  
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire for egg marketing 
Interviewer     : 
Telephone      : 
Respondent‘s details  
Date of interview  : 
Name/owner  : 
District /Sub district  :  
Village/Suco  : 
GPS  : 
Telephone  : 
 
Please answer by selecting the options (A, B, C etc), specify and fill in the gaps 
according to information required. 
 
1. What kind of poultry eggs are you selling? 
Species  Total number 
Village chickens  ............................. 
Muscovy ducks  ........................... 
Ducks (layer)  ............................. 
Other (specify species name and total 
number……………….. 
…………………… 
 
2. Do you sell eggs from your own poultry? A. Yes    B. No 
 
3. If the answer is ―No‖ to question 2, where did you buy eggs from? 
  A. Local market in this district (market name)…………………………….. 
  B. Farmers in villages in this district (villages‘ name)……………….. 
  C. Distributor in this district 
  D. Market in other districts (specify market name)………………………… 
  E. Buy them from farmers in villages in other districts (name of village)……… 
  F. Distributors in other district (district name)……………………………. 
 
4. How often do you sell poultry eggs in this market & how many? 
Frequency of selling   Number for selling  Total sold 
A. Every day     
B. Every week     
C. Every month     
D. Other, specify……………….     
 
5. What is the lowest and highest price of your poultry eggs? 
Species  Lowest price ($)  Highest price ($) 
Village chickens  .............................  .................... 
Muscovy ducks  ...........................  ....................... 
Ducks (layer)  .................................  .......................... 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire for estimation of the risk of 
introducing HPAI into Timor Leste: Expert opinion 
Qualitative estimation of the risk of introducing HPAI into Timor Leste for 
Livestock, Veterinary, Quarantine, AQIS and border control officers 
Perspectives 
Respondent’s details  
Name  : 
Position  : 
Address  : 
Phone    : 
Mobile  : 
E-mail  : 
Please note that the time period of your risk estimation is from now (2008) to 
the next five years. 
 
1 
In this first section, we would like to know your opinion regarding the risk of an outbreak of HPAI in 
the regions and districts of Timor Leste. 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement:  
 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
1  What  is  the  probability  of  the  west  Region  and  each  of  its 
districts having an outbreak of HPAI?  
Negligible…..Very 
high 
    0  1  2  3  4  5 
  A. Region west             
  B. Individual districts in west region  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  Covalima             
  b.  Bobonaro             
  c.  Liquiça              
  d.  Ermera             
  e. Ambeno             
2  What is the probability of the Central Region and each of its 
districts having an outbreak of HPAI? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  A. Central region             
  B. Individual districts in central region  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  Aileu             
  b.  Same             
  c.  Ainaro             
  d.    Dili             
3  What  is  the  probability  of  the  East  Region  and  each  of  its 
districts having an outbreak of HPAI? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  A. East Region             
  B. Individual districts in East Region  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  Manatuto             
  b.  Baucau              
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  c.  Viqueque             
  d.  Lospalos             
 
2 
In  this  second  section,  we  would  like  to  know  your  opinion  regarding  the  likelihood  of  HPAI 
infection, survival and establishment via various pathways 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statements:  
 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
1  What  is  the  likelihood  of  the  following  commodities  being 
infected  or  contaminated  with  HPAI  virus  before  coming  to 
Timor Leste? 
Negligible…..Very 
high 
a  HPAI Infection  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Legal frozen chicken imported from Brazil             
  2.  Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia             
  3.  Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia             
  4.  Contaminated local water sources             
  5.  Migratory  wild  birds  transmitting  infection  to  domestic 
poultry 
           
  6.  Smuggled eggs from Indonesia             
  7.  Legal Importation of eggs from Malaysia             
  8.  Mutation (LPAI Mutating to HPAI)                
b  What is the probability of HPAI virus surviving in the  following 
pathways? 
           
  HPAI virus survival  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Legal frozen chicken imported from Brazil             
  2.  Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia             
  3.  Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia             
  4.  Contaminated local water sources             
  5.  Migratory  wild  birds  transmitting  infection  to  domestic 
poultry 
           
  6.  Smuggled eggs from Indonesia             
  7.  Legal Importation of eggs from Malaysia             
c  What is the probability that if the HPAI virus survives in the above 
commodities (question 2b) escaping and establishing infection in the 
local birds and poultry? 
           
  HPAI surviving in legal frozen chicken importation from Brazil & 
causing infection of……… 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens              
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI  surviving  in  smuggled  live  chickens  from  Indonesia  and 
causing infection of……….. 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens              
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI  surviving  in  fomites  e.g.  cage,  egg  trays  carried  from 
Indonesia and causing infection of…………….. 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens             
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks               
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  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI surviving in contaminated local drinking water sources and 
causing infection of………… 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens             
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI surviving in migratory wild birds and transferring to domestic 
poultry and cause infection in 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens             
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI surviving in smuggled eggs from Indonesia to cause infection 
in 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens              
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
  HPAI surviving in eggs imported from Malaysia to cause infection 
to…………… 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Village chickens             
  2.  Ducks             
  3.  Muscovy ducks              
  4.  Local wild birds             
 
3 
In this third section, we would like to know your opinion regarding the possible risk of each route of 
HPAI introduction from overseas into Timor Leste and each region in Timor Leste 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement:  
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
1  Other  than  risk  pathways  mentioned  in  section  2  what  is  the 
probability of each of the following route of HPAI introduction 
from  overseas  being  responsible  for  causing  an  outbreak  of 
HPAI? 
Negligible…..Very 
high 
  Route of introduction  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Natural spread via air              
  2.  Legal live poultry importation             
  3.  Tourist/immigrant vehicles                 
  4.  Illegal importation of frozen chickens                 
  5.  Legal importation of commercial poultry feed               
  6.  Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed             
  7.  Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs             
  8.  Returning livestock trucks from West Timor              
  9.  Swill from aircrafts                   
  10.  Swill from boats                     
  11.  Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)              
  12.  Others (please specify)                 
  a.  ……………………               
  b.  ……………………             
  c.  ……………………             
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A 
If your answer for the probability of the West Region having a primary 
outbreak of HPAI in section one was negligible (0) please do not answer 
this question and go to Part B. 
 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement: 
 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
1  What  is  the  probability  of  each  of  the  following  routes  being 
responsible for causing an outbreak of HPAI in Region West? 
Negligible…..Very 
high 
  Region west  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Legal frozen chickens imported from Brazil             
  2.  Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia             
  3.  Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia             
  4.  Contaminated local water sources             
  5.  Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry             
  6.  Smuggled eggs from Indonesia             
  7.  Legal Importation of eggs from Malaysia             
  8.  Mutation (LPAI Mutate to HPAI)                
  9.  Natural spread via air             
  10.  Legal importation of live poultry             
  11.  Tourist/immigrant vehicles             
  12.  Illegal importation of frozen chickens                 
  13.  Legal importation of commercial poultry feed               
  14.  Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed             
  15.  Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs             
  16.  Returning livestock trucks from West Timor              
  17.  Swill from aircrafts                   
  18.  Swill from boats                     
  19.  Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)               
  20.  Others (please specify)                 
  a.  ………………………               
  b.  ………………………             
  c.  ………………………..             
 
B 
If  your  answer  for  the  probability  of  Central  Region  having  a  primary 
outbreak of HPAI in section one was negligible (0) please do not answer 
this question and go to Part C. 
 
Please answer each of the following by ticking the box that most appropriately represent your opinion 
to the following statement: 
 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
1  What  is  the  probability  of  each  of  the  following  routes  being 
responsible  for  causing  an  outbreak  of  HPAI  in  the  Central 
Region? 
Negligible-Very high 
  Region Central  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Legal frozen chickens imported from Brazil             
  2.  Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia             
  3.  Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia              
232 
 
  4.  Contaminated local water sources             
  5.  Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry             
  6.  Smuggled eggs from Indonesia             
  7.  Legal Importation of eggs from Malaysia             
  8.  Mutation (LPAI Mutate to HPAI)                
  9.  Natural spread via air             
  10.  Legal importation of live poultry             
  11.  Tourist/immigrant vehicles             
  12.  Illegal importation of frozen chickens                 
  13.  Legal importation of commercial poultry feed               
  14.  Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed             
  15.  Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs             
  16.  Returning livestock trucks from West Timor              
  17.  Swill from aircrafts                   
  18.  Swill from boats                     
  19.  Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)               
  20.  Others (please specify)                 
  a.  ………………………                 
  b.  ………………………             
  c.  ………………………..             
               
 
C 
If  your  answer  for  the  probability  of  the  East Region having a primary 
outbreak of HPAI in section one was negligible (0) please do not answer 
this question and go to page 7. 
Please answer each of the following by ticking the box that most appropriately represent your opinion 
to the following statement: 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
  What  is  the  probability  of  each  of  the  following  routes  being 
responsible for causing a primary outbreak of HPAI in the East 
Region? 
Negligible…..Very 
high 
  Region East  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  1.  Legal frozen chickens imported from Brazil             
  2.  Smuggled live chickens from Indonesia             
  3.  Fomites e.g. cages, egg trays carried from Indonesia             
  4.  Contaminated local water sources             
  5.  Migratory wild birds transmitting infection to poultry             
  6.  Smuggled eggs from Indonesia             
  7.  Legal Importation of eggs from Malaysia             
  8.  Mutation (LPAI Mutate to HPAI)                
  9.  Natural spread via air             
  10.  Legal importation of live poultry             
  11.  Tourist/immigrant vehicles             
  12.  Illegal importation of frozen chickens                 
  13.  Legal importation of commercial poultry feed               
  14.  Illegal importation of commercial poultry feed             
  15.  Tourist/immigrant foodstuffs             
  16.  Returning livestock trucks from West Timor              
  17.  Swill from aircrafts                   
  18.  Swill from boats                     
  19.  Other fomites (boots, clothes, soil, etc.)               
  20.  Others (please specify)                 
  a.  ………………………………                 
  b.  ………………………..……              
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4 
In this section we would like to know what is the likelihood of villages, and 
poultry in each region in Timor Leste getting infected by HPAI 
 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement: 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
A  What  is  the  likelihood  of  a  village/poultry  species  in 
……. Region getting infected by HPAI? 
Negligible…Very 
high 
  Villages in………….  0  1  2  3  4  5 
   a. West Region             
   b. Central Region             
   c. East Region             
  Poultry in………….    0  1  2  3  4  5 
   a. West Region             
   b. Central Region             
   c. East Region             
  What  do  you  think  the  likelihood  of  chickens  from  a 
household becoming infected, if AI is introduced into a 
village in Timor Leste? 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
               
 
5 
In  this  section  we  would  like  to  know  what  is  the  likelihood  of  your 
involvement as government or private veterinarians or District Livestock 
Officers  (DLOs)  response  to  the  report  from  farmers  about  the  HPAI 
outbreak ? 
Note: This section (section 5) is for MAF staff only, please go to section 6. 
 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement: 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
 
Note: 4A Just for veterinarians and 4B for DLOs to answer 
 
A  What is the likelihood of you as a vet/DLO responding 
to a report from farmers about sick or dead chickens 
by ……..? 
Negligible…Very 
high 
  Veterinarians respond by…………   0  1  2  3  4  5 
  Collecting samples                   
  Doing a rapid test                 
  Sending  positive  samples  (on  rapid  test)  to  an 
Animal  Health  Laboratory  (e.g  AAHL  Geelong)
   
           
B  What is the likelihood of you as a DLO responding to a 
report  from  farmers  about  sick  or  dead  chickens?
            
234 
 
   
  Collecting samples                   
  Doing a rapid test                 
  Sending  positive  samples  (on  rapid  test)  to 
Livestock Central 
           
 
6 
In this section we would like to know your opinion regarding the fate of live chickens that 
have been smuggled into Timor Leste via the Border of Indonesia 
 
Please  answer  each  of  the  following  by  ticking  the  box  that  most  appropriately  represents  your 
opinion to the following statement: 
Negligible (0) ;  Very low (1);  Low (2);  Moderate (3);  High (4);  Very high (5) 
A  What is the likelihood that if …….. are smuggled into Timor Leste 
via the border with Indonesia they will be ……. 
Negligible…Very 
high 
  Live chickens  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  released with other village chickens             
  b.  sold in the market             
  c.  kept for cock fighting             
  d.  consumed             
  Eggs  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  sold in the market             
  b.  consumed              
  c.  ………….             
  Frozen chickens  0  1  2  3  4  5 
  a.  sold in the market             
  b.  consumed              
  c.  ………………              
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire for targeted surveillance to 
demonstrate freedom from disease 
Risk assessment survey in Timor Leste 
 
Date of interview: .................... Interviewer: ....................................... 
 
Who is the family head or the main decision-maker on keeping, buying and selling 
poultry/birds? 
Can I interview the person? 
 
1.  Respondent (family head or main decision-maker) 
a.  Name: ............................................................................................... 
b.  Age: ................................................................................................. 
c.  Gender:   M [ ]    F [ ]   
d.  What is your main occupation?……………………………………….. 
e.  What is your highest education level?  
i.  No education       [ ];   
ii.  Primary school      [ ];   
iii.  Secondary school      [ ];  
iv.  High school         [ ];   
v.  Technical college     [ ];   
vi.  University        [ ] 
vii.  District/ village/ household no. .................................. 
viii.  GPS coordinates (save record)……………………… 
ix.  How many people are there in your household? 
    Male................Female.............. 
 
I.  General Information.  
Firstly, I would like to ask some questions about animals in your household. 
2.  Number of animals in your household. 
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3. How many head of poultry do you own now?  
A. Please complete the following table 
 
Species  Total # heads 
Species  Chicks  (<3 
months) 
Cockerels* 
(young  males 
3-12 months) 
Pullets*(young 
hens 3-12 months) 
Cocks 
(>12 
months) 
Hens 
(>12 
months) 
Village 
chickens 
         
Ducks           
Muscovies           
Other -specify           
*Pullets and cockerels: are the age of male and female chickens above 3 months old up to just before laying eggs or before able to breed or 
mating. 
 
B. From the number of mature female poultry in the above table, how many of 
them are currently laying eggs? 
  a. Village chicken:…………   
  b. Ducks:………………….. 
  c. Muscovy:………………. 
 
4.  Why do you keep poultry/birds? (tick all that are applicable) 
a. For eating           [ ];   
b. For selling birds         [ ];   
c. For selling eggs        [ ];   
d. For selling chicks/ducklings    [ ];   
e. For offerings         [ ];   
f. Keep for fighting cocks       [ ];   
g. Keep as pets         [ ];  
h. Other reasons: please explain:………………………….. 
 
II  Housing. 
Now, may I see where you keep your poultry? 
5. Interviewer: please tick where poultry/birds are kept. 
 
 
 
 
Type of animal  Sex  Total #.heads 
i.Female  ii.Male 
a  Village chickens       
b  Fighting cocks   -     
c  Ducks (layer)       
d  Ducks (Muscovy)       
e  Doves       
f  Pet birds       
g  Dogs       
h  Cats       
i  Pigs       
j  Cattle       
k  Horses       
l  Goats       
m  Buffaloes       
n  Other, specify)…………..        
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Chicken  
(Village) 
Ducks 
 (Layer) 
Ducks 
(Muscovy) 
Other (e.g fighting 
cocks):___ 
Free roam  [ ]  Free roam   [ ]  Free roam [ ]  Free roam [ ] 
Cages        [ ]  Cages        [ ]  Cages        [ ]  Cages        [ ] 
Shed         [ ]  Shed          [ ]  Shed          [ ]  Shed          [ ] 
Paddy field [ ]   Paddy field [ ]   Paddy field [ ]   Paddy field [ ]  
Paddy  field  in  day 
but cage at night [ ] 
Paddy field in day but 
cage at night [ ] 
Paddy field in 
day  but  cage 
at night [ ] 
Paddy  field  in  day 
but cage at night [ ] 
Other:  Other:  Other:  Other: 
       
III  Husbandry practice. 
Now,  I  would  like  to  ask  some  questions  about  how  you  take  care  of  your 
poultry and your crops. 
6.  Feeding practice. 
  (A) What do you feed your chickens? (Tick all that are applicable) 
a.  Premixed commercial feed      [ ]  
b.  Rice and kitchen leftovers      [ ] 
c.  Graze paddy fields        [ ]  
d.  Let them find own feed       [ ] 
e.  Other: please specify: …………………… 
 
(B) If you keep ducks (Muscovy or layers), what do you feed your ducks? 
(tick all that are applicable) 
  a. Premixed commercial feed      [ ]  
  b. Rice and kitchen leftovers       [ ] 
  c. Graze paddy fields        [ ]  
  d. Let them find own feed       [ ] 
  e. Other: please specify: …………………… 
 
   (C) If you graze ducks, please describe  
a.  How often (e.g. daily) do you graze ducks? ………………… 
b.  When (e.g. whole year or certain months) do you graze ducks? …… 
c.  Can you name the village(s) where you graze ducks: ……………… 
d.  Do ducks from other households or villages usually graze in the same 
paddy area?  
i.  Most of the time  [ ]  
ii.  Sometimes    [ ]  
iii.  Never      [ ]  
e.  How do you bring your ducks to the paddy?  
i.  Walk my ducks          [ ];   
ii.  Transport my ducks in a vehicle     [ ]  
iii.  Ducks wandering by themselves      [ ] 
 
6.  Water. What is the source of drinking water for your poultry? 
a.  Pond or lake    [ ] 
b.  River water    [ ] 
c.  Own well    [ ] 
d.  Community well  [ ] 
e.  Collected rain water  [ ] 
f.  Piped or tap water  [ ]  
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g.  Other source: please specify: …………………… 
 
7.  Agriculture. 
  (A) Do you grow crops (e.g. rice, maize)? Yes [ ];    No [ ]  
  If yes, please indicate the type of crops you grow:………………………… 
 
  (B) When (month) is the following season in your district? 
i. Planting these crops……………………………………………… 
ii. Harvesting these crops………………………………………… 
 
IV  Poultry activities. 
Now, I would like to ask some questions about selling or buying poultry. 
8.  Selling, offering or giving poultry/birds. 
  (A) How often do you sell your poultry/birds?  
a.  Never, I only keep them for our own eating      [ ] 
b.  Every (please specify): …….. days         [ ] 
c.  Every (please specify): ………weeks        [ ] 
d.  Every (please specify): ………months      [ ] 
e.  Others (please specify):………………………….  
 
  (B) How often do you offer your poultry/birds? 
a.  Never, I only keep them for our own eating      [ ] 
b.  Every (please specify): ………days        [ ] 
c.  Every (please specify): ………weeks        [ ] 
d.  Every (please specify): ………months      [ ] 
e.  Other (please specify):…………………………. 
 
  (C) How often do you give away your poultry/birds? 
a.  Never, I only keep them for our own eating      [ ] 
b.  Every (please specify): ………days        [ ] 
c.  Every (please specify): ………weeks        [ ] 
d.  Every (please specify): ………months      [ ] 
e.  Other (please specify):…………………………. 
 
(D) Where do you sell, offer or give away your poultry/birds? (tick all that 
are applicable) 
a.  Weekly market      [ ] Please specify where: …… 
b.  Permanent market      [ ] Please specify where: …… 
c.  Poultry trader        [ ] 
d.  Household in same village    [ ] 
e.  Household in other villages    [ ] 
f.  Other: please specify......................................................................... 
 
  (E) Who takes the poultry/birds to these places? ………………………… 
  (F) If these birds are unsold, do you bring the birds back?  
    Yes [ ];  No [ ] 
  (G) At what age do you sell, offer or give away your poultry/birds?  
  Chickens 
(Village) 
Ducks 
(Layer) 
Ducks 
(Muscovy) 
Fighting 
cocks 
Sell  Age:  Age:  Age:   Age:   
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  Chickens 
(Village) 
Ducks 
(Layer) 
Ducks 
(Muscovy) 
Fighting 
cocks 
Offer (traditional 
offer) 
       
Give away         
 
(H)  Do  you  sell,  offer  or  give  away  your  poultry  during  festivals  or 
religious ceremonies? 
a.  Sell             Yes [ ];No [ ] 
b.  Offer (traditional ceremony)      Yes [ ];No [ ] 
c.  Give away          Yes [ ];No [ ] 
 
 (I) If yes, what are these (major) festivals and when are they observed?  
a.  Sell at………………………..…………………. 
b.  Offer at………………………………………… 
c.  Give away at…………………………………… 
 
9. How many poultry did you sell last year?   
Species  Total # heads  Average 
Price/head 
(USD) 
Chicks 
(<3 
months) 
Cockerels 
(young 
males  3-12 
months) 
Pullets 
(young 
hens 3 to 
12 
months) 
Cocks 
>12 
months) 
Hens 
>12 
months 
Village chickens             
Ducks             
Muscovy             
Fighting cocks             
Other specify…..             
 
10.  Poultry/bird market. 
a. Please name the sub district or village where the nearest market is located 
b. Approximately how far away is the market from your household:….km 
c. Do  you  have  family,  neighbours,  relatives  or  friends  who  work  in any 
poultry/bird markets? 
i. Yes, my family members     [ ]   
ii. Yes, my neighbours       [ ]   
iii. Yes, my relatives who visit me    [ ]   
iv. Yes, my friends who visit me    [ ]   
v. No, none of the above       [ ]  
 
11.  Buying poultry/birds. 
  (A) Where do you usually buy new chickens, ducks or cock fighting cocks?  
Chickens (Native)  Ducks (layer and 
Muscovy) 
Fighting cocks 
Breed myself [ ]  Breed myself [ ]  Breed myself [ ] 
Market [  ] where:_____  Market [ ] where:______  Market [ ] where:__ 
Wholesaler/ dealer [ ]  Wholesaler [ ]  Wholesaler [ ] 
House in same village [ ]  House in same village [ ]   House in same village [ ] 
House in another village [ ]  House in another village [ ]  House in another village [ ] 
Other:……………  Other:………….  Other:______ 
   
  (B) How often do you buy new poultry/birds?   
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a.  Never               [ ] 
b.  Every (please specify): ………days      [ ] 
c.  Every (please specify): ………weeks        [ ] 
d.  Every (please specify): ………months    [ ] 
e.  Other (please specify)::………………………..   
  (C) At what age do you usually buy new poultry/birds? 
Chickens 
(Native) 
Ducks(Layer)  Ducks (Muscovy)  Other 
birds:__ 
Age:   days  Age:   days  Age:    days  Age:    days 
   (D) How do you make sure these new poultry/birds are free of disease? 
a.  I know the seller and trust him/her    [ ] 
b.  I check the birds are healthy      [ ] 
c.  I buy from safe places        [ ] 
d.  My concern is only the price but not disease [ ]  
e.  Other: please specify:………………………………… 
12.  Poultry  replacement  (what  do  you  do  when  you  buy  new  chickens  or 
ducks). 
  (A) Are all new birds kept separate from the rest of your birds upon 
                arrival?  
a.  Never separate (I put new birds with the rest of my birds)  [ ]  
b.  Rarely separate              [ ]  
c.  Sometimes separate            [ ] 
d.  Always separate               [ ]  
(B) If you separate the new birds, for how long do you keep the  new 
birds separate from the rest of your birds? 
a.  Separate all the time in household  [ ] 
b.  Separate for first ……………. days 
13.  Eggs. 
  (A) Please tick if you sell:   
a.  Eggs for eating     [ ] 
b.  Fertile eggs for hatching   [ ] 
  (B) Please describe where you sell these eggs: ……………………… 
  (C) Please tick if you buy:   
a.  Eggs for eating     [ ];  
b.  Fertile eggs for hatching    [ ] 
  (D) Please describe where you buy these eggs from: …………………… 
   
14.  Fighting cocks and songbirds. 
  (A) Do you own fighting cocks?   Yes [ ]     No [ ]  
a.  If yes, to Q 14(A) Where did you buy the fighting cocks from…… 
b.  If  yes  to  14(A),  have  your  fighting  cocks  competed  in  any 
competitions? 
a.  Yes     [ ];  
b.  No     [ ];  
c.  Don‘t know   [ ] 
d.  If  yes to  Q 14(A)(ii), how often do  you take  your fighting 
cock to a cock fighting competitions? Once  
every____days/weeks/months 
c.  Do you know in which sub district or village competitions are usually 
held?  
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    (B) Do you own songbirds?    Yes [ ]   No [ ]  
    If yes, what species of songbirds do you have and how many?................. 
 
15.  Poultry waste (manure, litter and feathers, other part of poultry that are 
not eatable)  
  Please describe what you do with poultry manure and litter and feathers 
after birds are slaughtered? 
a.  Throw outside house        [ ] Please specify where…& 
distance from house:… 
b.  Bury or compost       [ ]  
c.  Burn               [ ]  
d.  Spread onto fields      [ ]  
e.  Spread around house garden    [ ] 
f.  Leave where it is      [ ] 
g.  Other          [ ] Please explain:… 
 
16.  Cleaning cages (if farmers keep poultry in cages or sheds).  
(A) How often are poultry cages or sheds in your household cleaned or  
  washed? 
a.  Every week        [ ] 
b.  Every month        [ ] 
c.  Less often than once a month   [ ] 
d.  Never          [ ] 
  (B) Please specify if any chemicals are used for cleaning or washing? 
 
 V  Wild birds. 
Now, I would like to ask some questions about wild birds near your household. 
17.   Do you see wild birds within your household or farm? Yes [ ];No [ ] 
a. If yes, do you know which type of birds? Common name: …………… 
b. Please specify month(s) these wild birds are present:…………………… 
c. About how many wild birds are present each time?  
a.  <10      [ ];  
b.  Up to 50    [ ];  
c.  50 – 200   [ ];  
d.  More than 200 [ ] 
d.  Have  you  seen  wild  birds  mix  or  come  close  (several  metres)  to  your 
poultry? Yes [ ];   No [ ] 
e. Has  there  been  any  unusual  behaviour  in  these  wild birds  e.g.  sick  or 
deaths  Yes [ ]; No [ ] 
f. If  unusual  behaviour,  when  was  such  incident  and  please  describe  the 
incident ………………………………………………………. 
   
VI  Poultry disease.   
Now, I would like to ask some questions about your experience with poultry 
diseases 
18. What are the names of common poultry diseases in your own village? List: 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
19.    (A) Have your poultry/birds had any of the following diseases in the 
last few years?  
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a.  Newcastle disease          [ ] 
b.  Other poultry/bird diseases, if known Please specify:…………… 
c.  No disease in last few years        [ ] 
d.  Don‘t know            [ ] 
(B) If (a)  or (b) above,  please explain how you knew it was  Newcastle 
disease or another disease? 
 
20.  Have any of your poultry/birds had any of the following problems in the 
last few years?  
a.  Sudden death    Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
b.  Blue combs      Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
c.  Blue wattles      Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
d.  Difficult breathing   Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
e.  Trembling       Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
f.  Diarrhoea       Yes [ ];No [ ]; Don‘t know  [ ] 
 
21.  If yes to Q19(A)(a) or Q20, can you recall 
a. Which year and month did the birds get sick? ............................................ 
b. How many were sick? Complete the following table 
 
Species  Total poultry sick # heads  Total 
Chicks 
(1-3 
months) 
Cockerels* 
(young male 
3-12 
months) 
Pullets* 
(young 
hens 3 to 
12 
months) 
Cocks 
>12 
months) 
Hens 
>12 
months 
Village chickens             
Ducks             
Muscovy             
Fighting cocks             
Other             
c.  How many died? Complete the following table 
Species  Total poultry died # heads  Total 
Chicks 
(<3 
months) 
Cockerels 
(young  males 
3-12 months) 
Pullets 
(young 
hens  3  to 
12 
months) 
Cocks 
>12 
months) 
Hens 
>12 
months 
Village 
chickens 
           
Ducks             
Muscovy             
Fighting cocks             
Other             
 
d. What were the clinical signs…………………………………… 
e. How long after you noticed your chicken(s) were sick did it (they) die?....... 
     f. Which birds were affected e.g. chickens, ducks? ………………… 
g. How many were sick, how many died, and how many birds remained 
alive?  
Sick:………………Died:……………………........Remained alive:................ 
h. What did you do with the sick birds? ……………….................................. 
i. What did you do with the dead birds? ………………...................................  
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j. What did you do with the remaining live birds? ……………….................. 
 
22.  Reporting poultry diseases. 
(A)  If  your  poultry/birds  were  sick  or  dead,  would  you  report  it 
immediately to an authority?  
  Yes [ ];  No [ ];  Don‘t know [ ] 
  (B) If yes in (A), to whom would you report? (tick as applicable) 
a.  Village livestock workers (VLWs)      [ ] 
b.  Local authority (village or community leaders)  [ ] 
c.  Government veterinarian          [ ] 
d.  Neighbors, friends or relatives      [ ] 
e.  Other: please specify……………………………….. 
 
23.  (A) Have there ever been any outbreaks of poultry disease in your village?  
  Yes [ ];  No [ ];  Don‘t know [ ] 
(B)  If  yes  in  (23A),  can  you  recall  (as  detailed  as  possible)  when  the 
outbreak occur and what happened? ………….………………………… 
   
VII  Vaccination 
Now,  I  would  like  to  ask  some  questions  about  vaccination  of  your 
poultry/birds. 
24.   (A) Have your poultry/birds been vaccinated for any diseases?   
a.  Yes       [ ] Please specify for what disease:____  
b.  No        [ ];   
c.  Don‘t know     [ ]   
 
  (B) Have your poultry/birds been vaccinated for ND? 
a.  All vaccinated     [ ], how many…… 
b.  Only some vaccinated   [ ], how many…… 
c.  None vaccinated    [ ] 
d.  Don‘t know      [ ] 
 
(C) If not all poultry/birds vaccinated in (B), please describe which birds 
were not vaccinated (e.g. ducks, chicken etc)? ........................... 
 
(D) If not all poultry/birds were vaccinated in (B), why not? 
Do not read answers. Encourage respondent to answer  
a.  Vaccines not available        [ ] 
b.  Vaccines not enough          [ ] 
c.  Vaccinator did not come        [ ] 
d.  Difficult to catch birds        [ ] 
e.  Inconvenient to bring birds for vaccination    [ ] 
f.  Other: please explain fully……………………………… 
 
(E) If poultry/birds vaccinated for ND, how many doses/drops did each 
bird receive?  
  One [ ];  Two [ ];   Three [ ];  Other: please specify:……………… 
 
  (F) If poultry/birds vaccinated for ND, when were the vaccinations carried  
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               out in the past 12 months? (as exact date as possible)............... 
  (G) Please indicate who performed the vaccinations? ……………………. 
(H)  If  you  vaccinate  birds  yourself,  where  did  you  obtain  the  vaccine 
from? 
   
VIII  Disease risks. 
Now,  I  would  like  to  ask  some  questions  about  your  views  on  the  risks  of 
poultry having diseases. 
25.  What factors do you think pose a risk of your poultry becoming sick?  
  Do not read answers. Encourage respondent to answer. (Tick all that are 
applicable)  
a.  New poultry             [ ] 
b.  New eggs            [ ] 
c.  People, equipment and vehicles entering household [ ] 
d.  Wild birds near household        [ ] 
e.  Fighting cocks           [ ] 
f.  Paddy ducks            [ ] 
g.  Contaminated feed          [ ] 
h.  Contaminated water sources        [ ] 
i.  Neighbours‘ poultry          [ ] 
j.  Other (please specify): ………………………………………. 
 
26.  What do you see as necessary to prevent or control poultry disease? 
Do not read answers. Encourage respondent to answer. (Tick all that are 
applicable)  
a.  Early disease detection in poultry/birds         [ ] 
b.  Higher compensation for culled poultry       [ ] 
c.  Clean feed and water             [ ] 
d.  More education and awareness on disease prevention   [ ] 
e.  Safe source of poultry/birds           [ ] 
f.  Vaccines more easily available          [ ] 
g.  Better vaccines             [ ] 
h.  Someone to advise me when my birds are sick      [ ] 
i.  Control poultry movement from infected areas     [ ] 
j.  Reduce contact between my birds & other households    [ ] 
k.  Regular visits from veterinary department        [ ] 
l.  Other (please specify): ………………………………… 
 
IX  Disease awareness 
Now, I would like to ask some questions about bird flu in general. 
27.  Have you heard of bird flu? a. Yes  [ ],  b No [ ] 
28. Where did you learn the most about Bird flu? (tick all that are applicable) 
  a.  Village livestock workers    [ ] 
  b.  Veterinarians             [ ] 
  c.  Village or community leaders    [ ] 
  d.  Radio & Television      [ ] 
  e.  Newspapers        [ ] 
  f.  Pamphlets/brochure/poster    [ ] 
  g.  Neighbours        [ ]  
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  h.  Friends          [ ] 
  i.  Family          [ ] 
  j.  Wholesalers or dealers       [ ] 
  k.  Other:   Please specify:………........... 
 
29.  Please explain what you would do if you suspected your poultry/birds had 
Bird flu? 
  Do not read answers. Encourage respondent to answer. (Tick all that are 
applicable) 
a. Treat myself       [ ] Type of medications used……. 
b. Throw dead birds away (where?):……………………… 
c. Eat sick birds ourselves & share with friends   [ ] 
d. Feed birds to other animals   [ ] ,what animals?........ 
e. Give away         [ ], to who?............................. 
f. Sell birds        [ ], which market?.................. 
g. Bury birds        [ ] 
h. Burn birds        [ ] 
i. Report immediately to authority  [ ] 
j. Do nothing        [ ] 
k. Other: please specify………………………. 
 
30.  How are you currently preventing you and your family from getting Bird 
flu? 
Do not read answers. Encourage respondent to answer. (Tick all that are 
applicable)  
  a. Not eat poultry that fall sick or die        [ ] 
  b. Not eat poultry that die          [ ] 
  c. Eat only well-cooked poultry or eggs      [ ] 
  d. Bury dead poultry            [ ] 
  e. Burn dead poultry            [ ] 
  f. Wash hands with soap after handling poultry or manure  [ ] 
  g. Change clothes after handling poultry or manure    [ ]   
  h. Not letting children play with poultry      [ ] 
  i. Disinfect household regularly        [ ] 
  j. Do nothing              [ ]  
  k. Other: please specify:…………………………………………………..  
246 
 
Appendix 6: Questionnaire for quantification of risk of 
entry  
Questionnaire of experts‘ opinion for modelling the likelihood of HPAI entry and 
establishment in Timor Leste. 
 
Respondents details  
Name  : 
Position  : 
Address  : 
Phone    : 
Mobile  : 
FAX  : 
E-mail  : 
 
There are three sections (A, B and C) in this questionnaire. Please respond to 
relevant areas of expertise. Section A is for BPU, Section B is for Quarantine 
staff and Section 3 is for veterinarians. 
 
Section A: for Border police Unit (BPU) only 
1.  According to  your opinion,  approximately how many smugglers  are  doing 
business in your areas of patrol? 
a.  The minimum of………….... 
b.  The average of……………… 
c.  Maximum…………………... 
d.  If  you score  yourself on the accuracy of  your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
2. According to your opinion, what is the number of chickens smuggled by each 
smuggler? 
a.  The minimum of…………….. 
b.  The average of………………. 
c.  The maximum of…………….. 
d.  If  you score  yourself on the accuracy of  your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
3. According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the  probability  of  the  BPU  detecting 
smuggled chickens? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total smuggled 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total smuggled 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total smuggled 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5  
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4. According to your opinion, what is the probability of smuggled chickens being 
confiscated? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total smuggled 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total smuggled 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total smuggled 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
5. According to your opinion, what is the probability of submitting confiscated 
smuggled chickens being submitted to quarantine? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total confiscated 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total confiscated 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total confiscated 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
 
Section B for quarantine staff only 
6. What is the probability of you destroying smuggled chicken submitted by 
BPU? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total submitted 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total submitted 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total submitted 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
 
Section C: for veterinarians only 
7. According to your opinion, what is the Avian Influenza prevalence in chickens 
in NTT?  
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total smuggled 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total smuggled 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total smuggled 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
8. According to your opinion, what is the probability of smuggled chickens being 
released with local chickens? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%) of total smuggled 
b.  The average of……………….(%) of total smuggled 
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%) of total smuggled 
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5  
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9. According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the  probability  of  smuggled  chickens 
infecting other local birds? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%)  
b.  The average of……………….(%)  
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%)  
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5 
 
10. According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the  probability  of  smuggled  chickens 
being used for consumption? 
a.  The minimum of……………..(%)  
b.  The average of……………….(%)  
c.  The maximum of…………..…..(%)  
d.  If you score yourself about the accuracy of your answers above, one 
being  the  lowest  to  five  being  the  highest,  what  would  you  score 
yourself, (please circle)…..1/2/3/4/5  
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